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PREFACE
Jose Ortega y Gasset, offtimes like Don Quixote, 
has the proportions of a hero. In the Quixotic theme, 
Ortega jousted with his environment and sought to achieve 
a humanization of his surroundings whereby a "world" 
could be made of them. And, in this conflict, there was 
always the meaningless and the absurd weighing upon him 
and seeking to smother the breath from his aspirations 
and projects. Framed within this context, within the 
permanent, always undecided life struggle of which 
Quixote is a symbol, a presentation is made of Ortega y 
Gasset's political thought. Albeit on a more modern 
and political plain than that ridden over by the ancient 
Manchegan, the probings into the multiple dimensions of 
man by Ortega can be as provoking as those presented so 
long ago by Miguel de Cervantes.
To take upon oneself the responsibility of pre­
senting Ortega's ideas on politics, without his leave or 
warrant, opens avenues to accusations of presumptuousness 
and audaciousness. The writer does not deny that the 
task was approached with enthusiasm and verve; yet a 
restraint is employed throughout the study by having
ii
Ortega speak for himself whenever possible. Also, where 
it has been necessary to use logical processes to project 
his thought, the writer*s attitude has been that of "being 
positive with caution." The occasional modesty of tone, 
however, will not minimize the importance of the conclu­
sions reached —  it is believed the over-all study will 
speak for itself.
Beyond the challenge of extracting and presenting 
the political ideas of Ortega y Gasset, which has been 
in itself a quest of an amor intellectualis, it is hoped 
that some contribution is made toward refuting a too 
familiar assumption in Western civilization! the leyenda 
negra in general but especially the belief that Spain 
has yet to produce a modern, first-class, philosophical 
mind. This "black legend," having its origin partly in 
the consequences of the Protestant Reformation and resul­
ting in the treatment of Spanish civilization in a 
derogatory fashion, has been under serious attack in 
more recent times. It is sincerely desired that this 
presentation will add in some small way to the growing, 
permanent testimony in refutation of the myth, and further, 
that Jose Ortega y Gasset will be accorded his proper 
place among the pioneers of modern, Western thought.
Research material relative to the study and its 
related topics were found to be available in several 
language editions. Reliance was, however, on those
published in English and Spanish. The English works were 
of two types: translations of Ortega's primary works,
articles, and lectures; and analytical studies concern­
ing various aspects of his writings, for example, his 
philosophy, historical methodology, or particular view 
of a cultural subject. At present, there is no compre­
hensive study of Ortega's political thought, and many of 
his essays and lectures with political content have not 
been translated into English. Whenever possible, extant 
and quality translations have been used but reliance 
upon Spanish editions was essential.
Even In his native language, there is a contin­
uing compilation and publication of Ortega y Gasset's 
writings. The various editions of works appearing in 
the Obras completas (Complete Works), begun in 1932 and 
now expanded to some eleven volumes, are still deficient 
in a number of essays and lectures. That Spanish 
politics is responsible for this lack can only be sus­
pected, and whether or not any future release of unpub­
lished material will have relevance to this study is 
not known.
Bibliographical comprehensiveness in English and 
Spanish, therefore, is not presently possible and this 
study makes no such pretense. A wealth of material is 
available, however, and research efforts have shown it 
to be sufficient to encourage rather than to deter the
Vefforts of the writer, and to be as well within his 
linguistic abilities. There is the ever inherent 
problem of thought transmission in proper context 
from one language to another. Yet, the possibilities 
of substantive errors by the writer have been lessened 
through the assistance of the Spanish Departments at 
Spring Hill College and Southwestern at Memphis.
Where an error occurs, it is the sole responsibility 
of the writer.
In the encouragement of this endeavor, I am 
most grateful to the Department of Political Science 
at Louisiana State University. Acknowledgement is 
given to Professor Allan Richards for suggesting the 
topic, and his sound advice on numerous occasions. To 
the dissertation director, Professor Rene deVisme 
Williamson, is expressed my deepest appreciation. His 
scholarly example, never failing kindness, and cherished 
friendship have immeasurably lightened the task. Recog­
nition is also accorded to my wife, Mrs. Harriet Sweetser, 
whose patience and cheerful companionship throughout my 
academic pursuits have often been severely taxed but 
thankfully have never waivered.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET
by
Wilmer Albert Sweetser
From the time of Plato's Republic to the present, 
philosophers concerned with and seeking an understanding 
of man as a political being have advanced numerous 
theories relative to this condition and its implications. 
Unlike the Republic of Plato, the Leviathan of Hobbes 
and the Social Contract of Rousseau, there is no work 
containing the political thought of Jose Ortega y Gasset —  
a twentieth century, Spanish author-philosopher who died 
in 1955* Although a voluminous writer, Ortega wrote no 
such work, nor has there been any attempt by others to 
bring his ideas on politics together in an organized 
manner. Research, however, has indicated that diffused 
throughout a lifetime of numerous and varied writings are 
the basic concepts whereby an Ortegan political philosophy 
may be constructed. The purpose of this study is, there­
fore, to present Ortega's political thought within the 
framework of a value theory. As such, the primary concern 
is not with any set of laws or generalizations established
viii
by scientific techniques with a scientific rigor. Rather, 
it is a selective compilation of the ideas of a modern 
philosopher into a system of moral principles and norms 
that should regulate human behavior -- standards that are 
especially relevant to judging what is ethical, moral 
and just in political life.
To give the presentation of Ortega's ideas a 
coherence, the quality of being logically integrated, the 
deductive approach is employed with the overall format 
proceeding from the general to the particular -- from 
Ortega's given principles to their necessary conclusions. 
Within this format, three methods are used: the his­
torical; the philosophical; and the comparative. The 
historical method lends itself to Chapter II, and 
covers those biographical and bibliographical aspects 
pertinent to a general understanding of Ortega's life 
and major publications. The philosophical method, 
essentially deductive in character, begins with an 
examination of Ortega's basic postulates, or "first 
principles," and seeks to explain, through logical 
processes, the Ortegan philosophy of politics with 
specific reference to his:
a. theory of knowledge (Chapter III);
b. concepts of man and society (Chapter IV);
c. theory of the select minority (Chapter V);
d. existentialism (Chapter VI); and
e. concepts on the State and role of government 
(Chapter VII).
Allied with and an expansion of the historical 
method, the comparative method is employed throughout 
the study as an auxiliary means of clarification. By 
comparing the essentials of Ortega’s philosophy of 
politics with those of other political philosophers a 
better comprehension is sought.
The final section, Chapter VIII, is primarily 
inductive and conclusions warranted by the particulars 
of the study are given. There, the position is taken 
that the political thought of Ortega y Gasset ends with 
"expectations unfulfilled." Yet, rather than invali­
dating the study, there is the belief that his ideas 
provide a comprehension of the modern mentality, and 
especially an understanding of the political philosophy 
of Individualism in the twentieth century. The study, 
then, is not only important to the student of politics, 
but also of significance to the sociologist and psychol­
ogist. Even where Ortega’s solutions are incomplete in 
resolving the problems raised through his probings into 
the multiple dimensions of man, there is the provocative 
stimulation of the reader to continue the search for those 
values whereby modern man can understand and protect 
himself from governmental systems threatening to destroy 
the human personality.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is the presentation of 
the political thought of Jose Ortega y Gassett -- a twen­
tieth century, Spanish author and philosopher who died in 
1955* As a "philosophy of politics," it is essentially 
the study of a value theory.^  It does not, therefore, 
deal with any set of laws or generalizations established 
by scientific techniques with a scientific rigor. Rather, 
it is the selective compilation of the ideas of a modern 
philosopher into a general framework of moral principles 
and norms that should regulate human behavior -- standards 
that are especially relevant to judging what is ethical, 
moral and just in political life.
With this distinction, the study places Ortega y 
Gasset in the position of a value theorist. His ideas
1. Distinctions between "value" and "causal" theo­
ries are discussed in : David Easton, The Political System:
An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (NewYork* 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 52. See also: William A.
Glaser, "The Types and Uses of Political Theory," Social 
Research, Vol. 22, Autumn, 1955* PP* 286-290; and Arnold 
Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-
Century Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1959). PP* ^-9*
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on the nature of knowledge, of man and of society are 
examined in relation to his ethical premises and postu­
lates, And, how he answers questions on the purpose 
of the State; the justification of political power; the 
demarkation between human liberty and governmental . = • 
authority; and the manner in which political power ought 
to be used and its limitations are presented. In that 
the political thought of Ortega is concerned with ends 
or final values, his concepts will not be empirically 
verifiable. The resolution of this problem will depend 
either upon an agreement with the Spanish philosopher’s 
premises, or upon whether there is any value in the study 
of "the seamless robe of philosophy speaking with a social 
[and political] emphasis."
From the time of Plato's Republic to the present,
philosophers concerned with and seeking an understanding
of man as a political being have advanced numerous theo-
3
ries relative to this condition and its implications.
2. George Catlin, "Political Theory * What Is It?" 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXIII, March, 1957» 
p. 12.
3* The position that man is by nature a "political" 
being presents two possible questions: First, the histor­
ical process whereby he became political; and secondly, 
the philosophical position, the rationalization, that 
he is by nature thus. Although there is evidence that 
certain States have an historical basis, coming into 
existence in time and place by conquest, kinship, or 
compact, an exact and empirical substantiation has not 
been applicable to man per se. The traditional Greek- 
Christian concept, the one subscribed to by the writer, is
Unlike the Republic of Plato, the Leviathan of Hobbes and 
the Social Contract of Rousseau, there is no work con­
taining the political thought of Ortega y Gasset. Ortega 
himself wrote no such work, nor has there been any attempt 
by others to bring his ideas together in an organized 
manner. Research, however, has indicated that diffused 
throughout a lifetime of numerous and varied writings 
are the basic concepts whereby an Ortegan philosophy 
of politics may be constructed.
A justification of this particular effort could 
be in the task itself -- the compilation of the ideas 
of the Spanish intellectual leader and spokesman for 
governmental reform into a systematic treatise of 
political thought. There are, however, several other, 
more cosmopolitan benefits to be derived from the effort. 
First, the political concepts of Ortega y Gasset did 
not come from an intellectual vacuum. During his life, 
the drama of politics in Spain, in Europe, and in the 
world was being played within the setting of an inter­
national society which sought solutions to the problems 
resulting from: World War I; the collapse of empires;
the rise of Fascism and Communism; the failure of the 
League of Nations; World War II; the formation of the
that politics, as ancient as man's history, has its basis 
in human nature and is necessary to his existence and 
development.
United Nations; and the ideological struggles of the
"Cold War.” Much of Ortega's political thought is the
result of these conflicts within and between political
communities proposing alternatives, and they were most
often conflicts between the is and the ought to be. Yet,
because Ortega's writings are framed within a context of
time, situation analysis, and important as "era” studies
are to the historian, some additional answers are needed
to answer charges that the study might be: outdated and
otherworldly; intellectually and ethically sterile; or
A
permeated by a Spanish parochialism.
There is partial substance in the accusation that 
a study of this type suffers from an "intellectual and 
ethical preoccupation.” In defense, the position is 
taken that such an effort never is unwarranted, nor is 
it outdated or otherworldly. It is Ortega's concern for 
the crucial, moral questions in political society which 
enables him to treat with a human constant -- the ethical 
dimensions of man. If the "scientist,” or the "empiri-
4. A summation of the various criticisms of the 
study of political philosophy appears in: Arnold S. 
Kaufman, "The Nature and Functions of Political Theory,” 
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LI, 195^> P* 5*
5. This agrees with John H. Hallowell's position 
in Main Currents in Modern Political Thought (New York: 
Holt, I953). P* 8. He states that ethics and man's 
political acts have been intimately related throughout 
history. See also: J. Messner, Social Ethics: Natural
Law In the Modern World (St. Louis: B, Herder, 1952),
5cist,” does not recognize the ethical positing, then a 
second justification is made.
The question is asked: Can there be any agreement
to the consideration of Ortega's political thought as an 
art? By this is meant: Do Ortega's ideas represent a
handbook on the processes of governing to be. consulted 
by those persons seeking instructions for the governance 
of States? But, this is an unstable position to argue, 
for the historical situation in which the politician of 
practice has to act is always unique by reason of envi­
ronmental dynamics. Even should the politician succeed 
in eliciting a system from the works of a bygone writer, 
it inevitably would be a system more applicable to an age 
already past. Thus, if man acting politically can neither 
be guided, nor ordered, by a knowledge of past principles, 
and this seems irrational, what is the most stable justi­
fication for the study of Ortega y Gasset's political 
thought? The defense must be based upon more than an
pp. 213-220; and Henry J. Schmandt and Paul G. Stein- 
bicker, Fundamentals of Government (Milwaukee: Bruce,
1963), P. 16.
6. Eugene J. Meehan, The Theory and Method of 
Political Analysis (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey, 1935)»
p"! k-7, states that the political "scientist's” approach 
is value free. By this he implies that if the "scientist" 
can treat observed expressions of values as data, he 
cannot, qua scientist, express a preference for one set 
of values in preference to another. The political sci­
entist might not expel philosophical theory from the 
field, but, because of the problem of quantitative meas­
urement, he would question its importance.
academic interest, for this, only by itself, would be a 
low estimate of its usefulness, and if this were the 
reason, there would be little value in studying any past 
political philosophies.
The primary justification of this particular study 
is as follows: If the concepts contributing to the
political thought of Jose Ortega y Gasset are so closely 
tied to the conditions of the era in which they were 
developed, how can they have relevance to present, or to 
future conditions?? This discrepancy is the keystone 
of Ortega’s importance to the student of politics. It is 
through the assistance of contrast with other civiliza­
tions, past and present, that the student is made aware 
that the principles upon which his civilization is found­
ed are distinct and unique. So, one's own civilization 
is distinct, and others are foreign? No! The ’•others"
—  Jose Ortega y Gasset among them —  are representations 
of stages in political thought of which the present 
stands as a temporary terminus. Ortega's philosophy of 
politics is, therefore, a manifestation of western
O
civilization which is not foreign.
7. Robert G. McCloskey, "American Political 
Thought and the Study of Politics," American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 51» March, 1957» P* 115* examines 
this problem in regards to political philosophy in general.
8. The study of politics, political philosophy being 
within its scope, has recently been espoused as the "master" 
of all studies dealing with the community of man. See:
Historical and concerned with ethics as it is, 
Ortega's political thought gives comprehension to and 
acquaintance with the modern mentality —  to an under­
standing of man in the twentieth-century. There is the 
belief that this study, then, is not only important to 
the student of politics, but also of significance to the 
sociologist and the psychologist. Even where Ortega's 
solutions are incomplete in resolving the problems raised 
through his probings into the multiple dimensions of man,
there is the provocative stimulation of the reader to
g
search for his own answers.
To give the presentation of Ortega's ideas a 
coherence, the quality of being logically integrated, 
the deductive approach is employed with the over-all 
format proceeding from the general to the particular —
James K. Pollack, “The Primacy of Politics," American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 5^* March, 1951» P» 15»
This "modern" view was earlier expressed by Aristotle in 
the fourth-century B.C. Notei Introduction to Aristotle, 
ed. Richard McKeon (New Yorks The Modern Library, 19^7), 
p. 309. The place of political philosophy in the field of 
political science is stated ins Goals for Political 
Science, ed. (New Yorks William Sloane, 1951)» P^> 102; 
and William Ebenstein, "Toward International Collaboration 
in Political Science," American Political Science Review, 
Vol. ii-2, December, 19^8, p. 1186.
9. Beyond the mere acceptance of any political 
philosophy, complete or not, there is the continuing need 
for critical self-analysis to define and defend one's 
own philosophical position. See» David G. Smith,
"Political Science and Political Theory," American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 51» September, 19571 7
from Ortega's given principles to their necessary con­
clusions. Within this format, three methods are usedi 
the historical; the philosophical; and the comparative.^ 
The historical method lends itself to Chapter II, and 
covers those biographical and bibliographical aspects 
pertinent to a general understanding of Ortega's life 
and major publications.
The philosophical method, essentially deductive 
in character, begins with an examination of Ortega's 
basic postulates, or "first principles," and seeks to 
explain, through logical processes, the Ortegan philoso­
phy of politics with specific reference to hisi
a. theory of knowledge (Chapter III);
b. concepts of man and society (Chapter IV);
c. theory of the select minority (Chapter V);
d. existentialism (Chapter VI); and
e. concepts on the State and role of government 
fChapter VII).
Allied with and an expansion of the historical method, 
the comparative method is employed throughout the study 
as an auxiliary means of clarification. By comparing 
the essentials of Ortega's philosophy of politics with
10. The techniques of these methods are.described 
in; William Leo Lucy, History; Methods and Interpre­
tations (Worcester; Holy Cross University Press, 19^ 4-8), 
and Wilson Gee, Social Science Research Methods (New 
York; Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950).
those of other political philosophers a better compre­
hension is sought.11
The final section, Chapter VIII, is primarily 
inductive and conclusions warranted by the particulars 
of the study are given. There, the position is taken that 
the political thought of Ortega y Gasset ends with "expec­
tations unfulfilled." Yet, rather than invalidating the 
study, it is an encouragement toward a deeper understand­
ing of the philosopher. There still exists a vast amount 
of his unpublished materials: lectures, lecture notes,
and comments on his readings of other authors; personal
correspondence; and letters and memoirs of close associ-
12ates and co-workers. From these sources could be
11. Methods not used are the legal-juridical and 
the socio-psychological or behavioral. The various uses 
of the latter are found in; Albeit Somit and Joseph 
Tanenhaus, The Development of Political Science: From
Burgess to Behavioralism CBoston: Allyn and Bacon, 196?),
and Changing Perspectives in Contemporary Political 
Analysis, ed. Howard Ball and Thomas P. Lauth, Jr. (Engle­
wood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, 197.1). Criticisms 
of this method are in: Essays on the Scientific Study of
Politics, ed. Herbert J. Storing (New York; Holt, Rine­
hart and Winston, 1962). The former method, treating with
public law and the formal organization of government, is
not applicable to this type of study.
12. The quantity and quality of this material is
difficult to ascertain. What exists is held by the
Spanish government, and it has been made available for 
publication only in a piecemeal fashion.^  Several studies 
on Ortega note this problem. See: Jose Ortega y Gasset,
What is Philosophy, "Translator's Preface," trans. Mildred 
Adams~TNew York: W. W. Norton, 1964); Christian Ceplecha,
The Historical Thought of Jose Ortega ^ Gasset (Washington;
X U
obtained a better understanding of the origin of his
ideas, and some knowledge of his evolving concepts in
relation to the personal problems of his life. This
presentation, however, is limited to the published writings
of Ortega, and only the instances where he acknowledges
13the influences of others is noted. J
In summation, the purpose of this introductory 
chapter has been to point backward and to point forward. 
Backward in the sense that what is attempted is a par­
ticular presentation which has not been previously under­
taken, and forward in that the endeavor makes a contri­
bution to an understanding of the modern political men­
tality. The scope of the study is defined, and the methods 
employed toward that end in each of the following chapters 
are also described. Within each chapter are two refer­
ence pointsi the central theme of the chapter and the 
relationship of the chapter to the over-all study. The 
last chapter brings the entire effort together and presents
Catholic University Press, 1958), p. xii and p. 16?; and 
George Tyler Northrup, An Introduction to Spanish Litera­
ture, 3rd. ed. (Chicagos Chicago University Press"] i960), 
P. ^52.
13* Ortega, in his published works, recognizes 
especially the influences of Heraclitus, Henan, Kant, 
Bergson, Nietzche and Dilthey. The degree of each's 
influences is a controversial and intriguing subject.
See: Jose Sanchez Villasenor, Ortega £ Gasset Existen­
tialist : A Critical Study of His Thought and Its Sources,
trans. Joseph Small (Chicago: Henry Hegnery, 19^9T»
pp. 11-36.
11
the conclusions justified, by the material covered in the 
prior chapters.
Throughout the presentation, there is the balancing 
of circumspection with assertion. There are limitations 
in any study made on the ideas of another individual -- 
in effect, the attempt to speak for him. What is written 
does not suffer from complacency or timidity, but from 
the realization that the study of politics —  political 
philosophy -- is as dynamic as the men who make it.
Within these safeguards, there is the belief that the 
ideas of Jose Ortega y Gasset provide a valuable source 
of ethical norms whereby modern man can evaluate and 
resolve today's political problems.
CHAPTER II
ORTEGA* S LIFE AND WORKS
The December 1955 edition of the Wilson Library
Bulletin had among its obituaries the following notice:
October 18. JOSIS ORTEGA Y GASSET, Spanish writer 
and philosopher who was also a teacher, essayist, 
journalist, politician, and founder of several 
intellectual magazines; in Madrid; seventy-two. 
Revolt of the Masses, Toward a. Philosophy of 
History, Concord and Liberty, and Invertebrate 
Spain are among Senor Ortega's works translated 
into English that have had widespread interna­
tional circulation.1
To Spain, the death of Ortega presented the loss
of her most prominent literary figure of the first half
of the twentieth century, and an author considered by
2some to rank second only to Cervantes. Yet, this man 
of a five-fold career, variously termed the "Philosophical 
Pope of Spain," and the "refined humanist," was consid­
ered, with the exception of a small group of devotees, 
by those readers in the United States familiar with his 
name, to have been a man of one book -- The Revolt of
1. Vol. 30, p. 298.
2. David White, "One of the Twelve: The Life and 
Thought of Jose Ortega y Gasset," Religion In Life,
Vol. 25, Spring, 1956, p. 2*4-8.
12
3the Masses. Pre-eminent and as widely read as this one 
work was and although it was reviewed as a "truly original 
contribution to philosophy," it was generally unknown to the 
English speaking world the high intellectual status which 
had already been accorded to this voluminous author, not 
just by Spaniards, but by Europeans and Latin Americans as 
well. Ernst Robert Curtius, the German culturalist, has 
listed Ortega as one of the twelve peers of contemporary 
intellect, and the French, novelist-journalist Albert Camus 
wrote that "Ortega y Gasset, after Nietzsche, is perhaps the 
greatest 'European' writer."'* Displaying an unusual liter­
ary cosmopolitanism, it was the Wall Street Journal that 
hailed Ortega as having "rounded and co-ordinated . . . the 
material of Walter Lippman, Frank Simons, and Sir Arthur 
Salter."^ This comment by the Journal was, however, only
3» "A Great Doubter," Newsweek, Vol. 46, October 
31. 1955* P* 92£ quotes the labeling by litterateur- 
diplomatist, Senor Salvador de Madariaga. The article 
"The Cynical Mourner," Nation, Vol. 181, December 3. 1955* 
p. 470, lists among the group of prominent, American 
devotees such people as Mildred Adams, Waldo Frank, John 
Dos Passos, Henry R. Luce, and William Carlos Williams.
4. The description is quoted from Harry Lorin 
Binssee's review of The Revolt of the Masses, in "A 
Selected Shelf," The Bookman, Vol. 75* September, 1932,
P. 509.
5. Ernst Robert Curtius, "Ortega," Partisan Review, 
trans. Willard R. Trask, Vol. 17, March, 1950* PP* 259* 
Camus's quotation is taken from the frontispiece of 
Meditation on Quixote (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963)*
6. Mildred Adams, "Ortega y Gasset," Forum. Vol. 
90, December, 1933. P* 373*
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on the basis of the Revolt, and was shaded with an eco­
nomic bias.
One American writer, with a knowledge of Ortega's 
other works, has noted that his reading offers "a seedbed 
of ideas, anticipating or at least accompanying men such
9
as Spengler, Jaspers, Heidegger, and Toynbee." And, 
since his death, at least two publishing houses in the 
United States have had translated and have released an 
ever increasing number of his works. For a few years 
after his death, scholars and students presented post­
humous, analytical studies of some specialized aspect of
his writings. Still, even in the light of Ortega's
continued Influence and following in Spain, Europe and 
Latin America, the interest of the English speaking world 
in him remains narrowly restricted to those few in phi­
losophy, literature, and Hispanic studies with a very 
particular focus. There persists a general ignorance 
and a lack of appreciation for one of the most rewarding
minds of this century.
Mildred Adams has remarked in explanation of this 
regrettable phenomenon thati
. . . Ortega's introduction, in what ever guise, 
. . .  so long in coming . . . can be attributed 
only to the curious gulf which separates the 
United States from Spain. Had Senor Ortega with 
all his achievements, with his fame in Europe 
and South America, been a Frenchman, an Englishman,
7. White, ojo. cit., p. 248.
a German, his works would have been known here, 
.either in the original or the translation, long 
before this present day.
But Spain is a different matter. Only 
romanticists, more interested in the picturesque 
than the actual, go there of their own volition. 
Only men anxious to win South American trade read 
the language after they leave school. So this 
extraordinary individual who combines the skill 
of a philosopher, a teacher, a critic, an editor, 
a journalist, and a statesman . . . remains unknown 
to American readers . . . .
Before the presentation of Ortega's philosophy 
of politics, and in pursuit of some knowledge of the 
man, it appears, therefore, that an intermediate, bio­
graphical portrait is in order. This is not necessarily 
offered as any revelation of the origin of his ideas.
As intriguing as the sources of Ortega's thought might 
be, many difficulties are associated with the problem, 
and a great deal of controversy is attached to the issue. 
Bibliographical completeness also is not possible for 
there is no critical edition of Ortega's Obras Completas 
nor any comprehensive study of his papers, lectures, and 
personal library. Especially omitted are attempts to 
probe into Ortega's mental complexities which would 
indeed be presumptuous. What is given are those facts 
of his life as known, and the environmental circumstances 
which had a direct influence upon his writings.
Born in Madrid in 1883» Jose Ortega y Gasset was
8. Adams, pjo, clt. , p, 27^.
10
the son of a family distinguished in literature and 
q
politics. Privately tutored until the age of eight, 
he was reading and writing at the age of four, and when 
he was seven years old he is said to have memorized the 
first chapter of Don Quixote in the space of three hours.^ 
In 1897# the precocious youngster completed his secondary 
education at the Jesuit Colegio de Miraflores del Palo 
in Malaga with high honors. Following a year at the 
Internado de Deusto in Bilbao, Ortega entered the Universl- 
dad Central in Madrid and completed his formal education 
there in 1904. His course of studies had included law, 
literature and journalism but his primary interest was
9* George Tyler Northup, An Introduction to Spanish 
Literature (Chicago 1 Chicago University Press, i960),
'pi 450. Also,Christian Ceplecha in his The Historical 
Thought of Jose Ortega ^ Gasset (Washington: Catholic
University Press, 1958), pp. 1-2, give the following 
family information: His paternal grandfather, Jose
Ortega y Zapata held a position in the colonial govern­
ment of Cuba, his father, Jose Ortega y Munillo, at 
various times, was the editor of La Iberia, La Patria,
El Debate, El Parlamento. El Conservador and Los lunes 
del Imparcial; Ortega y Munillo also served for many 
years as a deputy in the Spanish Cortes. His mother's 
father was the founder of Los lunes del Imparcial, which 
was considered one of the most influential literary 
periodicals of the time.
10, Ceplecha, ojc. clt., p. 2.
11, The bachlllerato (B.A.) was granted by the 
Institute de Malaga in 1897; the licenciado (u-nlversitv 
graduate) by Universidad Central in 1902} and the docto- 
rado (Ph.D.) by Universidad Central in 1904. In the 
article "The Cynical Mourners," ojd. cit. , p. 470. it is 
stated that the Jesuits expelled Ortega from the Inter­
nado de Duesto for opposing the Spanish-American War . 
Ceplecha, ojd. cit., p. 3» has found no corroboration of
-J■ (
philosophy. Reflected in his first published article
in El Imparcial of March 14-, 190^, was a philosophical
preoccupation which was to permeate his many and varied
activities. With that article he was to consider his
12profession to be that of a philosopher.
The years 1905-1907 found Ortega at the Univer­
sities of Leipzig and Berlin where he heard lectures
13given by Riehl, Simmel, and Dilthey. J Also, he attended 
the University of Marburg in 1908 where he became acquain-
14
ted with Herman Cohen, the Neo-Kantian philosopher.
During these years, he occasionally wrote articles for 
both El Imparcial and a new, liberal publication, Faro.
The theme of his writings was the development of a twen­
tieth-century philosophy -- "to cultivate ideas, not 
reform customs; to make culture, not to urge morality.
this dismissal.
12. Ceplecha, op. cit., p. quotes from Joaquin 
Iriarte-Agirrezabal, Ortega £ Gasset, su persona su 
doctrlna (Madrids Editorial "Razon y fe,1 19^2), when 
he notes that Ortega says in his article that "our illu­
sion of free will, according to Spinoza, is no more than 
our ignorance of the causes that make us work," thus 
setting a tone for his future efforts.
13* Ibid., p. 5, Ortega was awarded a grant of 
^,500 pesetas from the Spanish government to study in 
Germany.
1^ -. Jose Sanchez Villasenor, Ortega y Gasset s 
Existentialist (Chicago: Henry Regenry, 19^9)» P. !•
15. Ceplecha, op. cit., p. 6.
It was also during his travels between Spain and 
Germany that Ortega received an appointment as "Profesor 
de la Escuela Superior del Magisterio" in Madrid, and 
his lectures began to reflect a criticism of the Spanish 
State. In this position, the twenty-five year old phi­
losopher found himself allied with a movement, the "Gener­
ation of I898," which was seeking a new Spanish Renais­
sance following the disastrous defeat by the United 
States in the Spanish-American War. With patriotic, 
intellectual, and artistic overtones, the movement recog­
nized that Spain had become destitute, and its leaders 
were determined to do something about it. The reforms 
advocated were multi-faceted with each individual supporter 
representing a particular aspect of the "Generation."
To some it meant a strengthening of national will; to 
others it meant a breaking with the past and a European­
ization of Spain; and to many there needed to be a re­
vitalization of education, of the arts, and of letters.
The politics of the group ranged from conservatism to 
socialism, and in religious postures from clericalism 
to anticlericalism and religious freedom. Yet, for all 
its divergencies, there was a community of purpose —  
the boss system, political jobbery, tyranny, and the 
ignorance of the great majority of the Spanish people 
had to be eliminated. Education was the primary solution, 
and seeking to start from the top the "effort was to
train devoted, intellectual leaders whose influence 
would penetrate to the masses." Spanish authors in 
their literary endeavors were to seek inspiration from 
contemporary European writers by orientating their works 
toward real life; and Spanish artists were to find their 
aesthetic delights in the warm pastoral beauties of 
Spain and not in cold portraiture of the past.
Although younger than most of the Generation of 
I898, Ortega was of a kindred spirit, and he both wrote 
and spoke in denouncing the poor conditions of Spanish 
life. Politically, he initially supported the Socialists 
in education he argued for the establishment of State 
supported, secular schools and the suppression of the 
Jesuit controlled colegios; and in religion he advocated 
toleration. Yet, Ortega, in his youthfulness, went 
beyond the Generation of '98. He may have allied himself 
with such movement leaders as Valle-Inclan, Azorin, 
Baroja, Maeztu, and Unamuno, but he sought to make Spain 
a vital part of liberal, humanist Europe, and raise 
both Spain and Europe to the "height of the times.
In his opinion, both were living in the past.
Following a visit to Italy and a return to Germany
16. Northrup, o£. cit., p. ^21.
17. Ceplacha, o£. cit., p. 13. The quotation is 
taken from "Prologo a la segunda edicion" of the 1922 
edition of Espana Invertebrada appearing in the Obras 
completas, Vol. IlT^  pp^  39-^0•
in 1911, Ortega seemed to have settled into the routine 
of his duties as Professor of the Chair of Metaphysics 
of the Universidad Central. Within three years, in 191^. 
he was to publish two works of major significance. The 
first, developed from a speech entitled Vieja £ nueva 
politica (Politics» 01-d and New), and delivered before
the League for Spanish Political Education, attacked the 
Spanish monarchy as decadent, the Socialists and Anar­
chists as too dogmatic, the Liberals as ineffective, and 
the Republicans as uncompromising. Ortega challenged the 
League to be experimental, to look for new social forms, 
and to support and adopt only those which would promote 
democracy and justice in Spain. No longer to be the 
strongholds of vested interests, the advent of a "new 
politics” meant that Spain's monarchy, army, clergy,
labor force, and educational system would become truly
1 Rnational in character.
The second work, a thin volume of essays given 
the title of Medltaciones del Quljote, was modestly 
introduced by the thirty-one year old teacher stating 
that:
Under the title of Meditations this first volume 
announces several essays on various subjects of 
no great consequence to be published by a professor 
of Philosophy in partibus infidelium. Some of
18. Jose Ortega y Gasset, "Vieja y nueva politica," 
Qbras completas (Ediciones De La Revista De Occidente, 
Madrid, 19^9). Vol. I, pp. 26?-308.
them, like this series of Meditations on Quixote, 
deal with lofty subjects; others with more modest, 
even humble subjects; but they all end by dis­
cussing Spanish "circumstances" directly or indi­
rectly. These essays are for the author -- like 
the lecture-room, the newspaper, or politics —  
different means of carrying on one single activity, 
of expressing the same feeling of affection. I 
do not claim that this activity should be recognized 
as the most important in the world; I consider 
myself justified when I observe that it is the 
only one of which I am capable. The devotion which 
moves me to it is the keenest one which I find 
in my heart. Reviving the fine name which Spinoza 
used, I would call it amor intellectualis. These 
are therefore essays in intellectual love. °
A German influence can be discerned in this early
collection, for along with the Roman, Ortega believes
German culture is one of the two main-streams of Western
thought. Europe's progress toward the modern era had
begun with the influx of the Germanic tribes into its
history. But, more important, Ortega employs a literary
method whereby he treats his meditations as "salvations."
Through this technique he looks ati
. . .  a man, a book, a picture, a landscape, an 
error, a sorrow -- to carry it by the shortest 
route to its fullest significance. . . . like 
the useless remains of a shipwreck, in such a 
position that the sun as it strikes them may give 
off innumerable reflections.20
By this interesting literary device, he explores ideas
of metaphysical depth, philosophical illumination,
Mediterranean culture, and the lethargies of Spain.
19. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Meditations on Quixote 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1963)* P« 31*
20. Ibid., pp. 31-32.
Ortega's position is one that is dissatisfied with mere
surfaces. He keys his search toward deeper meanings, and
in a somewhat Hegelian vein, he seeks to penetrate what
21he terms the ',concept.,
Significantly, it is also in this early work that 
his philosophical principle "I am myself plus my circum­
stances, and if I do not save it, I cannot save myself"
is advanced, and it becomes the fundamental "argument"
22which connects his various, individual meditations.
Rather than a series of independent theses, the book is
coherently connected and closely woven, Julian Marias
in his "Introduction" to Ortega's first work notes thati
The purpose is to meditate on Quixote, not 
through a whim, nor for pleasure only, nor even 
out of curiosity or the simple desire to know, 
but in order to know what we have to reckon with. 
This requires, first of all, to get out of oneself, 
and enter into what Ortega is going to call from 
now on the circumstance t "the mute things which 
are around us. '* That circumstance is primarily 
Spain. . . . Quixote represents for Ortega the key 
to Spanish reality, so problematical and contra­
dictory; in other words, the problem of its destiny
Continuing his journalistic activities, Ortega's
articles in El Imparcial appeared with regularity, and
in 1915 joining with Baroja, Azorin, Valle-Inclan and
Perez de Ayala was founded Espanat Seminarlo de la vida
21. Albert William Levi, "Shortest Route to Signif­
icance," Saturday Review, Vol. 44, June 24, 1961, p. 16.
I
22. Ortega y Gasset, ££. cit., p. 45.
23. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
nacional. Following a military revolt in Barcelona, he
published, an article in El Imparcial pointing to the
collapse of Spanish civil authority, and demanding the
2 Ucalling of a Cortes to draft a new constitution. As 
a result of criticism of the article by the paper's 
editor, Ortega left El Imparcial, and with several other 
writers founded the newspaper El Sol. This Madrid daily 
publication was to become very influential among Spanish 
intellectuals and the middle class as well. Its polit­
ical commentaries, often critical of the government, 
resulted in the newspaper's being suppressed on several 
occasions during the 1920's by the regime of Primo de 
Rivera. The editorials by Ortega in El Sol, however, 
did cover a wider variety of topics: Spanish pride,
castles, education, science, poetry, historiography, 
Hegel, Proust, architecture, and women. Through the 
popular means of a newspaper, the author was increase
ingly becoming an idol to a growing force of spirited
2 6and also anti-monarchical Spaniards.
Of further influence to the movement was his
2k, "Bajo el arco en ruina," Obras, Vol. XI,
pp. 265-268.
25. Ceplecha, ojd. cit., pp. 16-1?. Also, see 
Vincente R. Pilapil, Alfonso XIII (New York: Twayne, 
1969)# PP« 15^-173. for an analysis of the dictatorship 
of Rivera which lasted from 1923 to 1930.
26. "Intellectual's Horizon," Newsweek, Vol. 50i 
November 18, 19571 P« 13^.
second major work, Espana Invertebrada (Invertebrate
Spain) published in 1922. Intended as a critical survey
of four-hundred years of Spanish history, Ortega told
his readers in the "Preface" thatt
In working toward a solution of political problems, 
I do not think it entirely useless to place them 
in their proper historical perspective, and then 
to stand off at a distance and look at them.
Seen thus, they seem to clear of their own accord, 
and to take on the form and outline which best 
reveals their true reality.
Therefore the theme of these essays i®. 
historical, and not political. The judgements 
that concern groups and movements in modern Spain 
must not be taken as those of a combatant. They 
are the fruits of long and leisurely contemplation 
of the national scene. They have been directed by 
aspirations which are purely theoretic, and there­
fore without offense.27
It soon became evident, however, that Ortega had 
no intention of being a political non-combatant. Al­
though he begins the work with an analysis of the short­
comings of past Castilian leadership, an explosive thesis 
becomes quite clears
In a nation, when the mass refuses to be a mass —  
that is to say, when it refuses to follow the 
directing minority —  the nation goes to pieces, 
society is dismembered, and social chaos results.
The people as a people are disarticulated and 
become invertebrate.
In Spain we are now living in the midst of £g 
an extreme case of this historical invertebration.
He also sees the individualism of the Spaniard as having
27. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Invertebrate Spain, trans. 
Mildred Adams (New Yorki W. W. Norton, 1937)* P. 7»
28. Ortega y Gasset, ££. cit., p. 63*
degenerated, into anarchy which had been complicated by 
a collective manifestation in the various Spanish social 
groupings»
Spain is today not so much a nation as a series 
of water-tight compartments. . . . Each group 
lives hermetically sealed within itself. It 
feels not the slightest curosity about what 
happens to its fellow groups.29
It was this extreme form of class particularism
that Ortega believed was the major cause of the disasters
which had befallen Spain. The ability of Castile to
command and her force of arms had long ago brought Spain
unification and expansion, but never a national soundness.
After four-hundred years, the 1920's witnessed the nation
“not so much a people as a cloud of dust that was left
hovering in the air when a great people went galloping
30down the high road of history.1
Clearly, then, Invertebrate Spain marked an atti­
tude which distinguished Ortega from the Generation of 
1898. He sought to Europeanize Spain as opposed to 
Unamuno's “Spanish gospel,” and in this work, there was 
no obsession for the Spanish past. Included among those 
as unfit to lead were not only the masses but the rulers 
and servants of the monarchy. And, if his concept of an 
“Eminent minority” was adverse to democratic and social-
29. Ibid., pp. 44-45.
30. Ibid., p. 41.
istic movements, his intellectual liberalism would make
him a republican sui generis and an outspoken opponent
31of the Rivera dictatorship. This somewhat equivocal 
position would cause Ortega no little amount of conster­
nation in the early days of the Republic, and especially 
after his elite thesis of a "league of intellectuals" 
recieved additional amplification in his later publi­
cations.
For all of his many writings, Ortega had made no 
attempt to systematize his philosophical ideas, but in 
1923 he set about this task in the publication of El 
tema de nuestro tlempo (The Modern Theme). Based on a 
series of lectures presented at the University of Madrid 
during the 1921-1922 school year, and with a brilliant 
and penetrating insight, Ortega makes life the supreme 
value. By means of an attack upon the "pure reason" of 
Descartes and Kant which had so much been in vogue, the 
Spanish philosopher offers his "vital" or "historical" 
reason whereby the classical concept of Being is rejected 
as the principle of identity. In its place, "my life" 
becomes the point of departure for an understanding of 
reality. Ortega argues that: Rationalism had made
reason an absolute definitive for all life; that it had 
sacrificed all other values to itself by abstracting from
31. "Spanish Writing," Books Abroad, Vol. 27, 
No. 2, 1953. P. 124.
reality; and that real life had consequently been lost in 
the process. Far from being an irrationalist, Ortega 
seeks to give reason its proper place —  it is to be an 
instrument of living, not life itself. The new basis for 
understanding man, therefore, is not "being," a static 
and general term, but "life" with its drama, mission 
and vocation. The essential question for man thus becomes 
not "What am I?" but "Who am i?"-^
Elaborating on his earlier principle, "I am myself 
plus my circumstances," Ortega held that a person is not 
just his life within himself, he is one who lives with 
other selves, responsible to a context wider than himself, 
and, therefore to be understood only in that total context. 
The process of how one can know his life, vocation, or 
mission is "vital" or "historical" reason. Reason thus 
no longer treated life as a static abstraction but becomes 
subservient to dynamic and vital life, thereby inter­
preting reality and not dictating to it. Thus*
The modern theme comprises the subjection 
of reason to vitality, its localisation within 
the biological scheme, and its surrender to spon­
taneity, . . , Pure reason has. then to surrender 
its authority to vital reason.33
32. White, 0£. cit., p. 252.
33* Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Modern Theme (New 
York* Harper & Row, 1961), pp. 58-59* Ortega's thought 
is similar to that of Dilthey, Scheler, Cohen, Heidegger, 
and the existentialists. Yet, Ceplecha, ojd. cit. , p. 20, 
quotes a source implying that his thought, "seems to be 
rooted in a deep Spanish individualism for which man is
The publication of the 1932 work was almost simul­
taneous with his founding of a new magazine, Revista de 
Occidente. Soon to rank among the best of Europe’s intel­
lectual journals, it was to feature Spain's most prominent 
authors and poets —  Alberti, Espina, Jarnes, Lorca, 
Marichalar, Maranon, Morente and Vela. But, the Revista 
was also a method whereby European and other intellectual 
activities could be brought into Spain.
Sitting there in Madrid he reached out and garnered 
the seeds of culture wherever they matured -- 
French art, American astronomy, Pavloff's experi­
ments and Keyserling's philosophizing, English 
economics, Mexican and Russian statecraft -- and 
scattered them broadcast over his country.3^
By 1928, Ortega had become not only Spain's most
prominent literary personage but his publications were
enthusiastically received by audiences of students and
intellectuals throughout the Spanish-speaking areas of
the Western Hemisphere. International recognition would
be accorded to him, however, after the publication of
two works, La Rebelion de las masas (The Revolt of the
Masses) and Mlsion de la universidad (Mission of the
University), in 1930*
The Revolt, variously reviewed as a "truly original
contribution to philosophy," and as "one of those books
which must be taken into account by anyone who would
the supreme reality and the only subject of life and history. 
3^ . Adams, oj>. cit.. p. 375*
pretend to be conversant with the life of his time,"
received almost immediate, worldwide attention.  ^ In his
"Prefatory Note" Ortega statedi
In my book Espana Invertebrada, published in 1922, 
in an article in El Sol entitled "Masas" (1926), 
and in two lectures given to the Association of 
Friends of Art in Buenos Aires (1928), I have 
treated the subject developed in the present 
essay. My purpose now is to collect and complete 
what I have already said, so as to produce an 
organic doctrine concerning the most important 
fact of our time.3°
And, the "most important fact" was that European civili­
zation had been "vertically invaded" by a new phenomenon 
in human society —  a barbarian, mass-man. This new 
barbarian, the result of a vastly expanded population, 
was spoiled by modern conveniences, security, and all 
the other advantages of the twentieth century. Knowing 
nothing but what he liked, egocentric, immoral and without 
a philosophy, the mass-man was an intellectually lazy 
man, and one who had no real standards other than "opinion. 
His opinions and what he liked must, therefore, be what
everyone else must like for "to be different was to be 
37indecent."^ Further, anything having excellence, indi­
viduality, or quality —  any person or thing which was
35. Binssee, op. cit., p. 509*
36. Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, 
trans. anon. (New York* W. W. Norton, 1957)» P* 7»
37• "The Menace of the 'Mass Man'," The Literary 
Digest, Vol. 11^, September 3» 1932, p. 22.
different —  had to be crushed and eliminated. Typical 
manifestations of mass-men led by mass-mediocritles and 
examples of this retrogression of modern society were 
Fascism and Bolshevism; yet the menace of "vertical" 
invasion was universal, and the western democracies were 
also internally threatened. The solution to the cata­
strophe was for Europe collectively to engage in a great, 
unifying enterprise —  the building of Europe into a 
great, national State.^
Ortega thus explains the demoralized affairs of 
Europe and the world as due to an inversion of values 
with the masses refusing to allow themselves to be led. 
But, the directing minority had also defaulted by not 
knowing how to lead. There remained, then, a need for 
something more to be accomplished than a "European 
nationalization." The purpose of his next book, Mission 
of the University was to overcome the general culture 
of the barbarian mass-mind by replacing it with a "true" 
culture -- "the vital system of the ideas of a period,
As to the barbarian*s "new morality," Ortega wrotes
The great task of the present age, in the 
field of morality, is to convince common men 
(uncommon men never fell into the snare) of the 
inane foolishness which envelops this urge to
38. Ortega y Gasset, cit., p. 183. See also 
Jose Ortega y Gasset, "The Unity of Europe," Atlantic 
Monthly. Vol. 16?, April 1941, pp. 432-442.
39. The Revolt of the Masses, p. 42.
revolt and make them see the cheap facility, the 
meanness of it; even though we may freely admit 
that most of the things revolted against deserve 
to be buried away. The only true revolt is crea­
tion -- the revolt against nothingness. Lucifer 
is the patron saint of mere negativistic revolt.^0
These two works, The Revolt of the Masses and The 
Mission of the University, critical and dissatisfied with 
modern civilization as they were, contained no pointed 
suggestion as to the political philosophy through which 
reform could become possible. Speculation suggests that 
Ortega's taking an active role in Spanish politics tempo­
rarily posed a distraction to the completion of his 
philosophical efforts, for in January of 1930 the Rivera
regime collapsed and Ortega completely committed himself
in
to the movement for Spanish constitutional revision.
Under an indecisive monarch for nearly a year, the country 
struggled through a series of conciliatory attempts at 
constitutional monarchy, but a number of military muti­
nies and civil disorders finally resulted in the establish­
ment of martial law. During those troubled months,
Ortega continued his political articles, and joined with 
a number of Spanish intellectuals in the formation of a 
movement, La Agrupaclon al serviclo de la republlca (The 
League for Service to the R e p u b l i c . I n  the elections
^0. Ibid.
^1. Ceplecha, 0£. cit., p. 22.
4-2. Salvador de Madariaga, Spain; A Modern History
of June 28, 1931* the Agrupaclon, although not a political 
party per se, had fourteen of its members elected to the 
new Constituent Cortes with Ortega representing Leon.
The king, Alfonso XIII, having fled, the Agrupaclon 
stressed that its purpose was not revolutionary. What 
was sought was the construction of a republican system 
by means of a peaceful transition. When attacked by 
those advocating radical changes, the members of the 
League, however, refused to engage in any of the heated, 
partisan politics and vitriolic argumentation before the 
Cortes. It was in disillusionment, therefore, that 
Ortega resigned his seat, and with his fellow intellect­
uals disbanded the League by the end of 1931* In expla­
nation of his actions, it has been noted that»
Only men whose lives are spent in activities 
that are chiefly mental know how much of a sacri­
fice that entry into the daily details of politics 
meant. He and his fellow intellectuals —  Manuel 
Cossio . . . Gregorio Maranon . . . Perez de 
Ayala . . • Americo Castro \ even Unamuno himself —  
accepted government responsibility out of loyalty 
to an ideal that Americans well understand, just 
as they can understand the disillusionment that 
came with practical politics.^3
During the next four years, 1932-1936, Ortega
returned to his books and lectures, and such works as
Meditacion de la tecnloa (Meditation on Technique).
(New Yorki Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 379-380. 
43. Adams, ojd. cit., pp» 375-376.
J  J
Esquema de la crisis (Scheme of the Crisis) later Included 
In En torno a Galileo (Regarding Galileo), and Historla 
como slstema (History as a System) were produced. Although 
each was subtle and many-sided, Ortega's central theme 
never varied: he sought to explain the nature of major
historical crises, how, and why they occurred.
Beginning with an examination of the hundred 
years marking the transition from the middle ages to the 
modern era, 1550-1650, Ortega reflected upon a number of 
"distrusts"1 first, the distrust of the intellectualist 
traditions of Western philosophy; and, secondly, the 
distrust of natural science. The reasons for his ques­
tionings were argued on the grounds that what was called 
the "scientific method" could not successfully be applied 
to the study of man -- "most contemporary scholars have 
found it a very great deal easier to assemble aggregates 
of data than to raise ultimate questions." And, with 
reference to traditional philosophy, Ortega stated that 
"the 'idealistic' philosophical reaction to 'material­
istic* science was equally ineffective in the study of
man, since its concept of 'spirit' was a disguised natural­
ise
ism, static, and purely intellectualized." J Going back
Laura Krey, "What Wind," Sewanee Review, Vol. 
50, January 19^2, p. 105.
^5. Crane Brinton, "Philosophy in Balance," The 
Saturday Review, Vol. 50» January 19^2, p. 5«
J 1*
to an earlier position, the philosopher held that man did 
not have a nature but only a history; and in making 
himself —  continually becoming —  there was no substan­
tial reality. In that man is only what has happened to 
him, history becomes the only ontology —  where mechanical 
reason and pure science had failed, only historical 
reason (vital reason) explains the nature of being and 
the kinds of existence.
Although personally aloof from Spanish politics, 
Ortega's works of the period 1932-1936 were written in 
the political environment of a Republic that was dis­
integrating into anarchy and creating political animos­
ities which would cause Spain to suffer four years of 
bitter civil war. Yet, his writings were not solely the 
product of his reflections upon Spain's chaos. His 
major concern was for the fate of modern civilization, 
especially Europe, which in order to survive had to
avoid the "ossification of its traditional faith through
l\.n
an arteriosclerosis of its beliefs."
With the outbreak of the Civil War in Spain,
k6. This principle is important to Ortega's theory 
of knowledge and will receive special attention in Chapter 
III.
^7« "Basic Human Standards," Time, Vol. 5^ * June 
18, 19^9» P» 60. The quotation is from Ortega's address 
to the Goethe Bicentennial Conference at Aspen, Colorado.
A similar phrase is contained in his article "The Unity 
of Europe," Atlantic Monthly, April, 19^1» Vol. I67i 
p. ^32.
Ortega fled into exile, first to France, then to the
Netherlands, later to Argentina, and finally to Portugal.
Out of sympathy with various elements of the Republic as
well as with the Fascists, he was outlawed by both parties.
The philosopher, by 1936 in his fifty-third year, was
also in ill health and soon to undergo a serious operation 
-^8in Paris. As one who had spoken so strongly against 
monarchy and dictatorship, and had worked in the founding 
of the Republic, he was not to be forgiven by those 
expatriate, republican elements for what was considered 
to be desertion by those who confused their own political 
prejudices with their judgment of his philosophy. '
^8. Lorenzo Giusso, "Jose Ortega y Gasset," Living 
Age, Vol. 3^ -1, January 1932, pp. in a trans­
lation from La Stampa of Turin, Italy, presented a rare 
physical description of Ortega at the time of his partic­
ipation in the Constituent Cortes. Giusso described him 
thuslyi "His dark olive features, square, determined 
jaw and well-proportioned figure indicate vigor, and the 
decisive impetuosity in his eyes certainly does not 
suggest a languorous philosopher absorbed in the absolute. 
At first sight, Ortega y Gasset looks as if he had once 
been a wrestler or a fencing master. His person is as 
anti-romantic as his philosophy." The trying times of 
the years preceding the Civil War and a serious malig­
nancy had devastated his health by 1936 in contrast to 
Giusso's impression of him five years earlier.
49* At the outbreak of hostilities, Ortega and a 
number of other prominent Spanish intellectuals signed a 
manifesto pledging support to the Republic. Among them 
was the physician-historian, Dr. Maranon; the diplomat- 
novel 1st, Perez de Ayala; and the historian, Menendez 
Pidal. After a series of Republican atrocities and the 
increased dominance of Communists and Anarchists, most 
of the signers, many of whom had been prominent in the 
Republic's founding, fled abroad and repudiated their 
support of the Republic. The philosopher Unamuno and
36
The free thought of Ortega, on the other hand, made him 
a dangerous agitator against the ideology of Spanish 
Fascism. It would be nearly ten years before the Franco 
regime would permit his return to Spain, and then only 
with government restrictions upon his travels, speeches, 
and writings.
Exile and poor health did not mean a curtailment 
of Ortega's writing, nor of his lectures. While in 
France, the Netherlands, and in Portugal he wrote articles 
condemning as "forms of hemiplegia" the forces of Right 
and Left; he criticized the pacifism of British liberal­
ism as contributing to the collapse of the League of 
Nations; and he consistently argued for the unification of 
Europe —  a unity within which continental diversities 
were meaningful but not hostile.^  With the outbreak 
of World War II, Ortega was forced to leave Europe for 
Argentina where in a series of articles published as 
Del imperlo romano (On Imperial Rome), he challenged 
modern civilization to construct a new social order —
the novelist Pfo Baroja initially sided with the revolu­
tionaries under Franco, but each would later abandon that 
cause as well. See* Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War 
(New York; Harper & Row, 1963)* pp. 353-352+» The tragic 
circumstances of Miguel de Unamuno are given in Unamuno 1 
Creator and Creation, ed. Jose Rubla Barcia and M. A. 
Zeitlin, (Berkeley and Los Angeles; California University 
Press, 1967).
50. "Prologo para frances," and "Epilogo para 
ingleses," Obras, Vol. IV, p. 130 and p. 286.
a new faith -- as the only means of survival whereby 
the world could avoid a complete social collapse.^ 
Reviewed by a number of periodicals in the United States, 
the four essays were a continued elaboration of his 
favorite theme to which the philosopher added "the para­
doxical, ironical peculiarities of his own original 
mind . . .  as slippery as an eel and as full of springy
CLO
checks and balances as a cat's legs."-' Exactly what the 
"new faith" or new social order was, Ortega gave little 
indication. But, his continuing refusal to provide a 
solution, or a "new revelation," was not necessarily an 
"invitation to despair." Rather, it was Ortega's con­
sistent challenge to all philosophers to supply a new 
faith in an era of social collapse —  a new philosophy, 
inspiring and practical enough to restore the world's 
faith in human cooperation. ^
A critical review of Concord and Liberty written
51. Published under the title of Concord and 
Liberty (New York: W. W. Norton, 19^6), translated by
Helene Weyl.
52. "The Duty of Acting Grandly," Time, Vol. k?, 
June 10, 19^6, p. 102.
53. The stability of Rome, for example, was based 
upon a combination of concord and liberty, and this 
national harmony was the result of tenets whereby the 
citizenry may have vigorously disagreed in the law's 
application, but accepted without question the law's 
validity and the necessity for the exercise of supreme 
power. Without espousing any form of government as the 
most conducive to concord and liberty, he stated that
a nation's thinkers must re-discover its institutions
"by Jerome Frank in the Saturday Review of August 10,
1946, challenged Ortega as being a "defeatist" resigned 
to the inevitability of totalitarianism.-^ The difficulty, 
according to Frank, was the result, not just of Ortega’s 
central theme, but of the essential principles of Ortega's 
philosophy of history which denied him the achievement 
of certainty and the freedom from doubt. Thus, vital or 
historical reason, for all of its sophistication in the 
demanding of solutions —  "new faiths" -- presented a 
thirst which could never be sated but which Ortega never- 
theless had to strive to quench. ^
As aware of this difficulty as his critic Frank 
was, Ortega undertook in 1940 to systematize his ideas, 
and published in that year Ideas £ Creencias (Ideas 
and Beliefs). Yet, this, the last of his major works, 
was a fragment, a "first chapter," which was never com­
pleted. To a world of readers, advocates and opponents, 
what had hopefully promised to be the introduction to a 
complete political philosophy, soon to be followed by a
in "its own innermost being if it wants to lead a life 
of freedom." Concord and Liberty, p. 47.
54. "Invitation to Despair," Vol. 29i p. 10.
55. Ceplecha, o£, cit., p. 29.
56. Translated by Willard R, Trask and published 
in the United States as Man and People (New Yorki W.
W. Norton, 19bj5).
j y
sequel which would discuss the State, the law, the nation
and the inter-nation, was left unfinished due immediately
to what the author referred to as "urgent matters," and,
<7
in a few years, his death.
Regardless of its incompleteness, Man and People 
presented important clarifications as to Ortega's socio­
logical position. By a closely argued process he examined 
the meanings of "society" and the "social." Significantly, 
he also probed into the question of "how man knows what 
he k n o w s . H i s  answer was that man knows only through 
his senses; yet man did not allow himself the time to 
examine that knowledge. The result was that human life 
was lived in terms of inferences —  the common beliefs 
held in a particular era. Termed by Ortega "usages," 
they constituted in their totality, " s o c i e t y . P r o ­
ceeding into an examination of usages and linguistics, 
the philosopher ended his work with an essay on public 
opinion and public power. Also, in his conclusion to the 
fragment, Ortega promised that more would come through 
the subtle posing of the question* What hope is there
57• Thomas Molnar, "Ortega's Last Book," The 
Commonweal,,Vol. 6?, p. 645, cites a letter he received 
from Ortega shortly before the philosopher's death.
58, "Intellectual's Horizon," Newsweek, Vol. 50*
P. 134.
59. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Man and People (New 
York* W. W. Norton, 1963). p. 191*
for man when he cannot, or is unprepared, to examine and 
evaluate the usages of his time? Here again, Ortega 
carried his readers along in the expectation of receiving 
a future answer. Disappointingly, the followers of the 
philosopher were left deprived of a finalizing and com­
prehensive political philosophy.
As previously noted, the Franco government in 19^5 
had consented to the philosopher's return to his native 
Spain. But, Ortega's return was not in official honor, 
for he was denied his Chair at the Universidad Central 
and he was told to confine his work to cultural subjects —  
no further social or political themes.^ With the Spanish 
people, however, his popularity had not waned. When, 
after returning from twelve years in exile, he began 
his first series of public lectures in Madrid:
Every seat in the columned auditorium at 
Madrid's Club Mercantil had been taken, but still 
the people came. Mink-coated ladies and thread­
bare scholars jostled for places behind the doors, 
crowded onto the balcony overlooking the hall.
They waited patiently for the wiry little man 
with unruly white hair to step to the gold desk 
on the dias. When he did, they burst into cheers. 
They clapped and shouted so long that they seemed 
almost hysterical. The man smiled, slowly raised 
his arms for silence. Then he began to speak.
60. By Spanish law dating to the post-Napoleonic 
period that regulated university life, a professor who 
was in disfavor with a government could not be deprived 
of his chair nor its emoluments. He could, however, be 
prohibited from teaching. See Ceplecha, op. clt., 
pp. 29-30.
The speech Jose Ortega y Gasset made that 
night was on an academic subject —  Arnold J. 
Toynbee's Study of History. But all over Madrid 
. . .  it was the talk of the coffee-houses.61
Ortega had returned, and his remaining years were 
spent in his homeland with only a rare, occasional trip 
abroad. When visiting the United States in 19^9* as a 
guest-speaker at the Goethe Bicentennial in Aspen, Colo­
rado, he still displayed an optimism about mankind and 
he welcomed as normal and healthy the doubts that from 
time to time plagued humanity. In his address to the 
convention, and in his talks with newsmen, his state­
ments expressing a hope for the future noted thatt
. . . Man needs faith . . .  he needs belief as a 
soil and a solid ground where he may stretch his 
limbs and rest. Man is constantly getting lost .
. . but being lost is actually a dramatic privi­
lege and not an evil. When lost, the man who 
has faith turns himself into an instrument of 
orientation to guide man and to return him to 
himself. . . .  If man had not been lost, countless 
times, on land and sea, the points of the compass 
would never have been developed.
. . .  I do not recollect that any civilization 
ever perished from an attack of doubt . . . .  I 
do not see the world as darkly as many. People 
should not believe the politicians. I am opti­
mistic about the fate of Europe, and America can 
help to save what it is possible to preserve of 
European civilization, principally by spiritual 
aid,62
With a decline in health, watched by the government,
61. "Return of the Native," Time, Vol. 53» January 
17, 19^9, P.
62. Ortega's comments are quoted by Time, in the 
article "Basic Human Standards," ££. cit., p. 60.
and ignored by the Spanish press, Ortega's remaining years
in Spain were unproductively spent in "a time of silence.1'
Shortly before his death at age seventy-two of cancer in
1955 > he told" a friend1
In times of passion, the duty of the intel­
lectual is to remain silent, besides in times of 
passion one has to lie and the intellectual has 
no right to lie. . . .  I am here [under the Franco 
dictatorship] but I do not exist here. I do not 
want to take part in anything.°3
And, for what could serve as his epitaph, he had written:
The supreme value of life —  just as the 
value of money is in spending it —  is to lose it 
, on time and in good grace.
This, Ortega had done and, in his somewhat Quixotic 
fashion, he had seemed to value his philosophical journeys 
above their destinations. He had challenged the contem­
porary world; he had given it something to think about; 
and, in being a seedbed of provocative ideas which knifed 
into the errors of the time, he had, and has today, 
those among his readers who are devoted in their parti­
sanship as there are those who are violent in their 
opposition.
Since 1955» there have been numerous, posthumous
publications of various lectures, writings, and miscel-
65laneous commentaries of Jose Ortega y Gasset. Laudable
63. Quoted in "Death of a Philosopher," Time, 
Vol. 66, October 31# 1955» P» 25.
64. Ibid.
65. Important examples are: i/Jhat Is Philosophy,
^3
enterprises, the continuing translations and releases
offer the prospect of an intellectual atmosphere conducive
to a better understanding and appreciation of one of the
most provocative minds of the twentieth century. Ap-^
proached without a disdain for his "vital context" and
"without prejudice against the idiosyncracies which are
the price of their spontaneity," as well as the avoidance
of any over-patronizing, hero-worship or idolatry, the
works of Ortega "should be seriously considered in terms
of the hard core of philosophical reflection through
66which they achieve unity and stature."
Such an over-all philosophical consideration 
would be an exhaustive and delicate undertaking, for 
Ortega was broad in his range of interests and closely 
attached to the dispositions and vicissitudes of his 
age. It is possible, however, to narrow the scope to 
only those ideas necessary to the projection of a phi­
losophy of politics, and it is toward this purpose that 
the succeeding chapters are directed. Through a step-
translated by Mildred Adams (New York: W. W. Norton,
i960), which presents a course of lectures first given 
in Buenos Aires in 1928, and repeated in Madrid in 1929; 
The Origin of Philosophy, translated by Toby Talbot 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), a recent translation
which initially was to serve (19^ 4-0) as an "Epilogue" to 
a fellow philosopher's work on a history of philosophy; 
and, the Revlsta de Occldente has published two addi* 
tional volumes of the Obras completas, which include a 
number of political articles by Ortega.
66. Claudio Guillen, "On Reading Ortega," New 
Republic, Vol. 138, March 10, 1958, pp. 19-20.
by-step presentation of the writings of Ortega on various 
philosophical and political topics, a logical projection 
of his political philosophy will emerge. Following the 
standards established in this chapter's general survey 
of his life and works, Ortega's concepts will be serene 
in temper, display an enthusiasm for life and hold a 
strong distrust for abstractions. More significantly, 
his principles will be based upon what he believes is 
a dynamic man and his circumstances. In this there will 
be no fixed norms or a static system of ethics. What is 
sought is a political philosophy compatible with the 
ever changing conditions of man.
CHAPTER III
ORTEGA’S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
The first concept to consider in presenting the 
political philosophy of Jose Ortega y Gasset is his 
"theory of knowledge," A theory of knowledge —  an 
epistemology —  is a basic characteristic of a compre­
hensive political philosophy. The particular principles 
of a theory and the importance assigned to them vary from 
philosopher to philosopher; yet the concept and its 
logical foundations, explicit or implicit, are essential 
fundamentals,^  Although an epistemological examination 
is not always necessary to the understanding of a poli­
tical thinker, especially if the study is narrow in its 
scope, it is of critical significance to an understanding 
of Ortega's political thought. His ideas on knowledge, 
its types and the means whereby it is obtained -- through
1., ", . . political philosophy cannot avoid concern 
with [the] epistemological. . . . This concern may be 
explicit or implicit but it is never totally absent.!*
See; John H. Hallowell, Main Currents in Modern Political 
Thought (New Yorks Holt, 195371 pi 87 Another study on 
the importance of an epistemology to the understanding 
of political philosophy is: A. R. M. Murray, An Intro­
duction to Political Philosophy (New Yorks The 
Philosophical Library! 1953). Chapter I.
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the senses, by a. priori processes, by scientific tech­
niques —  have important consequences when applied to 
his basic political assumptions. The purpose of this 
chapter, therefore, is to present Ortega's views on the 
nature, limits and validity of man's knowledge. From 
this, it will be possible to assertain the extent to 
which his basic premises can be considered as true and 
rationally justified, or if he holds that such a know­
ledge is possible.
Historically, from the time of Socrates, three 
positions have developed relative to a theory of know­
ledge, and within; each position there have been numer­
ous variations. Of the major theories, one maintains 
that truth is ascertained only by empirical observation 
-- the truth or falsity of a proposition rests upon 
its scientific verification. Man's rationality in this 
case has at most an instrumental capacity in the deter­
mination of the effective means for achieving the de­
sired ends. It is impossible for "reason" to determine
whether the ends "ought" to be sought, or if they are
2
"proper" for man to seek.
Another theory of knowledge has held that truth
2. In varying degrees, this position has been held 
by: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, George Berkeley, Jean
Jacques Rousseau, Auguste Comte, Karl Marx and Bertrand 
Russell. Empiricism reached its ultimate form in the 
skeptical philosophy of David Hume.
is established by a priori methods —  a process of
rationalization independent of any sensitive experience
This "rationalistic" school maintains that categorical
answers are given as the product of abstract reasoning,
not only devoid of sense experience, but without any
reference to the historical or environmental contexts
3
affecting the particular subject.
The third position, differing from the "empirical 
and the "rational," has taken the form of a composite. 
Holding to a middle ground it;
a. Rejects the view that valid knowledge must be 
limited to sense knowledge;
b. Disputes the doctrine that abstract reasoning, 
divorced from the totality of experience, can 
establish truths about reality; and
c. Holds that the intellect and reason give us 
knowledge of the essences and properties of 
things which is more than a mere enumeration 
or a collection of relations that man has 
sensorially experienced.
By the utilization of these principles, it is possible
for a meaningful, political reality to exist; that the
reality's existence does not necessarily depend upon
man's knowledge of it; and that man has the faculty to
comprehend something about the reality's essence. It
also follows that a philosophical subscription to these
3. Among the supporters of this position have 
been; Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Kant, Fichte and 
Hegel.
Henry J. Schmandt, A History of Political 
Philosophy (Milwaukee; Bruce, i960), pp. 19-20.
premises implies the acceptance of the possibility of 
determining ethical ends within the reality and the 
capacity of man to answer questions in regard to the 
"oughtness" of political activities.^
More than being philosophical exercises, each 
of these general theories has had important ramifications 
when projected into the concrete order of politics.
For the reasons to be given, however, Ortega rejects 
each of them, and he attempts to formulate his own 
theory of knowledge outside the mainstreams of western 
philosophy. Before proceeding into an analysis of the 
Spanish philosopher's position, there are several char­
acteristics peculiar to his epistemological writings 
that require an explanation. First, the developmental 
pattern of his ideas reveal an almost continuing meta­
morphosis.^ Like a physical substance which undergoes 
a transformation when affected by an external force,
5. Initially developed by Aristotle, this episte­
mological system has been followed by Cicero, Aquinas, 
and the Scholastics —  Suarez, Vitoria, Bellarmine and 
Marltain.
6. Studies giving attention to Ortega's intellectual 
development are 1 Jose Ferrater Mora, Ortega y Gasset
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957) ; Joaquin Irlarte-
Agirrezabal, Ortega £ Gasset, su persona £ su doctrlna 
(Madrid; A. Zuniga, 1948); Miguel Oromi, Ortega £ la 
filosofia; sels glosas (Madrid: Esplandian, 1953); 
and Fernando Uribe Garcia, Jose Ortega £ Gasset, El 
problema critico (Bogota; Pontificia Universidad Cato- 
lica Javeriana, 1950)* The last work deals especially 
with Ortega's epistemology.
j+y
Ortega*s thought processes, reflected in his major works, 
react and respond to the conditions of his environment. 
This especially is apparent in regard to the influence 
that particular schools of thought have upon him at a 
given timei Scholasticism —  the Jesuit Colegio de 
Miraflores del Palo; neo-Kantian —  the Universities of 
Leipzig and Berlin; and Existentialism —  his later 
trips to Germany. To single out any one of his works 
and attempt to use it as indicative of his theory of 
knowledge, is at most an examination of only a particular 
phase of his intellectual development.
A second characteristic concerns the near-heret­
ical style, the literary technique, whereby Ortega pre­
sents his theoretical concepts. The formal philosophical 
devotee finds himself confronted with an Ortegan format
that reads like a "prose of intuition" rather than a
7
treatise based upon logical progression. One reason 
for this "style" is that Ortega uses as his mediums of 
presentation the newspaper, the periodical, the essay 
and the lecture. His "observations" on landscapes, 
pictures, books and persons, the world and its things, 
are portrayed in a wide range of possibilities for the
O
human being to experience. This he does, often using
?. Ernst Robert Curtius, "Ortega," trans. Wellard-.
R. Trask, The Partisan Review, Vol. 17, March, 1950, P» 26j,
7. Christian Ceplecha in his The Historical Thought
the metaphor, in an elegant prose displaying a genuine 
love of life; yet Ortega is always the intellectual and 
never forgets his belief in the primacy of thought.
His constant objective is to achieve a reconciliation 
between the age-old ingredients of epistemological 
antagonism —  life and reason.
Lastly, and contrary to the charge of some of his 
critics, Ortega in the sincerity of his objective is no 
mere "fan of modernity." He has little patience with 
those who "scampered from fashion to fashion."9 Cutting 
across his various philosophical phases is the consis­
tent belief that life is essentially problematical and 
man has to be continually evolving in order to meet the 
challenges of new problems. To do this is not to be 
"in fashion," but to be ever conscious of man's place 
in the historical sequence. The past is examined and 
carried within man, but only as a basis for new ideas. 
These "new ideas" of Ortega, often bedevilling in their
of Jose Ortega y Gasset (Washingtons Catholic Univer­
sity Press, 1958), p. xi, quotes Guillermo de Torre,
"Ortega y su palabra viva," Atenea, Vol. CXXIV, enero- 
febrero, 1956, pp. 20-21, on the point that Ortega pre­
ferred to speak rather than write —  " . . .  three-fourths 
of his prestige and intellectual influence is due funda­
mentally to his mastery of the spoken word." His writings 
are a kind of dialogue with the reader which maintains 
attention by vivid Illustrations and the use of the aphorism.
9. Jose Ortega y Gasset, "The Nature of Love," intro, 
George Pendle, The Living Age, Vol. 3^3, February, 1933»
P. 523.
appearance to the reader seeking a consistent philoso­
phical pattern, comprise what he believes is the real 
quest of truth. To the Spanish philosopher, knowledge 
is not in the static order of the abstract, but is what 
is here and now of essential significance to the living.
It is in reference to this aspect of Ortega's thought 
that George Pendle has stated:
The "idealist" philosophers of the past 
confined their gaze to the eternal —  "the eternal," 
from which all time and movement were excluded, 
as belonging merely to the less-real world of the 
senses, the world of "appearances." Ortega, never 
forgetting his relation to eternity, works in the 
world of time, the world where drains and poetry, 
love and turbines, exist, and change, and are < 
important.10
The first major work presenting Ortega's analysis
of the conditions of the mass-age in the twentieth-century,
a study essentially focused upon Spain, is his Meditations
on Quixote^  In an attempt to penetrate the genuine
soul of his native country, Ortega's diagnosis of the
intellectual situation is predicated upon the principle
that the primary contact of all things is to the reality
of existence. A "real" philosophy, if it is to be rooted
in a vital enthusiasm, must stress the living and have
12some universal characterizations. Reacting against his
10. Ibid., p. 522.
11. "Introduction" and "Notes" by Julian Marias, 
trans. Evelyn Rugg and Diego .Marim (New York: W, W. 
Norton, i960).
12. Curtius, o£. clt., p. 260.
initial training in scholastic philosophy and his education
in Germany, Ortega initiates a critical evaluation of
Rationalism and Idealism which culminates in his Revolt 
13of the Masses.  ^ By an intricate system of argumentation,
not only are these two "isms" denounced as unrealistic,
but his attack is extended to a challenging of Empiricism
as being too arbitrary. In reference to the first two
isms, they made the subject the primary substance which
could exist without things or accidents; and, in regards
to Empiricism, things were made the true reality which
14existed independently of their subjects. Using a totally
concrete technique of reconciliation, Ortega concludes
that subject and accidents cannot exist independently,'
they need each other, and they are inseparable. It is
with this basic concept that he is able to establish
his position that; "I am myself and my circumstances.
15• . . " Later, in his History as a System, he elaborates
on the principle by stating that:
Human life is a strange reality concerning 
which the first thing to be said is that it is 
the basic reality, in the sense that to it we 
must refer all others, since all others, effective
13• Trans, anon. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1957)*
1^. An in-depth criticism of Rationalism, Idealism 
and Empiricism is presented in one of the last works of 
Ortega to be published, What Is Philosophy, trans. Mildred 
Adams (New York; W. W. Norton, 19^0).
15* Meditations on Quixote. op. cit., p.
DJ
or presumptive, must in one way or another appear
within it.16
With things —  accidents and circumstances —  
being essential parts of the human person by which he 
lives, and with human life constantly changing, Ortega’s 
premises lead toward a form of subjective relativism. 
Logically, the extension of such a philosophical position 
into the social order implies a personal perspectivism; 
and when it is projected into the political order it 
provokes anarchy. Ortega, however, in The Modern Theme, 
denies that his concepts have these results. Granting 
that each person sees a different "world" does not nec­
essarily mean that the different views among men produce 
anti-social or hostile attitudes. Quite the opposite,
for in each man's view there is partial truth and ulti-
17mately the many views are complementary. What Ortega 
seeks to accomplish is to give the "personal perspective" 
an objective value so that when it is extended into the 
sphere of "oughtness," the products will not be social 
confusion and political dissonance. What develops is a 
new perspective on reality which Ortega believes provides
16. Jose Ortega y Gasset, History as a System and 
Other Essays Toward a Philosophy of History, trans. Helene 
Weyl (New Yorki W. W. Norton, 19^ 2)"i P^  165.
17* Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Modern Theme, trans. 
James Cleugh (New York: Harper & Row"]! 1961), p. 91*
for an orderly continuity of human thought that rationally
passes from one philosophical system to another. In the
harmonious multiplicity of all points of view, past and
present, no single position dominates the universe.
Each philosophical system is articulated with the vital
perspective from which it emanates, thus permitting its
l8connection with other future or exotic systems.
How is it possible for Ortega to arrive at these
conclusions? His answer is in the relativity of truth
and falsity. Each of the philosophical schools of the
past was true for its proponents because they saw in their
system a means for continued existence. To the present
philosopher, such a system might be either true or false
depending upon its current applicability. It is the task
of man's vital reason to evaluate the concrete situation
and to determine the contemporary theme. Toward this
objective Ortega asks:
Is it not a theme worthy of a generation which 
stands at the most radical crisis of modern history 
if an attempt be made to oppose the tradition and 
see what happens if instead of saying, "life for 
the sake of culture," we say, "culture for the 
sake of life?Hl°
At this stage of his philosophical development, 
Ortega, in renouncing Empiricism and Idealism, inclines
18. Ibid., p. 92. 
19o Ibid., p. 70.
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himself toward a form of Relativism with truth on the
verge of being renounced to save life. To overcome this
dilemma, he attempts an inter-penetration of the two --
life has to be intellectual, but at the same time the
20intellect has to be alive. This is the responsibility
of vital reason, the perspectivistic and individualistic
theory through which Ortega believes the world can be
truthfully seen. Yet, to place his philosophy in the
realm of Relativism requires a serious consideration, for
his stated positions are that Relativism is a "calamitous
21experiment," and Skepticism is a "suicidal theory."
Is science and philosophy more than sets of con­
victions which have truth only for a fixed period of 
time? Does it mean that Ortegan thought is undergoing 
a transformation toward the middle-rationalist position? 
The reader at this point is left perplexed, for the 
philosopher ends his Modern Theme in the belief that 
absolute and eternal truth is not attainable by man who 
was corrupt and finite. The multitude of opinions and 
tastes which men held in various eras, which were held 
by different races, and which were maintained by varying 
political systems are used by Ortega to illustrate his 
belief. Truth remains a most difficult problem, and it
20. Curtius, ojd. cit., p. 265.
21. The Modern Theme, op. cit., p. 29.
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is continually confused by being overlapped with what
22is termed "culture." In the writings which follow 
The Modern Theme, Ortega continues his struggle to es­
tablish an epistemology by some formula which will har­
monize reason and life, the always paradoxical ingre­
dients of truth.
With the publication of a series of works in the
early 1930's, there is the expectation that an Ortegan
23epistemology will emerge.  ^ What is presented, however, 
is another stream of probings and searchings. Provocative, 
subtle and many-sided as they are, the writings display 
a continuing, intellectual conflict within the author. 
Rationalism and Idealism finally being completely dis­
credited, Ortega seeks a refuge in Relativism, and he 
states thatt
Reality is mere interpretive intellectual reaction 
to that which we originally find surrounding our 
Ego. True reality cannot be known to the intellect. 
It has no being separate and independent from us, 
but its essence is completely expressed in Its 
being an advantage or obstacle. . . .  24-
22. Ibid., p. 37.
23. The Revolt of the Masses; The Mission of the 
University; Meditation on Technique; The Scheme of the 
Crisis; Regarding Galileo; and History as a System,
24-. Jose Sanchez Villasenor, Ortega £ Gasset 
Existentialisti A Critical Study of His Thought and Its 
Sources, trans. Joseph Small (Chicago; Henry Regnery, 
15^9Ti P» 93t quotes from Ortega's Meditaclon de la 
tecnlca (Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpe, 1939)«
J (
The instability of Relativism, however, gives 
Ortega's demanding mind no rest, and in his last work 
of the period, History as a System (1936), he grasps for 
something of a more enduring quality. In place of man 
with a nature and a substantial reality, he substitutes 
man with a history of continually becoming. If man is 
what has happened to him, history becomes the only ontol­
ogy. Where reason and science have failed, an "historical" 
reason, not unlike his previous "vital" reason, explains 
the nature of being and the kinds of existence.
Is historical reason the new epistemology, the
"new faith," promised by Ortega to his followers? No,
for History as a System, with all its sophistication
in demanding solutions, contains no systematized theory
of knowledge upon which an historical reason can be based.
This, he explains, will be the purpose of a forthcoming
2work, Ideas and Beliefs.  ^ For whatever reason -- the 
Spanish Civil War, his exile, ill health, a "gagging" 
by the Franco regime -- the promised work remains frag­
mentary. Although Ortega promised much in the beginning 
chapter, the work is left unfinished. As a consequence, 
what exists of an Ortegan epistemology is enigmatic and 
open to cutting criticism. From 192^1- until, his death in
25. Published under the titles Man and People, 
trans. Willard R. Trask (New Yorks W. W. Norton"! 1963).
1955» he promises a definitive work with additional 
promises being made in each succeeding publication. None 
of the promises are fulfilled; yet his works in the back­
drop of dictatorships, civil and world wars, and philo­
sophical conflicts continued to attract followers "by 
the transparent elegance of his style, at once stimulating 
and subtle in its shadings, sharp in its irony, rich in
p ^
allusions and evasions."
The question now is whether or not Ortega's 
fragmentary theory of knowledge contributes to the pro­
jection of a political philosophy. Measured in terms of 
traditional value theory, the Ortegan epistemology is not 
only incomplete, but it is outside the three historical 
patterns. Any reference by the Spanish philosopher 
to a general framework of moral principles and norms to 
which human conduct should conform would have to be based 
upon a theory,,not holding reality to consist of knowable, 
immutable truths. In effect, what Ortega does is ally 
himself with the pre-Socratic philosophy pf Heraclitus,
a philosophy holding to the principle of "pure happening"
2?—  the substantial variation of all existence.
26. Villasenor, ojd. cit. , p. 136.
27. Heraclitus (c.5^0-c.^75 B.C.) was a Greek 
philosopher born at Ephesus. He has been called the 
"father of metaphysics," and held that everything is in 
a constant state of flux —  the only reality is change 
or becoming. For this philosopher, science would be a 
virtual impossibility since nothing is certain and
An Ortegan theory of knowledge predicated upon the
principle of pure happening, however, does not imply life
of an alogical nature, nor life that is merely emotional,
sentimental and intuitional. To Ortega, it is a concept
whereby man's ambition is challenged to act in accordance
with the "best” of his ideas, and to this end knowledge
2 8is placed in the service of life. The determination
of what is best is made in reference to a positivistic-
biological value system. Man's intellect, incapable of
attaining truth, is still an important instrument in the
29satisfaction of his needs. x Scanty and utilitarian, the 
theory's justification by Ortega is in his belief that 
through its acceptance the inner, personal life of man 
and the richness of his relationships with his fellow 
human beings can be protected from the dictates of the 
modern, all-powerful State. Yet, the consequences of 
Ortega's epistemology, regardless of his expectations, 
increase rather than diminish the problematical aspects
necessary. Ortega gives support to this position in his 
chapter entitled ^ "The Attitude of Parmenides and Heracli­
tus." See: Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Origin of Philosophy,
trans. Toby Talbot (New York: W. W. Norton, 19f>7T» pp.
79-96.
28. Jose Ortega y Gasset, "The Self and the Other," 
trans. Willard R. Trask, The Partisan Review. Vol. XIX,
July, 1952, p. 398. Ortega further states that: "Man's
destiny, then, is primarily action. We do not live to
think, but, on the contrary, we think in order that we
may succeed in surviving."
29. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Man and Crisis, trans.
of his political thought. This becomes evident in an 
examination of the next concepts necessary to the con' 
struction of a theory of politics -- the doctrines of 
man and society.
Mildred Adams (New Yorki W. W. Norton, 1962), pp. 111-11^.
CHAPTER IV
HIS THEORIES OP MAN AND SOCIETY
The study of political philosophy is not neces­
sarily a study of epistemology. However, since Ortega 
y Gasset's theory of knowledge is basic to his political 
thought, and since it constantly influences his works, 
a description of it has been given. The task now becomes 
to see how his epistemological concepts affect his doc­
trines of man and society. In regard to the importance 
of these doctrines to the study of a philosopher's polit­
ical thought, it has been stated that*
The history of political thought amply 
illustrates the intimate connection between an 
individual's concept of the nature of man and 
his political philosophy. It is trite but none 
the less important to note that every social and 
political order must ultimately rest upon a phi­
losophy containing certain basic assumptions about 
man. . . . If we know what man is, we can then 
determine how he should act and what objectives 
he should pursue. And if we possess this know­
ledge, we are in a position to ascertain the 
role that the state should play and the goals it 
should seek.l
1*. Henry J. Schmandt, A History of Political 
Philosophy (Milwaukee* Bruce, 19^0), p. 9» See also* 
Stephen L*Wasby, Political Sciences The Discipline and 
Its Dimensions (New Yorks Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 
p. ^0. Wasby uses the broader term "political ideology"
6l
With the purpose of this study being the presentation 
of the ideas of Ortega contributing toward a political 
philosophy, the theoretical structure of his ideas in 
the final analysis will be determined by his concept of 
man's nature and end. It is, therefore, the purpose of 
this chapter to search out those of Ortega's ideas rele­
vant to his basic assumptions about man —  an Ortegan 
psychology -- and to place Ortega's man in what he believes 
is the appropriate societal ~ontext. But, before pro­
ceeding toward these objectives several preliminary 
observations are necessary.
The initial consideration is the difficulty of 
philosophically classifying his writings. From what has 
been given relative to his theory of knowledge, there is 
the characteristic of "openness" as the result of its 
positivistic-biological basis. Knowledge is a thing of 
flux in which man's intellect is placed totally in the 
service of human life. The reasons for this difficulty 
in classification, the epistemological openness, is that 
Ortega is the rare philosopher who recognizes the proble­
matical quality of serious mental endeavor. He stops 
short of closing his system by refusing to impose the
which emphasizes the quality of rulers, their selection 
and the normative principles whereby they govern. He 
does not restrict his definition to ideas alone, but 
includes their impact on political activity in regards to 
the defense, reform and abolition of social institutions.
conflicting schools of thought. In his own search for 
answers, he had passed through three stages of intellec­
tual development: Objectivism (Personas, Obras, Cosas);
Perspectivism (Medltaciones del Qul .iote); and finally 
Ratio-vitalism (El tema de nuestro tiempo).
Secondly, even though Ortega's epistemology is 
"open" and knowledge is totally in the service of life, 
Ortega refuses to be either idealistic or anthropocentric. 
He does not hold man to be the only reality, nor does 
he hold man to be the most important reality. Human
life is the "basic" reality simply because all other
3
realities appear within it. This does not mean, however, 
that human life is something within which all other things 
in the universe exist. Ortega believes that man's life, 
especially the life of each person, is beyond definition 
in terms of having a specific nature, being regulated by
2. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Obras completas (Madrid: 
Ediciones de la Revista de Occidente, 1969), Vol. I, 
p. ^19 and p. 309; Vol. VI, p. 196. Jose Ferrater Mora, 
Ortega ^ Gasset: An Outline of His Philosophy (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1957)* PP. 12-13, summarizes 
Ortega's intellectual phases and elaborates on each 
phase in Chapters II, III and IV.
3» Ortega's belief that "human life is the basic 
reality" appears throughout his writings. See his Obras 
completas, op. cit.. especially Vol. V, p. 8; Vol. VI, 
p. 13 and p. 3^7• In an English translation, the state­
ment and its explanation appears in: Jose Ortega y
Gasset, History as a System and Other Essays Toward a 
Philosophy of History, trans. Helene Weyl (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1962), pp. 87-l6l.
U*T
an established set of laws, and being composed of any- 
given substance. Although it kept itself in a bodily 
existence, life is not reducible to a man's body for this 
is in contradiction to the principle of historical-vital 
reason. It seems at this point that Ortega's epistemo- 
logical basis denies any possibility of a doctrine of 
man developing. Yet, "in spite of its allusions and 
elisions," there does emerge an Ortegan psychology.
Just as was the case in positing an Ortegan theory of 
knowledge, the scapel of intellectual abstraction is 
applied, the plethoric tissues are removed and a central 
mainstream is revealed which courses throughout his writings 
—  a consistent doctrine of man.
What, then, are Ortega's ideas regarding human 
life? Is it a consciousness, a mind, a spirit, a soul?
These were answers proposed by the various Idealist 
philosophers, and just as Ortega rejects these possibil­
ities, so does he reject the Realist's position of life 
as a philosophy of matter. Essentially, Ortega believes 
that not only are the ontological systems of the two 
isms in error, but that each has serious deficiencies 
in their analyses of human existence. So, if life is 
neither mind nor body, is Ortega forced into positing 
a neutral position which concludes life can be either
Mora, op. clt., p. 10.
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abstract or concrete depending upon the particular 
viewpoint at hand? The difficulty in applying this 
type of philosophical position to Ortega is that on 
the one hand he would have to accept a quasi-traditional 
ontology, and on the other hand he would have to take 
a neutral viewpoint. In a complete departure, he says 
that life is not a thing and not a being, it has no 
nature nor any fixed status, life for Ortega is a "hap­
pening." As noted earlier, this position corresponds to 
the epistemological system of Heraclitus -- the dynamics 
of becoming.And, only such a theory of life is logi­
cally consistent with Ortega's beliefs. A doctrine 
of man, however, demands more than the reduction of 
life to a mere theory. Heraclitus was not in error, 
his concept of flux was incomplete. In fact, Ortega 
finds all previous "isms" failing in whole or in part 
as gratuitous theories superimposed upon human life.
Life, like knowledge, was dynamic, it had to be given 
an account of, and the only proper theory applicable 
was one resulting from an accurate description of it.
N° a priori, mental gymnastics would suffice. That
5. The philosophy of Heraclitus has been previously 
noted and Ortega's affinity with that position. In 
History as a System and Other Essays Toward a Philosophy 
of History, op. cit. , p. 203, Ortega specifically saysi 
"In order to speak, then, of man's being we must first 
elaborate a non-Eleatic concept of being. . . . The 
time has come for the seed sown by Heraclitus to bring 
forth its mighty harvest."
which did apply to man's basic reality was Ortega's 
principle of ratio-vitalism.
His ratio-vitalism offers both its negative and 
positive considerations. From his "I am myself and my 
own circumstances,1' a basis is had for his descriptive 
ontology. Mind, body, physical and social environments 
are all realities with which man has to live and strug­
gle. Each man, living in a world he is born into without 
initial choice, strives with his particular and concrete 
circumstances. Generic, abstract living is not possible, 
and to live requires a constant dialogue with one's 
environment. Thus, the first principle of Ortega's 
doctrine of man is that life is not a subjective occur­
rence, but a positive and objective event. Helped or 
hindered by the individual's own psychological complexion, 
his personal character traits, man makes his life and 
strives toward the attainment of his vocation by acting 
and reacting to an existence of complex situations.
Man, composed of mind, body, psychological character, 
and inheriting a national-historical tradition has 
to constantly ask himself in whose service these 
forces function -- in effect, "who" and not "what" he 
is, The major questions of life, therefore, are not
6. Jose Ortega y Gasset,^  Meditations on Quixote, 
trans. Evelyn Rugg and Diego Marin (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1963)1 P* 5^*
7Immaterial but material.
Taking on a positive posture, the Ortegan psy­
chology seems to point toward a categorical imperative 
not unlike the Kantian rule of each man acting as he 
must and doing that which he has to do. Does this mean
the subscription to moral or normative rules? Summariz­
ing Ortega's answer to this question, Jose Ferrater Mora 
states s
It is nothing of the kind. It simply means that 
we must bow to our purely individual call, even 
if it runs counter to the conventional rules of 
morality. It is possible . . .  to offer resis­
tance to our destiny. But our life will be then
less authentic and, to a certain extent, less
real. To do what we have to do seems a pure 
tautology. It is rather a way of enlightening 
us about the fact of our concrete actions, if 
they are to be real and not merely symbolic, must 
spring from the sources of our authentic, and 
often hidden, ego, and must not be diverted by 
any conventional rule, by any of the many temp­
tations leading to the falsification of our 
existence•8
From this summation, numerous questions and indeed 
strong objections can be raisedi What can be known of 
one's "authentic" ego? Is an authentic life possible?
Are conventional and moral norms to be cast aside? Yet, 
whatever the protest, the challenger would have to face 
Ortega on a common ground, and it would have to be on 
the metaphysical rather than the ethical to be meaningful.
7. Ibid.. p. 5^.
8. Mora, ojd. clt., p. 51.
Using the concept of freedom as an example, he states 
in his Revolt of the Masses that man is free by compul­
sion, and even when he forsakes it, he makes the decision 
beforehand. Man commits himself, not for moral and ethical 
reasons, nor even because of "noble" motivations, but 
because commitment is an inescapable, inexorable facet 
of life, Man is committed to freedom, he is free by
Q
compulsion, and his freedom is absolute. It is not 
something he is endowed with but something that he is.
And, it follows that there are no rules whereby man is 
forced to make his life. Human life is a problem con­
sisting of the problem itself. In his Toward a Philosophy 
of History, Ortega uses the figurative, Spanish term 
quehacer —  what has to be done -- and the problem, the 
task, the basic rule is the discovery of our being.
Man has to be constantly deciding what he is going to do 
with his life, and he is fatalistically determined to 
exercise his freedom in the pursuit of his destiny.^
If his life becomes "inauthentic," his freedom is not 
necessarily decreased for to be free means the possibility
9. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Revolt of the Masses. 
trans. anon. (New Yorks W. W, Norton, 1957)» P* 23.
10. Ortega y Gasset, ojo. cit. , pp. 115-116. For 
the literal, English translation of the term sees Arturo 
Cuyas, Appleton* s Revised Engllsh-Spanish and Spanish- 
English Dictionary, -^th ed. (New Yorks Appleton-Century 
Crofts, 195^ ) 1 pT442.
11. Revolt of the Masses, p. h-8.
of deciding or not deciding what has to be done, or 
discovering or not discovering his being.
Life being a "trouble" beset by problems, there 
is little wonder that it and its many implications have 
preoccupied the minds of all ages. Man has indeed been 
plagued with all sorts of choices posited by philosophers, 
theologians and an almost full range of thinkers of 
every type and field of inquiry. "Blueprints" for living 
have been and were constantly being prepared to guide man 
in the construction of his life. But, can man really 
make his life like other things -- ships, houses, air­
planes? There is little doubt that it is done, and man 
is constantly perplexed by the diverse possibilities 
from which to choose. What helps him to decide, to 
exercise his freedom of choice? To this question, Ortega 
replies: society; the circumstances of our lives; and
the past, personal and collective. Whatever assistance 
used, the decision is personal and vital, the drama each
12has to act out, and the "shipwreck" he finds himself in.
Thus it is that man searches for certainty, for 
safety. He needs to know what he can rely on.
And life is always supported by a system of beliefs 
(creencias) on which man stands, by which he 
lives, even though he may not even be conscious 
of them. But when these beliefs fail man, or 
when a situation arises for which man has no
12. Jose Ortega y Gasset, "In Search of Goethe 
from Within," trans. Willard R. Trask, Partisan Review, Vol. 
XVI, December, 19^9# P. H 65.
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Ibeliefs, he must search for some support; and he 
does this by means of thinking. . . .  It is only 
when man is in doubt that he must form ideas, 
opinions, regarding reality, about the facts of 
a new circumstance.13
The primary and radical meaning of life thus 
becomes biographical and not biological. Its meaning 
is fully comprehended only when it is presented in nar­
rative form describing the situations and events which 
have confronted it, and the vital designs which have 
served as foundations. The dramatic character of human 
life has been attributed to many factors, but to the 
Spanish philosopher, the fact that  ^was an ephemereal 
and transient being is the most important.
Man is always in a hurry. . . . Pressed for time.
. . . He cannot wait. . . .  He cannot form projects 
only to be carried out in an indeterminate future.
He must strive urgently, hurriedly, for the main 
aim of his lifei the liberation toward himself. ^
What, then has Ortega finally come to in his human psy­
chology? The man in contradiction to the English, meta­
physical poet's "no man is an island?" Is human life 
absolutely independent? Is it an incommunicable reality? 
The answer is, NoI It may be useless to search for a 
transcendent reality, and it may be that human life is 
not the sole reality, but those aspects will not drive
13. Christian Ceplecha, The Historical Thought of 
Jose Ortega jr Gasset (Washington: Catholic University
Press, 1958), pages k6 and ^8.
Ik. Mora, ojd, cit. , pp. 5^-55»
man to despair even when he is disillusioned in those 
beliefs which previously have enhanced his existence.
For, that which saves him is a small group of people who
are ready and capable of grasping the unpredictable nature
of man's existence. They hold to their own beliefs; yet 
they have the initiative to start anew in the never-ending
quest for fresh forms and manners of living. The role of
this "select minority" will be examined in the next chapter, 
but the immediate problem is to relate Ortega's psychology 
of the individual to his doctrine of society. In effect, 
to view Ortega's man as a social being.
Without diminishing the freedom of the individual, 
Ortega never denies that man is also a social being.^
He recognized the influence of society and its problems 
upon man; and, indeed, his various psychological theories 
usually result from his studies of concrete, societal 
actualities.^^ Just as his doctrine of man develops from 
his societal observations, so too does a doctrine of society, 
emerge. It can be recalled that Ortega promised for over 
twenty years to publish a work devoted entirely to these
15* Without going into the various theories by 
the proponents and opponents of the position that "man 
is a social being," it is sufficient to note that, to 
Ortega, for man to be otherwise would be contrary to his 
concept of historical, vital reason.
16. Invertebrate Spain, The Revolt of the Masses, 
and Man and Crisis, all previously cited, were each 
basically studies and analyses of social problems and 
circumstances.
doctrines, including one on the political community, but
this ambition was never accomplished. Again, abstracting
from his extant publications, a wealth of material is
available whereby a doctrine of society can be projected.
Initially, the focus is upon the construction of a general
theory —  society-at-large —  with particular ramifications
to be discussed later.
Society, defined as "a group of persons regarded
as forming a single community, especially as forming a
distinct social or economic class,*' would be to the Spanish
17philosopher a misnomer. Like the Ortegan individual, 
society has no fixed nature, but is a concrete, living 
reality with only a history. Thus, to speak of "society," 
is to pay attention to the particular, historical develop­
ment of each society, and not to conclusions drawn from 
abstract reasoning on the topic in general. However, the 
study of particular societies ultimately contributes to a 
comprehension of the features that are shared. Societal 
knowledge can thus be conceptualized, but with the caution­
ary note of "occasionality," for:
There are concepts called • . . "occasional;" 
e.g., the concept "here," the concept "I," the 
concept "this." Such concepts or significations 
have formal identity that serves precisely to 
guarantee the constitutive nonidentity of the
17. David B. Guralinik (ed.). Webster's New World 
Dictionary of the American Language, 2nd ed. TNew York; 
World, 197077 P. 1352.
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matter signified or thought of through them. All 
concepts that seek to think of the authentic 
reality, life, must be "occasional" in this sense. 
There is nothing strange in this, since life is 
pure occasion.
Life being an occasion, society, just like the 
physical world, is nonetheless that part of the total 
environment in which man has to function. And, as the
*
physical environment pressures man, so too does the
societal through its mores, customs and ordinances to
19which man acclimates himself. ' In the task of life, 
society is one of those auxiliaries helping man to decide 
and exercise his freedom of choice; yet, beneficial as 
it is, it is also a force that stifles, oppresses, and 
is harmful, How is this possible? To explain the simul­
taneous nature of societal effects, a further examination 
of this complex situation is needed.
First, Ortega does not deny the necessity of 
society, and his conclusion is neither the result of a 
priori rationalization nor because of empirical, histori­
cal evidence that normal man has ever existed in a con­
dition other than societal. The bases for society --
18, History as a System and Other Essays Toward 
Philosophy of History, op. cit. , pp. 205-206.
Ibid., p. 210: "But experience of life . . .
is made up . . .  of the experiences that I personally 
have had. It is built up also . . .  by the society I 
live in. Society consists primarily in a repertory of 
usages, intellectual, moral, political, technical, of 
play and pleasure."
/*+
for man*s being a social creature -- is more profound.
Its cause is in his concept of "belief" which is not the 
product of individual thought nor of the thought of 
particular groups. Ortegan "belief," neither idea nor
20opinion, is always the product of a "collective nature."
For the sake of social concord, society's providing of 
beliefs prevents the chaos of dissent -- the disorder of 
formless matter and extreme confusion. Society's destiny 
thus becomes interwoven with the fate of the individual. 
Secondly, the Ortegan position that beliefs are "after- 
the-fact" implies that society is never original for it 
only organizes and collects usages and opinions of the 
past. In his Concord and Liberty under the title "Philoso­
phy and Society," even philosophy is a social fact, and
it is reinforced by being taught in educational insti-
21tutions and published in books. But, it is never
20. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Concord and Liberty, 
trans. Helene Weyl (New York: W. W, Norton, 19^3)» P* 19s
"A belief in the strict sense of my terminology is unlikely 
to occur as a belief of individuals or particular groups. 
Since it is not mere opinion, an idea, a theory, it will 
normally be of a collective nature. People are inclined
to believe in company and not of their own accord. A 
belief functions when established in a social environ­
ment by virtue of its 'collective validity' —  that is, 
regardless of the adherence of individual persons or 
groups."
21. See Jose Ortega y Gasset, Mission of the 
University, trans. Howard Lee Nostrand (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1966), p. 91* and, "Man Must Tame the Book," 
trans. Helen Muller. Wilson Bulletin, Vol. X, January,
1936, p. 305.
22creative, it is the late outgrowth of prior happenings.
It is for this reason that Ortega speaks of society as '"a
tyrant, and he uses the thesis to explain the decadence
23of his native country in Invertebrate Spain. v To Ortega, 
then, society is beneficial to man, but it is also harmful. 
Life for the "authentic" man who is in quest of solu­
tions to his problems —  to salvaging his own shipwreck -- 
receives on the one hand a life-line from society; yet, 
to the contrary, he must struggle against society's 
falsifications of life. Above all,' man must guard against 
his possible estrangement from the society he needs.
How does one solve the dilemmas presented by the 
Ortegan doctrine of man in conjunction with his doctrine 
of society? The proposed solutions are found in three 
of the Spanish philosopher's propositions appearing 
peacemeal in his works: Concord and Liberty; and History
as a System and Other Essays Toward a Philosophy of 
History.
The first of these propositions, as conditioned,
22. Ibid., pp. 103-107. Ortega concludes the 
section with the statement that: "The social constituent
of philosophy clearly forms the most superficial part
of its reality —  the bark of a tree, as it were. Society 
is never original and creative."
23. See: p. 170 of Mildred Adams' translation,
(New York: W. W, Norton, 1937)* where he states: "The
abstract divinity of 'the collective1 is coming back
to exercise its tyranny; indeed it is already creating 
havoc . . • ."!The quotation is from the section 
entitled "The Increasing Menace of Society."
i y
22creative, it is the late outgrowth of prior happenings.
It is for this reason that Ortega speaks of society as a
tyrant, and he uses the thesis to explain the decadence
23of his native country in Invertebrate Spain.  ^ To Ortega, 
then, society is beneficial to man, but it is also harmful, 
Life for the "authentic" man who is in quest of solu­
tions to his problems —  to salvaging his own shipwreck —  
receives on the one hand a life-line from society; yet, 
to the contrary, he must struggle against society!s 
falsifications of life. Above all,- man must guard against 
his possible estrangement from the society he needs.
How does one solve the dilemmas presented by the 
Ortegan doctrine of man in conjunction with his doctrine 
of society? The proposed solutions are found in three 
of the Spanish philosopher's propositions appearing 
peacemeal in his works; Concord and Liberty; and History 
as a System and Other Essays Toward a Philosophy of 
History.
The first of these propositions, as conditioned,
22. Ibid.. pp. 103-107. Ortega concludes the 
section with the statement that; "The social constituent 
of philosophy clearly forms the most superficial part
of its reality -- the bark of a tree, as it were. Society 
is never original and creative."
23. See; p. 170 of Mildred Adams' translation,
(New York; W. W. Norton, 1937)♦ where he states; "The 
abstract divinity of 'the collective' is coming back
to exercise its tyranny; indeed it is already creating 
havoc ... . ."sThe quotation is from the section 
entitled "The Increasing Menace of Society."
Is that even though man is a social being, he is iiot 
totally so. It is true that he subscribes to, or suc­
cumbs to social pressures, but he also resists its forces.
Man has, therefore, both social and anti-social impulses
2kwhich come into play wherever men live together.
Secondly, a society, in time and place, has to be grasped
in its entirety. Every social fact is interlocked with
other social facts; and each of society's functions pre-
2 5
supposes and in its turn is presupposed by others.  ^ The 
third and more complex proposition has as its basis the 
statement that what have previously been considered socie­
ties have never really been so, that is, men moving and 
acting in a common space or environment, men living with 
the rest of men, and men coexisting with others in associ- 
ations regulated by ordinances of conduct. That which 
gives society its real character and saves it from individ­
ual chaos on the one hand while guarding it from a detested, 
collective formalization on the other are the human, 
personal relationships of love, friendship, and kinship.
2k, Concord and Liberty, op. cit., p. 2k, He goes 
on to sayj "In view of this, does it not mean garbling 
the facts and barring, from the outset, the way to a true 
understanding of the eternal tragedy that is human co­
existence, when such a reality is simply called 'society?' 
Why omit in the name the antisocial component?"
25. Mora, ojd. cit. , p. 60.
26. Concord and Liberty, op. cit., p. 25» and 
History as a System and Other Essays Toward a Philosophy 
of History, op. cit., p. ^9.
((
As a result, the real society is harmonized by balancing 
the human with the social relationships. Only in such 
a situation is it possible for the individual to be free, 
spontaneous and authentic without his being radically 
estranged and alienated from the inescapable fact of 
society.
These, then, are Ortega's doctrines of man and 
society, and the solutions he offers whereby their in­
herent conflicts are resolved. In their resolution, the 
importance of each philosophical component is noted: his
theory of knowledge; his doctrine of man; and his doctrine 
of society. But, in each component, a substantive question 
is left unanswered, and although variously phrased, it is 
a common problem. Epistemologically, it is posed in 
Ortega's belief that knowledge is rooted in man's ambition 
to live in accordance with the best of his ideas. Psycho­
logically, there is Ortega's belief that man must live 
an authentic life. And, in his doctrine of society, 
it concerns the role societal knowledge plays in saving 
man from his "shipwreck."
The possible disposition of what in time and place 
is the "best," the "authentic" and the "necessary societal 
beliefs" is only briefly suggested in discussing the issues 
above. Generally, there is the reference to the role of: 
"Those individuals ready and capable of . . . having the 
initiative to start anew in the never-ending quest for
27fresh forms and manners of living." Specifically, 
however, it involves what will be termed Ortega's theory 
of the select minority. By means of logical projection, 
this theory will imply that Ortega's man will recieve 
assistance to meet his need for some type of certainty, 
and also that the assistance will be provided by an 
"elite." Without infringing upon man's freedom, for man 
is still free to choose, the minimum service by the elite 
will be to give man some understanding of his life and 
what is basic to it. The possibility of man's despairing 
in the face of the endless process of becoming and the flux 
of societal beliefs can be thus alleviated through this 
service. This theory of a select minority providing an 
elite counseling, however, is more than just another 
routine concept of Ortega's to consider. There is in its 
consideration the possible transition from the purely 
philosophical order to the concrete order of politics.
In the movement toward a comprehensive political philosophy, 
an Ortegan elite theory would be, therefore, an important 
link. For this reason, it is given special attention in 
the following chapter.
27. Supra, p. 71.
CHAPTER V
HIS THEORY OF THE SELECT 
MINORITY
Theories of "select minorities," or "elites," are 
not new concepts. Without tracing their development or 
possible relationships, it is, nevertheless, significant 
that Jose Ortega y Gasset develops his elite concept as 
a means whereby the organization and direction of man and 
society can be explained. In his Invertebrate Spain he 
states;
A nation is a human mass which is organized 
and given structure by a minority of chosen in­
dividuals. Whatever our political creed, we must 
recognize this truth. The legal form . . . can 
be as democratic or even communistic as you choose; 
but its living and extra-legal constitution will 
always consist in the dynamic influence of a 
minority acting on a mass.
This is a natural law, and as important in 
the biology of social bodies as Is the law of 
densities in physics.^
And later," in The Revolt of the Masses, he notes;
Society is always a dynamic unity of two component 
factors; minorities and masses. The minorities 
are individuals or groups of individuals which are 
specially qualified.2
1. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Invertebrate Spain, trans. 
Mildred Adams (New York; W. W. Norton, 1937)* PP» 62-63.
2. Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses,
ou
To avoid any initial confusion in Ortegan termin­
ology, he denies the necessity of his "select minority" 
being either political or economic. Rather, his minority 
is based upon personal distinction, merit and accomplish­
ment, and it is composed of those persons who lead lives of
effort and excellence who go beyond the ordinary in the
3
performance of their duties and obligations. It is this 
elite who really leads society and gives it the basic 
framework for its existence.
The first of all social acts is the organi­
zation of a human mass into those who lead and 
those who are led; in others, a certain ability to 
let themselves be led. Without a minority to
act on a collective mass, and a mass which knows
how to accept the influence of the minority, 
there is no society, or there will very shortly 
be none.^
Noticeably, there is a reciprocal action between the 
elite and the masses, for if a societal living of the 
masses is impossible without a directing minority, this 
same elite cannot exist by and of itself; indeed, it
exists for the masses. The masses and the select minor­
ity are, then, the two interdependent classes. They are 
not based upon economic, political, or social distinctions, 
but upon an aristocratic, exemplary differentiation.
trans. anon. (New Yorki W. W. Norton, 1957)* P* 13*
3. Ibid., p. 15.
Invertebrate Spain, op. cit., p. 65-
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How does Ortega identify these superior individuals? 
Through the use of historical-vital reason, and in con­
formity with the principle, Ortega takes various periods 
of history to exemplify his elite: Athens —  the polis,
with a superabundance of accomplished personages (to its 
own misfortune he concluded); Rome of the Republic;
France of the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries; Great 
Britain of the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries; and 
Spain during and shortly after the Reconqulsta. It was 
the select minority in each of those particular societies 
who created the artistic, religious, scientific, and 
technical innovations necessary to achieve their State's 
era of greatness, Each aristocrary, in its own time and 
place, was well organized and each member within his own, 
particular group could rely upon his fellows in a period 
of crisis. Yet, each elite had in its own time succumbed 
to the complacency of security, failed in its obligations 
and consequently had degenerated,
. * . too much security demoralizes men more than 
anything else. Because they came to feel too 
secure, all the aristocracies of history have 
fallen into irreparable degeneracy.5
Thus, the study of society, as predicated upon the inter­
actions between elites and masses, is essentially a
5. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Mission of the University, 
trans. Howard Lee Nostrand (New York: W. W, Norton,
1966), p. 14.
study of group dynamics, but not in terms that are always 
progressive. Particular elites degenerate and with them 
their societies -- each society being a total process of 
social interactions. This interpretation of history not 
only is a repudiation of the "concept of progress" used 
by various historians but the "great man" theory as well.^ 
Select minorities having a time-place identifi­
cation, what general characteristics identifies the 
"masses?" Again, it is not a division of social classes 
into "upper" and "lower." The mass differentiation is 
reserved for those persons who set no value on themselves.
"Just like everybody," they are happy to feel like every-
7
one else, and they possess no quality of excellence.
The mass is, therefore, a sociopsychological fact which 
even includes those among the intellectual life of a 
society -- which of its own seems to require and pre­
suppose an amount of achievement; yet*
. . .  in the intellectual life . . . one can 
note . . . the pseudo-intellectuals, unqualified, 
and unqualifiable, who are by their very mental 
texture, disqualified. . . .  On the other hand,
6. Ibid., p. 17* "History is not made by one 
man -- however great he may be. History is not like a 
sonnet; nor is it a game of solitaire. It is made by many 
peoples by groups of people endowed, collectively, with 
the necessary qualities.-'1 Ortega, at least on two occa­
sions, came close to contradicting himself when he wrote 
about Julius Caesar and Mirabeau. See, especially, the 
article "Mirabeau o el politico," Obras completas (Madrids 
Revista de Occidente, 1969), Vol. Ill, p. 603.
7, Revolt of the Masses, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
it is not rare to find amongst working men, who 
before might be taken as the best example of what 
we are calling "mass," nobly disciplined minds,®
But, whenever the masses refuse to continue their ano­
nymity, when they believe themselves capable of directing, 
and when in their envy, hatred, or ignorance they rebel 
against the elite, the society is destroyed. Only the 
constant and proper ordering of society's public affairs 
by the select minority can forestall a rebellion -- the 
masses can never be permitted to act of or by themselves. 
They must be influenced, directed and organized. Just 
as life is a continual process of becoming, those exem­
plary personalities possessing diverse talents and a 
collective heterogeneity of excellence have to be as well 
dynamic and unsated in their direction of the masses.
It is exactly the reverse of this normal condition 
the proper relationship of elite to masses -- that has 
caused the direst problems of the twentieth-century. The 
select minority has been vertically permeated by the 
masses —  a new form of barbarian invasion. Causative 
factors in the degenerative process are many* population 
explosion; scientific over-specialization; and, most 
certainly, the degeneration of and failure by the elite 
in the application of their vital reason. Not to be 
equated solely with a proletarian revolution, for the
8. Ibid., p. 16.
scientist, especially, has made his contribution as a
"learned ignoramus," the revolt of the masses has affected
o
"everyone" into being "everybody."7 Without direction, 
the masses do not know what they can become, and having 
only appetites and rights, they feel and thus demand direct
o
action as the only means of satisfying their drives. Even 
countenancing violence, the twentieth-century mass-man 
neither has the need of, nor the time for, reason or dis­
cussion. Controlling the State, the new barbarians impose 
their form of order with whatever means suit their purpose.1  ^
As previously noted, Ortega denies the existence of 
abstract values -- codes of ethics are valid only in time 
and place.11 But',' the masses of the twentieth century 
have moved toward an existence of no beliefs. This is not 
just an ammoral divorcing of ethics from politics. It is 
a total, societal immorality. The problem for Ortega 
becomes: How is it possible to reform the present-day man
of the masses? The solution he offers will have to be con­
ditioned by two questions: (1) Do the masses want to be 
reformed? (2) Even if they do, is not the socio-political
9. Ibid., p. 18.
10. "Today's mass-man, with no vital project," says 
Ortega, "is always ready to play at anything, and so he 
has welcomed the 'false dawns' of Fascism and Communism." 
In Chapters X and XI of Invertebrate Spain, op. cit., he 
accuses Fascism of being inherently contradictory, and he 
attacks Marx's economic interpretation of history for its 
false promises. See: pp. 172-201.
Supra, pp. 5^-59*
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structure erected by them too huge an impediment to
be overcome? The only immediate possibility Ortega sees
is that the masses will so punish themselves that in
frustration, exhaustion and fear of annihilation, a
return will be made to a societal direction by a select 
12minority. Watching the devastation of the Spanish
Civil War, the brutalities of World War II, and the
potential self-destruction posed by nuclear conflict,
Ortega thought such a reformation imminent. At the time
of his death, however, the destructive potential of the
masses had not diminished but had been magnified.
Under-developed as the Ortegan concept of elites
or selected minorities is, his observations establish a
link between his writings and those of the twentieth-
13century school of "civilized humanists." J And, the 
connection is more than that of just philosophical theory.
12. Invertebrate Spain, op. cit., p. 68.
13. "Civilized Humanism" is the title given by 
Michael Weinstein to one of the three major political 
philosophies developing in the twentieth century. Con­
cerned with the quality of modern life, its "philoso­
phers form no relatively coherent school of thought;" 
yet, their ideas are similar in that they believe human 
beings transform the world through their activities, and 
they act in relation to others through social processes. 
Their central concern "is with the uses that human beings 
make of their civilization." Included in this group as 
philosophical theorists are: George Santayana, Alfred
North Whitehead, Bertrand Russell, R. G. Collingwood,
Elijah Jordon, F. S. C. Northrop, Lewis Mumford and 
Pitirim Sorokin. See Weinstein's book; Philosophy, Theory 
and Methods in Contemporary Political Thought (Glenviewi 
Scott, Foresman, 1971)1 pp. 79-102.
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The sociopsychological and, perhaps, even the pathological
ramifications of select minorities-masses gives Ortega a
connection with the school's causal-empirical theorists
as well. In this regard, Michael Weinstein has writtenj
As the expression of civilized humanism in empirical 
theory, the theory of political elites defines the 
public situation through the concepts of ruling 
class, elite, or oligarchy. Underlying.the idea 
of a directing minority is the notion of a dominant 
and organized cross section of activity. . . . 
political elites . . . represent social types or 
people whose characters have been organized around 
particular cross sections of activity. Ruling 
classes represent the dominance of certain usages 
of cultural objects and justify their leadership 
in political formulas that express the public 
importance of the particular cross sections of ^  
activity identified with the regnant social type.
True, Ortega's use of the term ‘'aristocracy" does 
not necessarily imply that his elite is synonymous with 
government, and neither does he project any detailed for­
mulas which are employed by any, given select minority,^
1^ . Ibid.( p. 13. The author considers the three 
"master" political philosophies of the twentieth century 
to be: Pragmatism; Existentialism; and, Civilized Human­
ism. Each of these philosophies has its particular, 
causal manifestation in respectively: The theory of
Pluralism; Organization theory; and, the theory of Political 
Elites. Thus, that part of Ortega's writings which was 
philosophically in line with Civilized Humanism would have 
its causal counterpart in the theory of Political Elites.
See also pp. 5-H*
15. If an aristocracy is not synonymous with 
government, how does it implement its public policies? 
Basically a problem of "linkage," Ortega never answered 
this question directly. The involvement of Ortega and 
his "League for the Service to the Republic" sought to 
provide intellectual leadership to the Spanish consti­
tutional assembly of 1931* Disillusioned and holding 
themselves above partisan politics, all fourteen of the
a /
He does emphasize, however, the vital significance of 
particular elites in their various public situations, and 
he describes their societal functions in the complex 
organization of their respective political communities.
It is in serving more as a seedbed of ideas that Ortega, 
in his Invertebrate Spain, Mission of the University and 
especially Revolt of the Masses, shares the civilized 
humanist position with its more noted, causal proponents —  
Harold D, Lasswell, Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels.
Whatever his contributions to, or his similarities 
with causal, elite theory, it is in the philosophical 
area of civilized humanism that Ortegan concepts find 
themselves more applicable. A major theme shared is the 
belief that the contemporary political crisis is the 
result of attacks upon the format of cultural objects 
comprising modern civilization. The "barbarian" assault 
comes from the masses who are imbued with ideals of 
romanticism and naturalism; language becomes debased; 
personal and individual values are gradually destroyed; 
and, there is a constant surrendering to immorality.^
group's members resigned. Yet, an intellectual elite can 
influence policy without being in control of government, 
e.g., the Utilitarians and their efforts in reforming 
British parliamentary practices during the nineteenth- 
century. Empirical observation and measurement of linkage 
factors between Utilitarian philosophy and the various 
reform acts of Parliament would be diff icudtii, however, 
to accomplish.
16. Jose Ortega y Gasset, "The Unity of Europe,"
In opposition to this barbarianism, Ortega and the civi­
lized humanists championed the "ideal of a world civili­
zation synthesizing the foremost contributions of the 
diverse historical civilizations," thus, "no particular
civilization would be viewed as necessarily superior to 
17others." It was this cosmopolitan manifestation that 
had placed Ortega at odds with Unamuno and the Generation 
of ’98. But, it is also a distinction whereby Ortega 
achieves a following beyond that which is parochially 
Spanish.
In addition to the concepts surrounding the 
"invasion of barbarians," there is another important 
area of ideas that brings Ortega within the framework 
of the civilized humanists? value problems resulting 
from the encounter of western European peoples with 
other peoples -- societies -- of the world. To explain
trans. anon., Atlantic Monthly, April, 1941, PP* 432- 
433* refers to linguistic debasement. For his criti­
cism of modern, barbarian acts see his? The Dehuman­
ization of Art and Notes on the Novel, trans. Helene 
Weyl ("Princeton? Princeton University Press, 1948).
17. Weinstein, ojd. cit., p. 10. Also, as a specific 
example of Ortega's thought in this regard, and as an 
application of the principle of historical reason, he 
held that to look at a Spaniard as a Spaniard was to look 
backward. If Spain were to be alive in the twentieth 
century, it had to look at itself in the context of the 
times; therefore, in a European and World context if it 
sought to better itself. The community in which the 
Spaniard lived was no longer Spanish but cosmopolitan.
For a partial, translated expression of his position, 
see his essay "Concerning Pacifism," trans. A. Pastor,
The Nineteenth Century, July, 1938, pp. 20-34.
oy
the ramifications of the encounter, it began with the
explorations and colonizations undertaken by the Euro-
' /
pean nations. Other societies were discovered which had 
different religious, moral and value systems from those 
of Western civilization, and in the resulting clashes 
the European pattern was imposed as the superior system.
In more recent times, that early, somewhat Christian 
missionary posture has been challenged by an anthropo­
logical approach. This latter response considers each 
societal system with its particular religious, moral, 
and value system only as conditions relative to time and 
place; thus, it is possible to objectively examine and 
comprehend each society and how it developed.
It is this "conventional" approach to societal 
value systems and ethics by the Spanish philosopher that
provokes the sharpest criticism from the Aristotelian- 
1 RThomists. Yet, the Ortega who writes the Revolt of 
the Masses sees those masses as standing for no value —  
immorality rather than ammorality. Anarchical and vio­
lent, the barbarian masses abolish legal proceedings, and 
to impose their whims they take direct action. To control 
those masses, he urges the government of law and norms,
18. See: Ortega £ Gasset Existentialist: A
Critical Study of His Thought and Its Sources, trans. 
Joseph Small (Chicago: Henry Regnery^ 19^9)* P* 100.
Written by the Mexican Jesuit, Jose Sanchez Villasenor, 
the attack is particularly directed against Ortega's 
"ethical vitalism."
for "a life without principles is a greater privation
19of self than death." 7 Thus, in summation, confronted 
by a world crisis, the Ortega who approached ethics in 
a conventional fashion and treated life as a superfluity 
now sees Western Civilization on the verge of extinction 
With the absence of norms, the repudiation of laws and a 
loss of morality -- without commandments, laws, duties, 
and sanctions —  the Ortegan resolution is in a recourse 
to an elite, a select minority. Unlike other civilized 
humanists, however, who project solutions in terms of 
governmental frameworks whereby the will of the elite 
is transmitted into a value system of public policy, 
concrete Ortegan solutions remain truncated. Through 
the use of historical-vital reason, he eloquently des­
cribes the crisis, but:
Rather than launch a noble adventure with no 
other guide but the truth, he does not hesitate 
to leave his most penetrating and dramatic work, 
The Revolt of the Masses, mutilated and incom­
plete. We suspect a secret fear of exposing 
himself, of correcting the vitalistic immorality 
evident in his previous writings. 0
So, again, Ortegan observations fall short of
projections in the real order; and in this case there
could have been a specific application to the area of
19. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Obras completas (Madrid: 
Revista de Occidente, 1969)# PP. 1235-123o•
20. Villasenor. ££. clt., p. 116.
the State and politics. Exercising the clinical ability 
of a medical diagnostician, he can and does elucidate 
upon the causes of societal ills, but like today's 
specialized diagnostician he is unwilling to apply the 
final treatment or to provide those surgical skills 
necessary to complete the cure and rehabilitation of the 
patient. Every avenue leading toward the development of 
a political philosophy thus far, it would seem, has been 
left dead-ended. With the approach well paved by the 
fundamentals expressed in the Revolt of the Masses, what 
prevents Ortega from developing a civilized humanist 
philosophy of politics? The answer to this question, and 
an answer which keeps the elite ideas of Ortega solely in 
the area of political "thoughts" will be proffered in 
the ensuing section. Before proceeding with that topic, 
however, several concluding remarks are necessary.
First, in order that it not appear that Ortega 
has been judged too harshly in his failure to formalize 
his ideas into political institutions and practices, it 
must be noted that Ortega consistently abhors formali­
zation of any kind. He realizes that society is an 
element in which man has to move, but that with its rules, 
customs, and usages a too burdensome pressure is often 
brought to bear. The State -- the superlative of society 
is one of society's pressures, and indeed, the strongest 
force, and man needs it lest he be required to do every-
thing by himself."' The State, however, unlike Hegel's
mystical being, is not everything in society, it is only
a part. This does not imply that man can escape the fact
of its existence or its pressure, but to relieve this
force, Ortega advocates that the State envelop the social
body with the greatest ammount of elasticity. For this
to be accomplished, the people must be able to shape
their State after their own vital preferences instead of
warping themselves into any rigid mold of the State,
22In this fashion, the State functions like a skin. Man 
has ''life in freedom” when the State operates as an 
expansive cover. When it operates more as an orthopedic 
apparatus, then man has only a restricted "life of adap­
tation."2-^ The State's role, therefore, is two-fold»
(1) it is an occasional concept with a meaning dependent 
upon particular societies in time and place, and (2) it 
has the responsibility of always preserving a certain 
degree of identity. For Ortega to posit any ideal or 
practical type of State and form of government would be 
by his implications not only presumptuous but preposterous.
Secondly, the works of Ortega which relate to 
the school of civilized humanists, both philosophically
21, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Concord and Liberty, 
trans. Helene Weyl (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963)* P* 33*
22. Ibid., p. L7.
23. Ibid.
and empirically, stand for the most part, outside the 
mainstream of his philosophy. Invertebrate Spain, The 
Revolt of the Masses, The Mission of the University, 
and a small number of essays were each directed against 
a particular problem which was then more than adequately 
analysed by a similar pattern of techniques and themes —  
group dynamics, sociopsychological analysis, elites, 
masses. Undercurrents of his more consistent principles, 
however, undermine those works, and the results or con­
clusions in terms of concrete recourses were left lacking. 
A great deal of the misconceptions had about Ortega in 
regard to his over-all philosophy, has been due for the 
most part to those three works. They have been the ones 
most read, whether fully understood themselves or not, 
with the result being that the total spectrum of his 
ideas has been seldom examined or taken into consideration. 
In short, those writings are representative of only a 
certain phase of his intellectual development, and one 
that was virtually terminated with the collapse of Repub­
lican Spain. Regardless of whatever reasons caused his 
change of focus, it is to his later works that one must 
look for the development of his more consistent themes, 
albeit some of his primary concepts had appeared earlier 
in embryonic forms.
Lastly, it is not Impossible for Ortega to have 
developed a complete political philosophy by a logical
and empirical progression from the principles he set forth 
in those works corresponding to civilized humanism —  
had he made, of course, one significant alteration. George 
Santayana, an American "civilized humanist," has "developed 
a comprehensive, carefully articulated, philosophy of life 
and civilization" with basic concepts comparable to those 
of Ortega. Problems of liberty and civilization, govern­
ment and politics, as well as a theory of elites are worked 
out in detail. But, Santayana takes the step that Ortega
avoids. The American formalizes and thereby rejects the
2concept of constant flux. J The image projected by Ortega, 
in contrast to that of Santayana, is a State and its atten­
dant political system not only being divorced from ethics, 
but also being separated from any meaningful authority to 
sanction. It is apparent that these two principles go 
logically hand-in-hand in a philosophy of anarchic ideal­
ism, and such a position is reinforced by the absence of 
any formalized institutions. Does Ortega realize the
2A. Weinstein, o£. cit. , p. 83» quotes Morris 
Raphael Cohen, American Thought (New York: Mcmillan-
Collier, 1962), p. 390.
25. Santayana in his Reason in Society (New 
Yorkt Mcmillan-Collier, 1962), terms his form of elite 
government a "timocracy." For a description of its 
functions, see: pp. 131-132.
26. This could explain why the Anarchists, espe­
cially in Spain during the 1920’s and early 1930’s, read 
Ortega with some interest. Without championing their 
cause, he was, nevertheless, providing them with ideas 
upon which to base their action. Sees Hugh Thomas,
consequences of his thought? It seems that, on the one 
hand, he is writing against the concrete causes of a 
deplorable situation; and, on the other hand, trapping 
himself in the abstract order by supporting principles 
which can have the self-same effects. This concrete- 
abstract paradox will receive attention in a later chap­
ter, but it is important to note at this point that 
Ortega the "civilized humanist" could have avoided the 
inherent contradictions. On at least two occasions, the 
Spanish philosopher openly confronted issues which were 
more profound than those usually encountered in the 
course of his descriptive writings of the past or of 
the present —  the resolution of which would have enabled 
him to escape from his inconsistencies. In his Revolt 
of the Masses, he asks whether or not the mass-man can
be re-awakened to a personal life, but he replies by
27saying "this frightful theme is too virgin." A second 
confrontation occurred in "En el centenario de Hegel," 
("On the One-hundredth Anniversary of Hegel"), when he 
asks the question, "Who am I?" but, again, he declines 
to go beyond his "myself and my circumstances" in an
The Spanish Civil War (New York; Harper & Row, 1963)* 
pp. kO-kU,
27. Obras completas, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 131- 
133* Also on p. 190 of the Revolt of the Masses, op. cit. 
he states; "This great question must remain outside 
these pages."
yo
? Ranswer which is essentially historical.
The expectation that Ortega's theory of a select 
minority would lead to the development of a political 
philosophy comparable to those of the "civilized humanists" 
is thus left unfulfilled and in a paradoxical position.
But, this does not imply that Ortega's ideas, whether 
causal or philosophical, are not without merit. As is 
generally the case with most of his writings, and espe­
cially those on this subject, Ortega is acutely aware 
of the problems confronting the twentieth-century man.
He describes what he believes are the causes of the problems, 
and he offers a solution. He refuses to suggest, however, 
the means whereby his elite, concept can be projected 
directly into a political context. If this is a criticism, 
then it is offered to Ortega's credit that he stimulat- 
ingly and provokingly penetrates a crucial area of polit­
ical thought -- the philosophical bases of elite forms 
of government. Also, as source material, the quality of 
Ortega's observations gives him a stature far above the 
majority of those writing on this particular topic and 
the other conflicts in evidence or developing from at­
tempts to put such theories into operation.
Finally, and lest what has been said be taken in 
any wise as a concluding judgment, the venture by Ortega
28. Obras completas, op. cit. , Vol. V, p. *4-1^.
into the realm of civilized humanism is only a temporary 
deviation. There is another aspect of his thought to 
he presented, and no final evaluation can-be given until 
this position is examined. In the next chapter, the 
focus is upon Ortega's philosophy considered in reference 
to its existentialist content. From this over-view will 
emerge clarifications of his theories and doctrines which 
have been only alluded to thus far. For, his existen­
tialist views are the primary mainstreams influencing 
almost the entire spectrum of his writings. With only 
a vague appearance in his early works, this twentieth- 
century movement will gradually dominate his later 
publications. And, if a comprehensive political philos­
ophy by Ortega remains possible, it will be contingent 
upon the positions held by him and permitted by the 
tenets of this philosophy.
CHAPTER VI
ORTEGA’S EXISTENTIALISM
Existentialism is a philosophical movement which
has reached its full development only in the last fifty
years.^ Claiming among its forerunners such philosophers
as Augustine and Pascal, it is Soren Kierkegaard who is
2
generally acknowledged as the movement's founder. This 
nineteenth-century, Danish philosopher reacted against 
the cold, impersonal abstractions of the Hegelianism 
then dominant in northern Europe and, in turn, emphasized 
the concrete, spontaneous and free aspects of man's 
existence. From Kierkegaard to the present, Existen­
tialism has been much less a set of doctrines than it
1. Lee Cameron McDonald, Western Political Theory: 
The Modern Age (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
I962TI p. ^03, notes: "Existentialism is a much mis­
understood but highly important twentieth-century phenom­
enon, perhaps the most significant philosophic movement 
yet to rise up in this century. . . . its political 
consequences are tremendous."
2. Existentialism resists precise definition 
either as a collective "ism," or as a distinct "school" 
of philosophical thought. For this reason the word 
"movement" is used here rather than the narrower term 
"school." A movement includes several schools with one 
or more important factors —  whether of starting point, 
method, or doctrine -- in common.
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has been a certain approach to philosophy common to a
3
number of thinkers with divergent concepts. For all 
its variances, the movement's thinkers, in their common 
approach, have stressed man rather than nature, the 
richness of man's personal life and the essential quality 
of the relationships among men. Concerned primarily with 
the "human" person, the Existentialists usually have 
been more occupied with psychology and ethics. But, 
this does not say enough, for in these two divisions of 
philosophy, the movement has departed from the traditional 
formats. It has stressed the concrete rather than the 
abstract, the particular rather than the universal truth, 
and human feeling and the will rather than the pure 
intellect.
Although the Existentialists have no set doctrine, 
each of the movement's philosophers have also approached 
their efforts with a practical and vital concern for 
man. To them, philosophy is not a mere speculative 
undertaking. Each thinker, albeit in varying phraseology
3« Examples of individual differences in basic 
doctrine are: the Protestants Kierkegaard, Jaspers and
Tillich and the Catholic Marcel are Theists. Nietzsche, 
Camus, Sartre and Heidegger are Atheists.
Philosophy to the Existentialists is ". . .an 
experiment in which the philosopher is not an observer 
detached from the data and manipulations, but a person 
who 'stands in the very core of the experiment himself'.
. . ." Thus, the Existentialist does not split thought 
and action, but takes them together in the human situation 
See: Michael Weinstein, Philosophy, Theory, and Method
stresses the importance of man's "authentic" existence. 
And, each argues against the individual drifting along 
with the crowd. Positively, they believe that man must 
be himself, face his own situation however tragic, accept 
his responsibilities and choose his own course deliber­
ately and freely.^ In subtle philosophical formats that 
often ramble in scope, the Existentialists seem to be 
both apolitical and even antipolitical in some cases.
In the following analysis, however, there is little 
doubt that the movement's concepts have very significant 
political ramifications.
With regard to political philosophy, Existential­
ism requires the theorist to reorientate himself away 
from the search for fixed classifications whereby human 
behavior can be explained. The new focus is the condi­
tion of man —  in effect, the consequences of man's 
social and political structures. The model of the "au­
thentic" man is then referred to man's "human," or actual, 
position. More often than not, the Existentialist con-
in Contemporary Political Thought (Glenview: Scott,
Foresman, 1971)» P* 55* Weinstein quotes from Ernst 
Breisach, Introduction to Modern Existentialism (Mew 
York: Grove Press, 196FJ, p. h-.
5» "The hallmarks of Existentialism have been the 
continued attempts to give a serious analysis of human 
existence and describe the tragic price that one must pay 
to live authentically in the twentieth-century." 
Weinstein, o£. cit., p.
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eludes that the freedom of man has been denied and re­
stricted by the prevailing structures. In that these 
structures are reinforced by prevailing ethical and 
philosophical systems, Existentialists find themselves 
in a position of being opposed to the social and politi­
cal status quo. It is for this reason that the movement 
has been identified as "revolts against," or "revolts 
within," various political systems. There is inherent 
in this revolt an explanation as to why the philosophers 
of the movement choose to describe rather than to define. 
Essentially, the authentic man must have the freedom to 
realize his potential.^ To conceptualize man's knowledge, 
nature and conditions, social and political, would be to
impound a free existence. The only boundaries applicable
n
to man are those things beyond his potential. Existen­
tialists in their political philosophy; therefore, seldom 
set forth a comprehensive political philosophy; that is,
6. Eugene J. Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought : 
A Critical Study (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press'^  19o7),
p. 384, notes: "The human predicament is defined by the
Existentialists in purely subjective terms. 'Existence 
precedes essence.' Man is born into the world as a body
of possibilities; what he is at any moment in time is 
what he has experienced. Man defines himself by experi­
encing and by acting; he creates his values by living and 
by choosing."
7. Three things which Existentialists generally 
consider beyond man's potential, or his "boundary con­
ditions," are: his being in the world; his being among
others; and his death. See: Ibid., p. 57 > and William
Ernest Hocking, "Marcel and the Ground Issues of Meta-
to the point of implementing their ideas in the concrete 
order of politics. Politics is for them "that field in 
which the fateful organization of the power of one man
Q
over another is established."
When the movement's theories of society and the 
State are examined, there are additional departures from 
past philosophical positions. First, they hold that man 
is not just the basic unit, but he is the only "real" 
unit. Men are found in numerous groupings —  economic, 
social, religious, political —  yet, the choice of belong­
ing is man's and the collectivity cannot presuppose or 
infringe upon man's freedom. He is free to join and
free to resign, and he gives only what he chooses of
g
himself to the group. As a political theorist, where 
society and the State are concerned, the Existentialist 
becomes, therefore, more of a descriptive ethnologist 
with his primary focus upon how authentic man's condition 
is in time and place. And, the task of the Existentialist 
philosopher is to exhort man to realize his fullest
physics," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
Vol. 14-, June, 1954, p. 4-67.
8. Breisach, ojd. cit., p. 235* Also, McDonald, 
op. cit., p. 407, notes that Jean-Paul Sartre especially 
attacks the concept of the natural community. The commu­
nity is established out of fear, maintained by terror, 
and is artificial,
9* This denies the theory of "group" psychology.
The only psychology applicable is that which is egocentric.
J. \ J J
potential.
These characteristics of Existentialism appear to 
have been formulated and made applicable to the "Specta­
tor" himself -- Jose Ortega y Gasset. To give the des­
cription a more special application, the works of the 
Spanish philosopher are now approached from this outlook. 
To avoid, however, a reiteration of what has been previ­
ously written, an introductory summation portrays Ortega 
as a philosopher of culture, but:
. . .  a culture recognized as ephemeral and rela­
tive, no more than a natural process of living 
bound down to existence, spurning hierarchical 
standards, rejecting the bigoted savants of the 
last century. . . , "10
To Ortega, this does not mean a philosophy of moribund
pessimism. He approaches reality with a kind of "love"
that sees even in the lowliest creature a drive for
fulfillment. Disgusted with the past philosophies that
spoke of distant perspectives, he focuses his attention
on the immediate environment —  on the problems of day-
to-day living. With a "philosophy of the day," the
10. Jose Sanchez Villasenor, Ortega ^ Gasset 
Existentialist: A Critical Study of His Thought and Its
Sources, trans. Joseph Small (Chicago: Henry Regnery,
19WT7"p. 133* Ortega asked: "Is it not a theme worthy
of a generation which stands at the most radical crisis of 
modern history, if an attempt be made to oppose the 
tradition and see what happens if instead of saying,
'life for the sake of culture,' we say, 'culture for the 
sake of life'?" See: Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Modern
Theme. trans. James Cleugh (New York: Harper & How,
1961), p. 70.
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triumph of life's values becomes Ortega's unvarying theme 
in all his reflections. It is this theme that provides 
the key to all his philosophical studies, and it is 
expressed in a literary style having an elegance and 
charm not to be found in most philosophical studies.
Other than being a philosopher, Ortega is also a psychol­
ogist, and he explores man's emotions and his relation­
ships with others in a penetrating insight into group 
11dynamics. But, above all, life is the supreme value —  
reason, pure reason, must be subjected to living and 
become vital reason. Human existence is valuable in 
itself, and it does not need rigid confinement by ascet­
icism, culture, or justice. Even though men have livedi
. . . for religion, for science, for morality, 
for economics; they have even lived to serve the 
will-o'-the-wisp of art or of pleasure; the only 
thing they have not tried is to live deliberately 
for the sake of l i v i n g . 12
Thus, life is its own justification, the supreme value
of existence —  superior to all norms, irreducible to
concepts, and facinatingly ephemeral in its eternal
evolution.
11. For an example of Ortega in the role of a 
psychologist, see; Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Nature of 
Love, with an "Introduction to Ortega" by George Pendle, 
The Living Age, Vol. 3^3» February, 1933» PP» 522-530.
12. Villasenor, oj3. cit. , p. 138» citesi Jose 
Ortega y Gasset, Obras completas, 1st ed. (Madrid; 
Revista de Occidente, 19^8-^?)» p. 860.
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Critics of Ortega’s theme have sought to trace
his thoughts to numerous sources: Renan, Goethe,
13Bergson, Fichte, Dilthey, Heidegger . . . et al. J And, 
in attacking the ideas of those writers, they have sought 
to destroy the position of Ortega. Such an approach 
might be acceptable if the purpose was to criticize from 
the philosophical position of an opposing value system. 
The task at hand, however, is to present those ideas of 
the Spanish philosopher which flow from his basic prin­
ciple -- his existentialist tenets -- and then to capture 
their relevance in regard to a political philosophy.
So, returning to the Ortegan theme of Mlife as 
the highest value," it must be noted that life suffers 
from a basic insecurity -- the historically, inexorable 
environment. Without knowing how and without having 
given existence to himself, man finds himself "under-
lA
going a process of radical disorientation." The intel­
lect becomes man's instrument whereby he confronts his 
situation and seeks to provide for his vital needs. By 
functioning in a human life moved by the constitutive 
urgencies of this life, the intellect has its practical
13. A sympathetic study is given by David White 
in his "One of the Twelve: The Life and Thought of
Jose Ortega y Gasset," Religion in Life, Vol. 25, Spring 
1956, pp. 2^7-258. Villasenor, op. cit., the Jesuit, 
attacks Ortega through what he believes are Ortega's 
sources.
l^ . The Modern Theme, op. cit., p. 79*
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usefulness. And, with intelligence being practical and 
utilitarian, the driving force of thought becomes the 
demanding desire to ground itself in living, and, so, 
to live to the maximum of man's particular ideas. Only 
in this way can man's life be fruitful, genuine, and 
authentic.^ Carried to its logical conclusion, ethics 
becomes equated with life's vital necessities, and the 
intellect becomes subject to man's will.
In Ortega's ethical framework, values are pred­
icated upon a vitalistic type of morality, and he defined 
them as "a strange, nebulous class of objects which our 
conscience encounters outside itself as it encounters 
trees and men." A value is a truth only because it 
pleases man in time and place, or, because he desires it. 
Possessing both negative and positive properties, a value 
presents dimensions of quality, hierarchy, and material­
ity. Taken collectively, however, it is erroneous to
consider them as a system of prohibitions and generic
17duties which were the same for all individuals. Each
15. Martin Nozeck, "Unamuno, Ortega, and Don Juan," 
The Romantic Review, Vol. 0^, December, 19^9» PP» 268-27^. 
elaborates on this theme by using Ortega's defense of Don 
Juan as an "authentic" man rather than being the hedonist 
who refuses to conform to established norms of conduct.
Don Juan is an example of the free man whose intellect is 
grounded in living.
16. Villasenor, ojd. cit., p. 106, quotes from the 
Revista de occidente, Vol. I, No. p. 58*
17. The Modern Theme, op. cit., pp. 71-77. Chapter
.Luy
human, individually or in a group, has his own values —
the professor, the politician, the woman of the world —
and because each person possesses his own, untransferable
destiny, values are matters of expediency and personal
propriety. As for duty and obligation, these are things
that are "superabundantly added to that which is necessary
and essential," and they are only "needed to fill the
1 8emptiness left by illusion and enthusiasm." It is 
because of this ethical vitalism cutting through his 
thought that Ortega refuses to institutionalize his 
conclusion in the Revolt of the Masses. Nothing is more 
opposed to his moral concepts than a mandatory system of 
rigid norms. For the Spanish philosopher, ethics and 
duties have to be freely accepted rules of conduct, 
otherwise, man can neither be free nor authentic.
Clearly, Ortega's vitalistic ethics have become 
a self-determining system that stands apart from tradi­
tional norms. With one's own life being the ethic, it 
becomes a moral imperative for each man to strive for
the fulfillment of his destiny -- to realize his ever-
19becoming potential. ' Reason is to serve this purpose,
VIII, "Vital Values." Reference is also made to the 
hierarchy of values in Ortega's article "The Pride of 
the Basques," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 207, January, 1961, 
p. 114.
18, Obras completas. op. cit. , p. 1064.
19. Ibid., p. 1341.
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and this is what he means in the Modern Theme when he
states! "Pure Reason must yield its dominion to Vital 
20Reason." But, if man has the vital imperative to act 
in accord with his destiny, how does Ortega explain the 
paradox of man being a prisoner of his environment —  
himself plus his circumstances? To this question, he
21replies that man is free to accept or avoid his destiny.
Man is not only free, but he can never be sure what his
vocation is. Life, then, the supreme value with its
own vital imperative, is also an uncertainty in which
each person constantly faces the danger of not being
able to realize his true self. It is for this reason
that Ortega constantly stresses that, rather than be
faced with despair, man should be inspired to approach
22his life as a challenging mission.
20. The Modern Theme, op. cit., p. 59*
21. Jose Ortega y Gasset, History as a System and 
Other Essays Toward a Philosophy of History, trans. Helene 
Weyl (New York! W. W. Norton, 1952), p. 203. Brenton 
Campbell in his article "Free Will and Determinism in the 
Theory of Tragedy," The Hispanic Review. Vol. 37, July, 
1969, PP. 375-382, also elaborates on man's freedom in 
terms of his will by contrasting the views of Perez de 
Ayala with those of Ortega. Citing sections from The 
Revolt of the Masses and two articles from the Obras 
completas, Campbell concludes that Ortega believes the 
world to be determined and unchangeable, but that within 
the world, man possesses "the power to choose what he will 
do and be." Man is "obliged to exercise his liberty of 
choice, for even doing nothing represented a decision."
22. Indeed, it is the "superior man" who selects 
objectives beyond himself, and places himself in their 
service. Obras completas, op. cit., see especially
JLuy
These principles, which recur throughout Ortega's
various writings, reflect the four central themes of
existentialism: (1) the description of life as a unique
happening; (2) the opposition to any philosophical system
that posits a complete explanation of man's being; (3)
the obsession of man for an authentic life; and (4) the
23disassociation of man from himself,  ^ Sensitive to the 
over-all conditions of his half of the twentieth-century, 
the "Spectator'' sees all the promises of past philosophies, 
and theologies as well, failing to protect the freedom of 
the individual. Most of the abuse man is enduring is in 
turn sanctioned by some "rational" format. In a parallel 
with the dehumanization man suffered during the middle 
ages, contemporary man is again finding his rights and 
duties contingent upon his being a functionary in a 
highly bureaucratic society. The tragedy of modern man 
is that he is compelled to live within the system's guide­
lines; thus, to stay alive, a human being has to give up 
not only his freedom but the essence of his being. In
Volume IV, pp. 181-182, This is in accord with Ortega's 
position that "freedom" is a lack of restraint and not 
lack of causation. Free will is thus synonymous with 
self-determination. The "ordinary man" interprets the 
world, on^the other hand as something definite and fixed. 
See: Jose Ortega y Gasset, "Time, Distance, and Form in
Proust," trans. Irving Singer, Hudson Review, Vol. 11, 
Winter 1958-1959. P. 508.
23o Breisach, ££. cit., p. 21.
effect, man is not himself and. his circumstances, but one 
totally conditioned by his societal as well as his biolog­
ical environment -- a position of complete impotency.
Just as the Renaissance and Reformation had served to 
revive medieval man to his status of a human being,
Ortega and the Existentialists seek to provide a "new 
revelation" whereby the authentic man can again be 
possible.
The question remains, however, as to what that 
new revelation consists of whereby man can lead an au­
thentic life and be inspired to pursue his life's mission. 
It is to this end that Ortega sets out to fully develop 
his principle of "vital" reason. After proposing the 
concept in his Modern Theme, written in the early
1920's Ortega left its development suspended in his
2 3thought patterns for nearly a decade. Perhaps it was 
because of his involvement with Spanish politics, or due 
to his deviation into the civilized humanist domain of 
elites, masses, and barbarians. But, for whatever reason, 
the principle re-emerges in more refined terms by the 
mid-1930's and its newer exposition is to refute some
2^. History as a System and Other Essays Toward 
a Philosophy of History, op. cit., p. 223.
25. In Ortega's "Preface" to The Modern Theme, 
op. cit., p. 9» he notes that the work had its origin in 
a series of lectures he delivered to his students during 
the school year 1921-22.
misconceptions that developed concerning several of his 
earlier statements.
One misinterpretation resulted from the Ortegan 
emphasis on life. This led some of his readers to assume 
that the Spanish philosopher's position was purely vital- 
istic a biological philosophy. As early as 1924, 
Ortega denied this meaning, for "biological vitalism" 
was applicable to scientific thought and was in no way 
suited to his purpose as it did not allow human freedom
p ZT
or originality. The second interpretation possible, 
that of philosophical vitalism, was more of an episte- 
mological method, and it was this type of vitalism that 
Ortega left for later elaboration.
To reduce the element of ambiguity, it must be 
here noted that philosophical vitalism has at least 
three meanings:
1. To the Pragmatist, knowledge implies a bio­
logical process which is totally subject to 
physical laws —  a completely empirical process.
2. To Evolutionary Materialists, knowledge is an 
intuitive process in which rationalism is 
denied as well as any epistemology per se.
3* To the Existentialists, knowledge is of a
26. "Neither Vitalism nor Rationalism," Obras 
completas. op. cit., Vol. Ill, pp. 270-280. Later, in 
his essay on "The Nature of the Novel," trans. Evelyn 
Rugg and Diego Marin, The Hudson Review, Vol. X, Septem­
ber, 1957» P* 42, Ortega states that biological vitalism, 
as set forth by Darwin, has " . . .  succeeded in imprison­
ing life —  our last hope -- within physical necessity. 
Life is reduced to mere matter, physiology to mechanics."
rational character, but life has to be the 
focus of philosophical endeavor and the task 
of reason is to seek an understanding of 
life's meaning.^?
It is the third type of vitalism which comes the nearest
to Ortega's concepts and purposes, and it is this basic
position that begins to clarify in his later works.
With his distrust of both Idealism and Realism 
-- pure reason and physical reason -- Ortega does not 
leave for himself the positions of being either neutral­
ist or irrationalist. His task is seen as being one of 
not developing a new theory of reason, but of orientating 
it toward life. Human life is not imbued with reason, 
but man develops it and he uses it. Man not only has to
cope with his circumstances, but he has to relate to his
28surroundings as well. And, although man's environmental 
relationships and encounters are not always rational, 
his life without reason is impossible, Reason being
27. Jose Ferrater Mora mentions these three types 
of ‘'philosophical" vitalisms in Ortega £ Gasset 1 An 
Outline of His Philosophy, trans. Helene Weyl (New Haven? 
Yale University Press, 1957), P* 38. Chapter IV of this 
study is an in-depth analysis of Ortega's concept of 
"ratio-vita'lism," pp. 38-^6.
28. History as a System and Other Essays Toward 
a Philosophy of History, op. cit., pp. 170-171. Ortega 
goes on to sayi "If with serene self-mastery he uses 
the apparatus of his intellect, if in particular he uses 
it in orderly fashion, he will find that his faculty of 
thought is ratio, reason, and that in reason he possesses 
the almost magic power of reducing everything to clarity
. . . penetrating it by analysis until it is become 
self-evident."
especially utilitarian, man has to know how to act. He 
has the freedom to seek out his destiny, and it is his 
reason that saves him from despair —  his "vital" reason,^ 
Vital reason, being an adjunct to the reality 
of life for Ortega, also carries with it the implication 
of its serving as an approach —  a method. Yet, what is 
its course, its rules? Ortega rejects traditional norms 
-- ethics -- so, what system could be used? Here, Ortegan 
philosophical vitalism turns to the empirical guidelines 
of experience, and this is what gives life its dramatic 
character -- the "shipwreck" man confronts. In a play on 
words, it is man, not viewing his circumstances, but 
rather _in view of his circumstances, who is acting, or 
more properly re-acting. As a result he acquires "con­
victions", positive and negative, which take the form of
30"ideas" predicated upon evidence and experience. It
is by his ideas that man seeks his authentic self, and
31acts toward the fulfillment of his destiny.
What Ortega finally comes to in his elaboration 
of vital reason is a life's reality having its source
29. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Concord and Liberty, 
trans. Helene Weyl (New Yorks W. W. Norton, 19^3)• 
pp. 6 4 - 6 5 .
30. Toward a Philosophy of History, op. cit. ,
p. 174. See alsoi Jose Ortega y Gasset, Man and Crisis, 
trans. Mildred Adams (New Yorks W. W. Norton, 1962), 
pp. 23-24.
31. Concord and Liberty, op. cit., p. 99*
In historical experience; thus, his vital reason becomes
32in his later works "historical" reason. The principle 
"I am myself and my circumstances," is to become in its 
final form an attitude that man is not an immutable being 
living in one historical period but a creature whose 
reality is solely determined and crucially molded by 
his history -- past and present. Just as the Ortegan 
restriction of the concept of ideas is to provoke strong 
disputations among and between philosophers and psychol­
ogists, his merging of vital reason with an historicism is
33to open additional avenues of criticism.  ^ Regardless 
of whether the concept is interpreted rigidly or moder­
ately, its influence upon his previous doctrines of man 
and society becomes immediately evident. Also, his 
elaboration of the concept is eventually to be extended 
to the question of the nature of philosophy itself.
This last facet of Ortegan existentialism —  a 
philosophy of philosophy -- is given primary attention
by the philosopher in his essay "Notes on Thinkings Its
3Z4,
Creation of the World and Its Creation of God." Seeking
32. Ibid., pp. 92-96. Ortega discusses this 
topic under the title "Brief Digressions on the ’Histor­
ical Sense'."
33- Mora, ojd. cit., pp. ^2-^6, examines the flaws 
in Ortega's philosophy as well as the implications his 
historicism has in regard to metaphysics,
3^ . Concord and Liberty, op. cit., pp. 51-82.
to resolve the role of philosophy in the life of man,
Ortega projects its justification only in so far as it
contributes to man's living. As knowledge has been 
described as a vital function in this regard, so too has 
philosophy to be constantly renewing itself in the service 
of man. It must be more than a mere logical format estab­
lished over two-thousand years ago which may or may not 
be applicable to the time at hand. There is no denial 
that purely logical thought is a philosophical process, 
but it is irrelevant unless it is related to the concrete
order, includes the philosophical order, and is utili­
tarian. The quest for truth, always in flux, has espe­
cially to be undertaken in the proper historical context.
There is little doubt that traditionalists in 
ethics, logics, metaphysics, psychology, and even pure 
philosophers take issue with Ortega's existentialist 
thought. There can be no denial, however, that the 
course he follows focuses upon human life and its condi­
tions. Although he chooses a route that is in opposition 
to normative systems and one that is essentially critical, 
he is no pessemist. What he seeks is to free man from 
prior systems of thought which in their manifestations 
have been not only abusive but have subjected the activi­
ties of each human being to a regime of codified, pre­
defined categories. Ortega is therefore, reluctant ever 
to define. His medium is description, and in his
writings on human life, this approach is not an incon­
sistency. For, to define is to limit, and life, always 
changing, out-distances any conceptualization. The 
"seed of Heraclitus grown full" thus allows for human 
possibilities to be realized. If man is to be free and 
authentic, the imposition of artificial or arbitrary 
boundaries contradicts the meaning of life. True, man 
functions under restraints, but these should at best be 
only "possibilities" of human choice. This, however, 
leads to other areas of examination, and the task now 
is to project Ortegan thought into the area of politics 
—  in effect, to relate his philosophical existentialism 
to his political thought.
CHAPTER VII
HIS CONCEPTS ON THE STATE AND 
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
To give clarification and unity to the concepts 
discussed in this chapter, a brief prefacing includes 
two of Ortega's recurring views concerning man and society. 
The first is his view of man with regard to the individ­
ual's group-societal relationships. It is recalled that 
the Ortegan man is an "historical being among others."
As such, the individual human being is the only real 
social unit. There is no denial that society is a condi­
tion in which man has to live; yet, other than this over­
all grouping, the philosopher does not recognize any 
other sub-units which have usually been considered as 
purely social. For Ortega to have done so would have 
meant that man's freedom would have suffered from excessive 
group demands. Also, the individual would have been 
placed in too many "circumstances" which pressured him 
to concede in obeisance to an imposed collectivity. To 
Ortega, societal groupings are always prejudicial to 
human freedom per se, and there is always the inherent 
danger of human choice being preempted by group associ-
117
ations. His opposition is especially directed against 
associations which are involuntary in nature rather than 
those which are solely voluntary. The individual can 
lend his support to a sub-societal grouping, but the 
choice must be his own. It also follows that a man's 
support of a group implies that he shares in the recog­
nized as well as unrecognized consequences of that 
membership.1
The second prefacing issue involves what Ortega 
and other Existentialists refer to as the "public situa­
tion." This condition is viewed from the two ways in
which the human being, as he is affected by the political
2
order, can be studied. From one point of view, the human 
condition is observed as it occurred in the lives of past 
human beings. Investigating those lives in their parti­
cular time-place environment, Ortega then relates them 
to the over-all social and political situations and gives 
a descriptive interpretation of the degree of personal 
freedom peculiar to the given era. By using this tech­
nique, Ortega's role is that of an historical ethnographer
1. "Existentialists never tire of pointing out 
that not even soldiers can escape morally from freedom 
by pleading that they had to follow orders in every 
case." Seei Michael Weinstein, Philosophy, Theory, and 
Method in Contemporary Political Thought (Glenview, Illi­
nois t Scott, Foresman, 1971)» P* 59* Ortega would not 
have used the term "morally," but rather the term "conse­
quence ,"
2. Ibid.
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and not that of a political philosopher. He uses this 
technique on past and present public situations. But, 
he then expands upon these time-place observations by- 
adding his own specific experiences. With this combi­
nation, he establishes a philosophical framework and 
makes it accessible to his readers as ''experiences of 
men in'the various conditions of contemporary societies."^ 
Using the other viewpoint, Ortega observes the public 
situation in terms of the possibilities man has for 
living an authentic life in the time-place circumstances 
he describes. The description includes a criticism of 
the philosophical system then current and constricting 
the individual. His criticism, however, is always negative. 
Ortega does not propose an alternate political philosophy -- 
either for the past public situations, or for the present.
To advocate a political philosophy would be contradictory 
to the existentialist position of each person arriving
3. The existentialist political philosopher thus 
employs the technique of "representation," whereby 1 "All 
that the historian or ethnographer can do, and all that 
we can expect of either of them, is to enlarge a specific 
experience to the dimensions of a more general one, 
which thereby becomes accessible as experience to men
of another country or another epoch," Weinstein, Ibid., 
quotes from Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology 
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), p. 1?. He further notes
that such efforts can be judged only on what is called 
the "agreement of personal testimonies."
4. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Concord and Liberty, 
trans. Helene Weyl (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963)1 PP» 
9-48. The essay "Concord and Liberty" is an example of 
Ortega's use of this technique. Basically, it is a
at his own norms through the continual process of actual­
izing his possibilities. Thus, what Ortega has to say 
concerning the political order will only go so far as 
saying what must not be done if man’s freedom is to go 
unthreatened. He will not presume to tell man what he 
has to do.
With these conditioning aspects in mind, what 
does Ortega have to say about the State —  its origin, 
nature, and purpose? What are his ideas on government—  
its role, form, and relationship to the governed? At 
this point, and on the basis of what has been said, there 
is little doubt that the philosopher’s attitude toward 
these subjects is negative. He considers the State to 
be the ’’superlative" of society, and it is the strongest 
instrument of social pressure. Because of its potential 
for oppression, Ortega advocates that its authority should 
be very elastic.^ These are important characteristics, 
and they will be elaborated upon later in their more 
proper context. For developmental reasons, the immediate 
objective is to examine what Ortega believes is the origin
modified form of the analogy.
5* Concord and Liberty, op. cit., p. 33* Ortega 
notes 1 ”A state always and essentially exerts pressure 
upon the individuals who constitute it. Proceeding by 
means of domination and rule, it cannot help making it­
self felt as coercion," In the same work, p. 105, Ortega 
gives his explanation of the term "superlative."
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of the State.
Until the writing of his last work, Man and People, 
Ortega had given the subject of the State only an inci­
dental consideration, and then only as its aspects 
related to his various other topics.^ In the chapter 
entitled "What People Says ’Public Opinion,' Social 
Observances,' Public Power," he sees the State as being
the result of strength -- the power manifestation of 
7
man. Life is a drama and as such it has its plot. In 
that man's ideas constitute the essentials of that plot, 
how and by what means can he fulfill his destiny? The 
State, as a power manifestation, varies in man's ideas 
but has its origin, nevertheless, in those ideas. That 
it is natural is not self-evident. Its "naturalness" 
is predicated upon it being accepted by man's prevailing 
ideas. Because these ideas have become usages, the 
State has become an established means of power, and 
has come to exert its constraint upon everyone in the 
form of a "binding observance."
6. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Man and People, trans. 
Willard R. Trask (New Yorks W. W. Norton, 1957). In 
192^, Ortega published an essay entitled "The Sportive 
Origin of the State," and it was eventually reprinted 
in his History as a System and Other Essays Toward a 
Philosophy of History, trans. Helen Weyl (New Yorks 
W. W. Norton, 1962), pp. 13-^0. The "sportive" nature 
of this work is quite different, however, from the somber 
tones of Man and People published nearly thirty years 
later.
7. Ibid., pp. 258-272.
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The binding force exercised by these observances 
is clearly and often unpleasantly perceived by 
anyone who tries to oppose it. At every normal 
moment of collective existence an immense reper­
tory of these established opinions is in obligatory 
observancej they are what we call "commonplaces.
The two, marked characteristics of a binding observance
are given by Ortega asj
(1) that . . . whatever be its origin, it does not 
present itself to us as something that depends 
upon our individual adherence but, on the contrary, 
is indifferent to our adherence, it i_s there, we 
are obliged to reckon with it and hence it exer­
cises its coercion on us, since the simple fact 
that we have to reckon with it whether we want to 
or not is already coercion;
(2) contrariwise, at any monent we can resort to it 
as to an authority, a power to which we can look 
for support.9
Interestingly, the two characteristics attributed 
to the State have also been attributed to public opinion, 
to law, and to government. Ortega recognizes this, and 
points out that past philosophers have made an error in 
separating these aspects of a single collectivity.
Society, as a body of usages, imposed Itself upon man; 
yet, it is an authority to which recourse can be had for 
protection. Being an imposition and a recourse, the 
State -- the superlative of society -- is in essence a 
power, "an insuperable power facing the individual.1 ^
8. Ibid., p. 265.
9. Ibid., p. 268.
10. Ibid., p. 269.
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The State, then is an energetic emanation of ideas 
expressed in public opinion and inseparable from it. Where 
men have erred, says Ortega, is in giving the name "State," 
and "society" to a collectivity; and, it has resulted in 
a euphemism that has falsified man's view of his collec­
tive life. That which has been taken to be "societal" 
has implied harmonious relationship. What has received 
little or no consideration is the fact that societal 
relationships are also dissocietal —  unharmonious. There 
is that "never-ending struggle between its genuinely 
social elements and behaviors and its dissociative or 
antisocial elements and b e h a v i o r s . F o r  any society 
to exist with a minimum of genuine sociability there is 
the need for a public power to intervene. The State, 
through its government and law, is the institution, and 
its auxiliaries manifest the necessary strength for 
society to endure.
There is in Ortega's description all the material 
elements traditionally attributed to the State: people,
territory, and government. Also, to the State, supported 
by public opinion, he gives that essential of power which 
distinguishes it from other societal groupings. As long 
as the State is an obligatory observance backed by estab­
lished opinions, it is empowered with absolute, coercive
11. Ibid.
authority to intervene even in violent form. This is 
the State as described by the "Spectator." His descrip­
tion does not mean he accepts it as natural, true or 
untrue, good or bad. It means simply that the State 
has its origin in the ideas of man, that it is supported 
and perpetuated by public opinion, and that it comes into 
existence when the society develops and ceases to be
primitive. Man thus has created a special body empow-
12ered to act in an irresistible form.
With regard to the question raised by political
philosophers as to what gives unity to the body politic,
Ortega lends no support to the State being a spiritual
or a biological entity. Each of these theories implies
a totalitarianism which Ortega cannot accept -- their
being antithetical to the need of man to be free if he
13is to be authentic. Nor can he accept any mechanistic 
theory as that which gives unity to the State. To do so 
in this case would deny the social aspects of man’s 
character, and it would reduce man to being somewhat of 
a gear in a motor. For Ortega, the only theory of unity 
which is acceptable is one that recognizes the individual 
as the primary unit of the body politic whose end is
12. Ibid., p. 272.
13* To deify the State as Hegel did, Ortega 
declares a senseless mysticism. See his Revolt of the 
Masses, trans. anon. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1957)• 
pp. 127-136.
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separate and distinct from the social whole. This is not 
a State that operates in conformity with either fixed 
biological or mechanical laws. It is a State predicated 
upon a foundation of free human beings which in no way 
impairs the realization of their developing potentials 
after its establishment. The State is not divine in 
origin, but the product of man's ideas; and, as such, it 
is an artificial thing subject to man's determination.
The measurement of its being "good" or “bad'' is only in 
the sense that it must be dynamic in relation to histor­
ical reason. Corporate or collective "good" above the 
lives of each individual has no place. In this sense, 
the unity of the State is equivalent to the sum total of 
each person's desires, interests, passions, and intelli­
gences; and its service is that of an apparatus of 
1^perfecting.
Of the three theories whereby the State histori­
cally comes into existence —  force, kinship, social 
contract -- there is no question that Ortega subscribes 
to the force system. Whether it is the effort of young 
men or mature men, that which predominates in man's 
earliest social organizations is power. In power there 
is conflict and war. War calling for a leader, discipline,
>; 14. Jose Ortega y Gasset, "Espana invertebrada,"
Obras completas, (Madrid; Revista de Occidente, 1969). 
Vol. Ill, p. 106. Also see p. 113 of Invertebrate Spain, 
trans. Mildred Adams (New York; W. W. Norton, 1937)1
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authority and law, a spirit of societal concern develops-,
and the primitive life in common eventually projects the
1<
idea of a primeval political association, It is not 
the family that is the primal unit of early political 
association, but age classes that dominate through strength. 
In time and place, hordes become tribes and tribes become 
“bodies politic." The unification is affected by power, 
and the social classes are differentiated between on the 
same power basis. "And, all this indlstinguishably merging 
into one phenomena," Ortega says provides "the irrational 
historical origin of the S t a t e . B y  taking this posi­
tion, the problems of philosophical origin and rational 
justification for the existence and authority of the 
State have no place in Ortegan thought. As to man's 
continuing need for the State, his explanation rests on 
a quite elementary truth —  it is an historical fact!
And, this "historical fact" is given sustained support 
by man because it proves itself useful, otherwise, it 
could not have existed since the beginning of recorded 
history.^
15. History as a System, op. cit., pp. 28-29.
16. Ibid., p. 31.
17. David Easton, The Political Systems An Inquiry 
into the State of Political Science (New Yorks Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1966), p. 223, finds a similar basis for political 
science. He states: "Like all social knowledge; political
science has its origins and continuing support in the 
obvious fact that human beings find it useful. If men
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The positing of the State as an historical verity 
relieves Ortega of any need for the mental gymnastics 
which have plagued other political philosophers on this 
subject. As for the question of political authority —  
the legal and moral power of the State to require obedi­
ence -- this too becomes irrelevant. For, authority is 
in the ideas-beliefs of men, and it is established there 
by obligatory observances, usages, and public opinion. 
Like the State, authority is an historical fact, and 
man must reckon with its coercive power. There is,
therefore, no need to justify it by any complicated and
1 ftunreal divine, designative, or translative theories.
How does the State prove itself useful? Inasmuch 
as the State operates through its government, Ortega's 
answer to this question becomes an inquiry into the 
activities of government. But, government has two 
purposesi proximate and ultimate. What does he have to
did not feel that political science does or might ulti­
mately satisfy some human purposes, it could scarcely 
have existed for over two thousand years."
18. These theories have been used to explain the 
source and justification of political authority. Divine 
theories hold that political power is vested by God 
directly in a person or group; translation theories hold 
that God bestows power in the political community as a 
whole and not in one or a number of persons; and the 
designation theories hold that civil power is transferred 
to its holder by God once the political community desig­
nates the ruler, person or group. These concepts are 
theistic examples, but there are other types. Sees 
Henry J. Schmandt and Paul G. Steinbicker, Fundamentals 
of Government (Milwaukeei Bruce, 1963)1 PP» 91-95
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say about those functional and operational means which 
contribute to the attainment of immediate governmental 
objectives? And, what does he hold is the specific 
purpose for which the State exists and toward which those 
in authority are obliged to work? The inquiry thus 
entails the ethical aspects of first discerning the 
essential principles that "should" determine the purpose 
of the political community; and, second, arriving at 
Ortega's basic standards according to which political 
action "ought" to be conducted.
Ortega recognized the importance of observing 
the actual format of social life in its particular his­
torical setting, and then seeing how it operates in terms 
of what the people believe are the ideal, philosophical 
ends. Every volume of the Qbras completas is filled with 
these observations. He is also aware that States violate 
in various degrees the purposes, expressed in terms of 
public opinion and beliefs, for which it, the "super­
lative of society," is brought into existence. For this 
reason, he uses the word archetype instead of ideal 
when speaking of States, and for that matter, politicians 
as well. The ideal is desirable, but not possible; and,
thus, the archetype is the highest possible form of 
19reality. 7 Ortega also recognizes that the State is
19. See his essay; "Mirabeau o el politico,"
Qbras completas, op. cit., Vol. Ill, especially p. 603.
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only an instrument in the life of a nation. The State,
therefore, is not to be considered as an absolute value,
for in history it is "the vitality of the nation that
20triumphs, not the formal perfection of the State."
And so, Ortega is aware i?iiat while some States have 
attained a close approximation to their purpose, others 
have made radical departures. His historical observations 
can only reveal what States in time and place have held 
and sought as their objectives, and what States have 
deviated. The political writings of Ortega, in this 
regard, do not reveal what he sees as the archetype or 
possibly even as the ideal. To find these answers, it 
is necessary to return to his basic philosophy.
The justification for this "dropping back" is in 
the significance of problem itself. Very careful con­
sideration must be given to the subject of State "pur-- 
pose," for what Ortega holds in this regard determines 
his views as to the "means" —  the functions and activi­
ties -- which the political community through its govern­
ment can utilize. The only approach to this issue, 
therefore, is through what Ortega believes are the natures 
of man and the body politic. There is, perhaps, no other 
question in political philosophy which is more dependent 
upon one's philosophy than that of the ultimate purpose
20. Ibid., p. 631.
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of civil society. It is, therefore, from the premises
established in previous sections that Ortega's view of
the ultimate objective of the State is arrived at; and
the method employed is that of comparing his concepts
with other prominent theories which have pertained to
the subject.
One of the theories relative to the purpose of
the State has been Anarchism. Defined ast
. . .  an attempt to establish justice (equality 
and recipocity) in all human relations by the 
complete elimination of the state (or by the 
greatest possible minimization of its activity) 
and its replacement by an entirely free and 
spontaneous cooperation among individuals, 
groups, regions and nations,21
anarchism further considers the State an instrument of 
domination and exploitation and human nature as essen­
tially good when uncorrupted by the political community 
and its established institutions. The State with its 
government must be abolished and replaced by some form 
of voluntary, noncoercive association. No person or 
group has the authority to rule over any individual 
against his will.
To Ortega, this theory is fundamentally defective 
in that it denies the necessity of any coercive organi­
zation in human society. The absence of such a power
21. 0. Jaszi, "Anarchism,1 Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1930-193577
Vol. II, p. 46.
results in chaos and disorder; and, in reality, anarchism
is un-historical for it reverts man to the primeval
22condition of the herd. As to the "goodness" of man's
nature, Ortega states that:
Man, in a word, has no nature, what he 
has is , . . history. Expressed differently* 
what nature is to things, history, res gestae, 
is to man.23
Thus, man in time, because the human factor is 
changeable, can and has been bad, better, and worse.
As a free being, he would continue to be whatever he 
decided.
Collectivism is another type of concept which 
has been concerned with the purpose of the State. 
Consisting of a number of theories grouped under this 
title, collectivism pertains to a trend in social develop­
ment that repudiates the laissez-faire practices of the 
nineteenth-century. In its extreme form, it advocates 
government intervention in the economic and social life 
of the community on a large, paternalistic scale.
Finding expression in the doctrines of Communism and 
Socialism, there are several varieties of each "ism" 
which differ in extent and degree of government control
22. Jose Ortega y Gasset, "Concerning Pacifism," 
trans. A. Pastor, The Nineteenth Century, Vol. 12^,
July, 1938, p. 33• Ortega calls anarchy the "superlative 
dissociation."
23. History as a System, op. cit., p. 217.
and ownership; in the means to accomplish those objectives 
and in the philosophical concepts which underlay the 
programs.
Communism, advocating state ownership of the 
means of production and equal distribution of wealth, 
is based on the concepts of dialectical materialism, 
historical determinism, and class struggle. The role 
of the State varies during the various stages of the 
communist process, but in the final phase, political 
government, class distinctions and human conflict dis­
appear. Ortega's opposition to this form of collectivism 
is consistent and relentless. He attacks it in his 
Invertebrate Spain, in European newspapers and in many 
of his lectures as an "essential retrogression," which 
is "anti-historic" and "anachronistic," -- the "monot­
onous repetition of the eternal revolution," that "de­
vours its own chil d r e n . A n d ,  in his essay on The 
Unity of Europe, Ortega describes it as one of the
situations of "frightful homogeneity" toward which the
2 f)world is sinking.
ZUr, George H. Sabine, A History of Political 
Theory (New York: Holt, 1953T» PP« 752-768.
25. Revolt of the Masses, op. cit., pp. 92-93.
See also: F. deCles, "Through Spanish Eyes: Two Spaniards
on Spain, I., Ortega on Bolshevism," Living Age, Vol. 3^» 
April, 1933» PP* 130-132, which is a partial translation 
from Neue Freie Presse, a Vienna liberal newspaper.
26. Jose Ortega y Gasset, "The Unity of Europe,"
Ortega's intellectual attack against communism, 
however, is by means of his principle of historical 
reason. First, the economic interpretation of history 
is applicable to only a given time; and, second, man's 
social classes have not always been economic classes.
But, what is the most presumptuous about communism is 
its totalitarian quality which forces man into a pre­
conceived form. This is in direct conflict with Ortega's 
principle of life as a thing in constant flux, and it 
denies the freedom of each human being constantly to 
search for his own destiny. Any type of collectivism 
which frustrates man in his quest is therefore, an arbi­
trary imposition upon human life which in the proper and 
original sense is "each individual's life seen from
27itself," and which is always "mine" and "personal."
At odds with Anarchism and Collectivism, Ortega 
also strikes out against Fascism. To the Spanish philos­
opher, nothing is more ridiculous than this theory which 
holds the State to be an absolute consciousness with a 
will and a personality of its own, for this is carrying 
the idolatry of the State to its ultimate pinnacle. The 
two characteristics which especially mark fascism, how-
trans. anon., The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 16?, April, 
19^1. P- ^33.
27. Man and People, op. cit., p. 58.
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ever, are "violence and illegitimacy." It is illegit­
imate —  "illegitimatist" —  paradoxically, in that it
not only obtains power illegitimately, but once in
29power, "it also exercises it illegitimately." 7 Violence, 
the consequence of illegitimacy, is not only the means 
of obtaining power, but once the regime is established, 
violence is continued as the only means of enforcing 
law. Violence is the essence of law and the law is 
violence! There is, therefore, no meaningful theory 
applicable to fascism, because its rationale is simply 
force. This "cult of the fait accompli" is a negative 
force and can be established successfully only upon the 
weaknesses of man.^
Hence, to Ortega, both collectivism and fascism 
are historical retrogressions back toward a form of 
primitivism. There is no hope for the world in these 
two "false dawns." To what theory, then, does Ortega's 
ideas of man, society, and the purpose of the State 
appeal? Certainly not to "Liberalism," for this also 
is associated with the past. If the task of the philos­
opher is "nothing else than an uncovering, a bringing 
to the surface, of what is lying in the depths," what
28. Invertebrate Spain, op. cit., p. 195*
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 199
11does Ortega reveal?^ Based upon what has been noted 
concerning his basic concepts, that "ism'1 which most 
corresponds to his ideas as to the purpose of the State 
is Individualism.
There are so many interpretations of this theory 
that it is difficult to reduce them all to a single 
common denominator. Perhaps a description in the broad­
est sense is one that holds that the welfare of the 
political community is best served by permitting each 
human being the widest scope of freedom consistent with 
the freedom and safety of its other members. The State 
—  government -- is restricted to the functions of main­
taining order and protecting each individual's freedom.
Its interference into various societal endeavors is 
kept to a minimum, or at least is denied any promotive 
functions. Not to be confused with the economic "lib­
erals" of the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries, nor 
with that of the biological-evolutionists of the last cen­
tury, Ortegan individualism advocates the highest level 
of possibilities for authentic existence within the 
specific time-place frame of the society. Since life 
is dynamic, so too must the State be as well. If the 
State becomes static, and if man becomes sated in that 
condition, he becomes, in effect, dehumanized -- this is
31. Revolt of the Masses, op. cit., p. 131.
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32man's "perpetual risk." Government is not to replace 
man, the basic unit of society, with a purpose of its 
own. Rather, its purpose is to provide that environment 
in which it is possible for each man to perform his 
particular functions in a way beneficial to himself —  
materially, socially, and intellectually. And, to do 
that which is the most conducive to free, human living, 
the political environment must be one of peace and .justice.
The good of society, the sum of personal goods, 
is undermined and weakened when injustice in any form 
exists. In a certain sense, "justice" is the "soul" 
of the political community for unless this characteristic 
permeates the State, its true end is perverted. Since the 
time of Aristotle, classical political theorists have 
distinguished between three kinds of justice» legal, 
distributive, and commutative. With the rise of the 
modern, nation State, a fourth type —  international -- 
was added. These distinctions correspond to the various
possible relations between man and his fellow human
33beings. But, Ortega gives his own meaning to justice,
32. Jose Ortega y Gasset, "The Self and Others," 
trans. Willard R. Trask, The Partisan Review, Vol. 19,
July, 1952, p. 399.
33* The relation of the individual to the State 
is regulated by "legal" justice; the relation of the State 
to the individual by "distributive" justice; the relation 
of individual to individual by "commutative" justice; 
and the relation of State to State by "international" 
justice.
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and as a part of man’s life that stood in the need of a
new revelation, Ortega states that*
. , . among the various ways in which we can 
behave to our neighbors our perception selects 
one in which it finds the special quality called 
“justice." The capacity for perceiving, for 
thinking justice, and preferring the just to the 
unjust is primarily a faculty with which the 
organism is endowed in order that it may promote 
its own peculiar and private convenience. If 
the sense of justice had been pernicious, or 
even superfluous, to the living being, it would 
have meant so heavy a biological burden that the 
human race would have succumbed.3^
Justice, according to the Spanish philosopher, therefore, 
comes into existence in the format of a convenience that 
is vital, but at first only in a subjective form. As 
such, “juristic sensibility" has no more value than one 
of man's biological functions. Once society has emerged 
from its primitive condition, the sentiments of man give 
way to necessity and justice. More than a "binding 
observance" or something comparable to a biological 
function, justice becomes a thing having the "irresist­
ible demand for its own existence" —  even though it can
be a negative pressure upon man and thereby become an 
35inconvenience.Apart from human sentiment and biological 
utility, justice acquires a value in itself —  it is a
34. Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Modern Theme, 
trans. James Cleugh (New York* Harper & Row^ 19^1)» 
pp. 4l- 42.
35. Ibid.
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"plenary sufficiency."
There is little doubt that the Ortegan concept 
of justice is predicated upon the strongest of bases, 
and its importance cannot be overemphasized. In his 
existentialist description of human life as the reality, 
as a unique adventure in the quest for authentic exist­
ence, the relevance of his concept to the role and func­
tions of government becomes very clear. Indeed, the 
very freedom of the human being is predicated upon jus­
tice. With ethics divorced from politics, it is justice 
that fills the ammoral void and protects man's individ­
ualism.
But, justice is not self-sufficient, nor is it 
a substantive thing. Just as personal rights and privi­
leges are not passive possessions and mere enjoyment,
justice represents a standard attained by personal 
effort.-^ In his essay entitled "The Self and Others," 
Ortega says:
Nothing that is substantive has been conferred 
upon man. He has to do it all for himself. . . . 
it is because of his effort, his toil, and his 
ideas he has succeeded in retrieving something 
from things, in transforming them, and creating 
around himself a margin of security which is
always limited but always or almost always
increasing.37
If man is to plan his attack against his circumstances,
36. Revolt of the Masses, op. cit., p. 64.
37* The Partisan Review, op. cit., p. 395*
139
if he is going to humanize the world, that political 
system is unjust which permits its citizens to be domi­
nated by things. Man has to govern things himself, he 
has to impose his particular will and design upon them, 
he has to realize his ideas in the outer world, and he 
has to shape the planet after the preference of his 
innermost being. To Ortega, this is not irresponsibility, 
but responsibility. Man's destiny is in action.^ He 
does not live to think (contrary to the Idealist and the 
Rationalist), but man thinks in order to survive. Man 
is never sure that he is able to carry out his thought 
and he is never sure that he is "right," but if he is 
to be more than an animal in a zoo, man must have the 
freedom of his actions. Justice is that "plenary suffi­
ciency" which enables man to put himself, not just to 
the service of his own being, but to the service of the 
world.
Beyond the existentialist task of merely describ­
ing concrete human existence, Ortega joins his thought 
with action in the human situation. His theories are 
not things in an Intellectual vacuum, but projections 
that are particularly adaptable to the present time. As 
one author notes:
38. Ibid. , p.
1^0
It is "the theme of our time," a time of crisis 
in which beliefs are being dissolved and in which 
new ideas are taking shape preparatory to becoming 
new beliefs to replace the old ones. This new 
theory of reality, to which Ortega gives expression 
in his philosophy . . . establishes once again a 
theoretic solution to the cleavage between man 
and his universe. . . .  39
Human affairs are not res stantes, but to Ortega they
were historical phenomena —  pure movement and perpetual
mutation. It follows, then, that law -- all the rules
of conduct established and enforced by the authority of
a given political community -- has to be dynamic as well.
If there is to be a liberation of human activity from
radical limitations, law cannot be static, for there is
no form of justice more arbitrary than that circumscribed
by the clause rebus sic stantibus. Traditional law has
been "a collection of rules for paralytic reality."^0
But, as historical reality changed all the time, it comes
"into violent conflict with the stability of law which
in
is a kind of strait jacket," And, as Ortega points out,
"a strait jacket put on a healthy man would certainly 
drive him raving mad." Law, therefore, must be dynamic 
if the political system is to avoid the unjustnesses of 
of a status quo; and this is also applicable to those
39* Leon Livingstone, "Ortega y Gasset*s Philo­
sophy of Art," PMLA, Vol. 67, Summer, 1952, p. 626.
0^. "Concerning Pacifism," og. cit., p. 2^ .
1*1. Ibid.
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rules regulating the relations between political societies,
42that is, international law.
Ortega's positions on the topics covered in this 
chapter never change. Beyond what has been covered and 
abstracted from his extant publications, however, little 
can be added. It is to the earnest credit of his intel­
lectual "integrity that up to his death in 1955» he
understands and yet refuses to cheer on those activities
43
whose increasing vogue would vindicate his theories."
To the civilized humanists —  Santayana, Whitehead,
Jordan, Northrop, Sorokin -- Ortega leaves a storehouse 
of ideas for projection, both philosophical and causal.
And, to the existentialists —  Jaspers, Hocking, Camus, 
Marcel, Sarte -- Ortega's legacy of thought is a virtual 
cornucopia. Whether or not Ortega would agree with the 
conclusions of any of these writers, however, remains a 
matter of conjecture. To a world of readers, opponents 
as well as advocates, what Ortega promises as an intro­
duction to a complete political philosophy remains just
42. Ibid.. p. 26.
43. Paul West, "Ortega and the Humanist Illusion," 
The Twentieth Century. Vol. 166, October, 1959» P» 244.
44. Eugene J. Meehan, Contempory Political Thought 
(Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey, 1967), p7 392, notes that
Jaspers and Marcel especially followed the tradition of 
Ortega. Of interest is that Jaspers supported a demo­
cratic form of government whereas Marcel advocated an 
aristocracy.
that. His Ideas and Beliefs which would, he states, 
treat with the concrete instrumentalities of the State 
was terminated by his death with only the introductory 
section completed.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study has been the presentation 
of Jose Ortega y Gasset's political thought within the 
context of a value theory. As such, attention was focused 
upon discerning his principles and norms applicable to 
human behavior and especially relevant to judging what 
was ethical, moral and just in political life. A logical 
integration of his ideas was sought through the use of 
the deductive approach. Following a biographical and 
bibliographical chapter familiarizing the reader with 
those aspects of the philosopher's life, succeeding 
chapters proceeded from Ortega's stated principles to 
their necessary conclusions. In a systematic and method­
ological format, the concepts examined were his; episte- 
mology; psychology of man and society; theory of the 
select minority; existentialism; and, finally, Ideas on 
the State and role of government.
Throughout those chapters, it was seen that a 
consistent line was drawn by the philosopher —  he refused 
to formalize his philosophical attitudes. Had Ortega 
institutionalized his principles, further study would
1^3
have been possible with reference to the form of govern­
ment advocated and its ramifications. And, Ortegan polit­
ical thought would have achieved the dimensions of a 
comprehensive political philosophy with his abstract 
principles being implemented in the concrete political 
order. To have ended the study with such an accomplish­
ment would have been the ideal for the cataloguer of 
political ideas. But, Ortega's philosophy does not 
permit the ideal conclusion. His political philosophy 
stands as incomplete; yet, in this position, it also 
remains inherently noncontradictory and perpetual in its 
appeal to researchers.
The explanation for this conclusion, and one 
that has been in evidence since the positing of Ortega's 
theory of knowledge, is that Ortega's philosophic thought 
is dynamic —  "the seed of Heraclitus grown full."
Passing through several phases of intellectual development, 
even making a surface deviation culminating in the Revolt 
of the Masses, there seems to be no constant philosophical 
mainstream coursing in his works. For all the multi­
faceted aspects of his writings, however, Ortega's ideas 
finally reveal their existentialist orientation. It 
is from this perspective that Ortega must be considered, 
albeit in some of his works the "ism" exists only 
as a deep under-current. The understanding, therefore, 
of the basis for his philosophy of "beings in constant
IMS
change” provides the key to much of what Ortega wrote and, 
indeed, why he refused to posit certain conclusions.
In a literary sense, Jose Ortega y Gasset the 
Existentialist, carries his readers along in situations 
comparable to those found in Cervantes' Don Quixote.
As if by design, the reader, in a series of Quixotic 
parallels, finds himself accompanying "Don” Ortega in 
his intellectual jousts against the forces seeking to 
dehumanize mankind. The reader also discovers that he 
often has been led, somewhat like the donkey after a 
carrot, by Ortegan promises of various intellectual 
rewards —  of "new revelations” -- in return for his 
academic endeavors. And, the reader in a final analysis 
might arrive at the conclusion that Ortega has not con­
ducted him to any philosophical "inns.” Rather, Ortega 
has carried him along and then left him to marvel only 
at the brilliant aspects of the literary journey. But, 
what of the vistas acquired as a result of one's Ortegan 
travels? Are they of enough value in themselves to have 
warranted the undertaking? Answers to this question 
depend upon why the philosopher is read, what he has to 
offer, sind the reader's own system of values. Contin­
gent upon the reader's purpose or position, Ortega can 
either infuriate, or he can impress his fellow-travelers.^
1. Paul West, "Ortega and the Humanist Illusion,” 
The Twentieth Century, Vol. 166, October, 1959» P* 2^1,
X'+O
Those infuriated by Ortega, to one degree or another, 
generally express the opinion that their study of his 
works leaves them with the "feeling of expectations 
unfulfilled." True, he broaches a wide range of contro­
versial topics in his writings, but there is no cohesive­
ness in his efforts and he comes to a halt too quickly 
without sufficient elaborations. In this regard, the 
researcher seeking a comprehensive political philosophy 
can discover that what he believed was an ideal effort 
is frustrated at the end. Other critics oppose their 
intellectual journey with Ortega even while the tour is 
in progress. They variously attack what is read as 
beings a relativistic dilettantism in metaphysics; a 
"sinister light" contributing to world horror by divorcing 
ethics from politics; an agnostic attack upon society's 
Christian foundations; and an irrational assault upon 
whatever "ism" the particular opponent of Ortega is 
trying to defend.
gives an in-depth discussion of these issues.
2. Christian Ceplecha, The Historical Thought of 
Jose Ortega £ Gasset (Washington: Catholic University
Press, 1958), p. 158, expresses this attitude after trying 
to discern a methodological system in Ortega's writings.
3. Jose Sanchez Villasenor, Ortega £ Gasset 
Existentialist 1 A Critical Study of His Thought and Its 
Sources, trans. Joseph Small (Chicago: Henry Regnery,
19^9)1 P« 232. This work by the Mexican Jesuit Villa­
senor attacks Ortega on the metaphysical and analytic 
planes. Villasenor's criticisms of Ortega are based upon 
Thomist-Scholastic philosophical principles.
This study, however, has not been undertaken to 
reach any critical conclusions. The motivation has been 
the writer*s belief that the Spanish philosopher has 
something to say worth the effort of reading. But, 
beyond the special interests of the writer, to whom are 
the writings of Ortega y Gasset of value? Who will find 
his political thought useful? In his broadest appeal, 
Ortega's works are meaningful to those having the concern 
that mankind is being dehumanized by the forces of modern 
civilization. If only negatively, Ortega provides biting 
criticisms against the rigid dogmas and political systems 
that seek to concretize human beings into predetermined 
categories, whether it takes the form of rationalism, 
scientism, or totalitarianism. There is little doubt 
that Ortega is a spokesman for the integrity of the human 
personality, and his maximum affinity is with those 
theories sharing a similar position. (See: Figure I,
p. 1*4-8).
To Anarchism in general, even though Ortega rejects
the theory, there is an appeal in the shared belief that
men join together in their labors because of a mutual 
A
self-interest. Man's joint endeavors must not be the
*4-. It is recalled that both the Anarchists and the 
Syndicalists in Spain had recourse to Ortega's writings 
in the 1920*s and early 1930's. Ortega denounced the 
groups because of their resort to violence and murder. 
Philosophically, Ortega held that the two groups were 
trying to affect ends that were "un-historical" and out
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* Oscar H. Ibele, Political Science: An Introduction
(Scrantoni Chandler, 1971)» p. 62. Ibele uses the diagram 
to illustrate the maximal and minimal roles of governmental 
activity in a clockwise fashion.
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result of any force by the coercive instrumentalities of 
the State. There is also a common opposition to this 
institution because of its inherent presumptiveness and 
interference which debases man's intellect and personality. 
The State is always an impediment to man's aspiration to 
live an "authentic" life. From without and within, Ortega 
and the anarchists are opposed to any association unless 
it is founded upon a non-compulsive and voluntary member­
ship. With Nihilism, Ortega has less affinity, for this 
broad anarchic negation repudiates all established ideas, 
institutions, practices, and standards. Yet, in accord 
with the nihilists, Ortega denounces all traditional 
abstract, logical, metaphysical, and speculative systems, 
as well as all orthodox religious beliefs. In their 
places are advocated, to a degree: emotionalism; hedon­
ism; humanism; and either deism or atheism. The inci­
dence of appeal increases between Ortega and Anarchism's 
Syndicalist and Guild Socialist positions. Of the two, 
Guild Socialism is most in agreement with Ortega's basic • 
political ideas. The State is retained, but only with 
the minimum of power and a small number of bureaucrats.
What is sought is the abolition of the stultifying monot­
ony of life and the exploitation of man caused by modern
of place in the twentieth-century. For a short description 
of the Spanish Anarchists and Syndicalists see: Hugh
Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper & Row,
1963)* PP. ^0-^ J-.
technology's mechanistic techniques of mass production.
In this regard, Ortega's concepts of man and society 
provide the Guild Socialists with arguments against what 
is seen as a rigid uniformity imposed by an economic- 
political coalition that destroys the human personality.
The second "ism" in the first quadrant of Figure 
I, Individualism, is divided into three subdivisions! 
Classical Liberalism; Classical Capitalism; and Conser­
vatism. Ortega's affinity with this group has been 
examined in Chapter VII, but more than advocating the 
principle of "the lest government is the best," the 
philosopher maintains that "the best government is that 
which promotes the most individual freedom." Thus,
Ortega is in agreement with Individualism's general 
attitude that the State should not be abolished, but 
the autonomy of the human person should be protected 
against governmental encroachments. Further, government 
should only protect its citizens, it must never determine, 
especially in matters of morals, public opinion, and 
religion. Ortega does not agree with Classical Liberal­
ism's principles of rationalism and empiricism, nor with
5. Oscar H. Ibele, Political Science t An Intro­
duction (Scranton; Chandler, 1971)» pp. 68-69* notes 
that; "The contemporary scene with its beatniks and 
hippies and with the rise of the New Left . . . betrays 
aspects of the older nihilism among some of its adherents. 
A number of youthful rebels have begun to criticize 'the 
Establishment.' . . . they seem to be in revolt against 
aspects of modern civilization which they believe tend
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its appeal to a "higher law." There is accord, however, 
on the autonomy of the individual and the concept of the 
State as a means rather than end. Also, there is a 
marked similarity in their belief in "voluntarism" —  
that society ought to be a series of voluntary acts.
This conviction common to Ortega and the Classical Liberals 
is that which makes it possible for man to live an authen­
tic life, have an originality of thought, and realize 
the ambitions of his ever-developing personality.
Additional examples of similarities between Ortega 
and the other types of Individualism could be given.
The increase of significant differences in philosophical 
foundations, however, would weaken the possible compari­
sons and make their logical association increasingly 
tenuous. What has been noted, for the most part, are 
the areas of closest accord and affinity which can be 
used by the various "isms" represented in the first 
quadrant of the diagram. This has been done, but, in 
making the comparison of ideas, an additional purpose 
has been served: the classification of Ortega*s politi­
cal thought. Based upon the incidences of agreement and 
disagreement, Ortega's ideas are neither expressly anar­
chistic, nor are they completely compatable with the
to force them into a mold of anonymity and facelessness, 
constituting a challenge to individuality."
traditional individualistic positions. Ortega's thought, 
in effect, overlapps Anarchism's maximal theory, Guild 
Socialism, and Individualism's minimal theory, Classical 
Liberalism.^ The conclusion, therefore, is that the 
philosopher's position is that of being in approximately 
the center of the diagram's first quadrant (Notei Shaded
n
area of Figure I).
Beyond this philosophical juxtaposing, the study 
of Ortega's political thought has a more important dimen­
sion. That which adds to Ortega's position among the 
philosophers of modern western civilization, accounts 
for his following, and explains the widespread attention 
given to his works, even by those hostile to his concepts 
is his evaluation of contemporary human conditions. In 
a lively and brilliant style, he describes and explains 
the situation of modern man and compares it with what 
he believes man's authentic existence should be. His
6. Ortega would and did criticize these "isms" as 
un-historical -- Guild Socialism for wanting to re-estab­
lish an economic system of the Middle-Ages, and Classical 
Liberalism for being a thing of the eighteenth and nine­
teenth-centuries. His major disagreement, however, is 
with the "natural law-natural rights" bases of Classical 
Liberalism. See* Jose Ortega y Gasset, "What Goes On," 
trans. anon, from El Sol. a Madrid Republican newspaper, 
The Living Age, Vol. August 3, 1933. P» ^99; and
Jose Ortega y Gasset, "The Unity of Europe," trans. anon. 
The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 16?, April, 19^1* P* ^36.
7. This is a conclusion significant in itself, for 
it conflicts with the opinions of several authors who, 
looking only at the surface of Ortega's writings of the 
"select minority" period, have been misled in placing 
him in the minimal area of Fascism.
±DJ
conclusion that man's situation stands in the need of 
correction does not include the means of affecting the 
correction; yet this omission does not destroy the in­
herent worth of his evaluation. For, a careful study of 
the questions raised by Ortega in his value discussions 
are of positive use. The aspects of social and political 
life that he examines are usually those neglected by 
researchers primarily concerned with only explanations.
In stressing the human aspects of man, Ortega's writings 
have merit, therefore, to the student of political science, 
sociology, and psychology.
Finally, Ortega and the other existentialists 
provide source material for those in political science
O
engaged in causal theory. In the belief that man's 
predicament is caused by the inadequacy of previous scien­
tific outlook, the collapse of rationalism, the deper­
sonalization of technology, and the collectivization of 
man, a concentration of criticism occurs. Focusing atten­
tion upon the human condition and its boundaries, Ortegan 
concepts contribute to those concerned with the formu­
lation of "organizational" theory.^ Describing this
8. David Easton, The Political System; An Inquiry 
into the State of Political Science (New York; Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1966), pp. 52-63, discusses the role of causal 
theory in political science.
9# To Ortega, one of the boundary conditions of 
the human situation is the historical fact of "being 
among others," and the mode of this societal relationship
± j ‘-r
school, Weinstein notes thatj
Organization theory constitutes a revolution in 
political thought in that traditional political 
theory distinguishes the state from other 
associations as the container of all social 
existence while in organization theory the state 
is seen as merely one of many organizations, 
performing functions that cannot be determined 
prior to observation.10
The association of Ortega with organization theory 
is thus through its consideration of "the bureaucratic 
social technology as a decisive aspect of the contempo­
rary public situation."11 In Ortegan terminology, the 
"bureaucratic apparatus" through which collective tasks 
are performed in industrialized societies, corresponds 
to the sub-societal units which are non-voluntary, 
oppose man's creative freedom, exploit his talents, and 
submerge his authentic existence. Clearly, this is one 
of the consequences of social and political life in the 
twentieth-century and it is a condition that Ortega 
denounces. It is also a subject that is being given 
closer examination by those who see a highly bureaucra­
tized State as a danger to all systems of representative
4- 12government.
10. Michael Weinstein, Philosophy, Theory and 
Method in Contemporary Political Thought (Glenview, 
Illinois« Scott, Foresman, 1971)» P* 152.
11. Ibid.
12. Seej David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel 
Denney, The Lonely Crowd (New Haveni Yale University Press, 
1961); William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man (Garden
J-JJ
The writings of Jose Ortega y Gasset thus have
their place in political philosophy, and, complete or
not, they achieve what the philosopher sought, for in
1933 he said*
It is not that I must think in black or white* on 
the contrary I do not believe that I am thinking 
politically at all yet at every instance I am 
searching for the truth of our time. . . .  he who 
wishes to live a sincere life must do likewise.^3
And, in 19^1 he added*
My work is the obscure, subterranean task of a 
miner. The job of the intellectual is . . .  to 
clarify things a little.
Ortega did think politically, search for the truth of 
our time, have a concern for mankind, and seek to under­
stand the human condition. Regardless of whether he 
convinces or antagonized his readers, he nevertheless 
challenges and provokes all to follow in their own quest 
for what is real and meaningful. In the drama of world 
politics expressed in conflicts between ethical systems 
of "ought to be," Ortega sweeps all established formats 
aside as contributing to man's inhumanity to man. Truth, 
relative to time and place, had to be used in the service
City, New York* Doubleday, 1957)? Herbert A. Simon, 
Administrative Behavior (New York* Macmillan, i960); 
and Herbert Kaufman, "Organization Theory and Political 
Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 58. 
March, 196k, pp^  5-1^•
13. "What Goes On," oj>. cit., p. ^99.
1^. "The Unity of Europe," ££. cit., p. ^38.
of life and not in its destruction. As long as there 
are those who share a similar belief, the concepts of 
the "Sage of the Escorlal" will continue to have an 
appeal.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
WORKS CITED
Ball, Howard., and Lauth, Thomas P. Jr., ed. Changing
Perspectives In Contemporary Political Analysis. 
Englewood Cliffs* Prentice-Hall, 1971.
Brecht, Arnold. Political Theory: The Foundations of
Twentieth-Century Political Thought. 3rd ed., 
Princeton* Princeton University Press, 1963*
Breisach, Ernst. Introduction to Modern Existentialism.
New York* Grove Press, 1962.
Ceplacha, Christian. The Historical Thought of Jose
Ortega £ Gasset * Washington* Catholic University 
Press, 1956.
Cuyas, Arturo. Appleton* s Revised Engllsh-Spanlsh and
Spanlsh-English Dictionary^ ^th ed., New York* 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956.
Easton, David. The Political System* An Inquiry into 
the State of Political Science. New York*
Alfred A. Knopf, 1966,
Gee, Wilson. Social Science Research Methods. New York* 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950.
Goals for Political Science. New York* William Sloane, 
1951.
Guralnik, David B., ed. Webster's New World Dictionary 
of the American Language. 2nd ed., New York* 
World, 1970.
Hallowell, John H. Main Currents in Modern Political 
Thought. 1st ed., New York* Holt, 1953*
Ibele, Oscar H. Political Science* An Introduction. 
Scranton* Chandler, 1971*
Iriarte-Agirrezabal, Joaquin. Ortega y Gasset, su persona 
Z SU doctrina. Madrid* A. Zuniga, 19^8.
157
158
Jaszi, 0. "Anarchism." Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences. Vol. II, New Yorks Macmillan, 1930- 
1935.
Levi-Strauss, Claude. Structural Anthropology. Garden 
City, New Yorks Doubleday, 1967.
Lucey, William Leo. Historys Methods and Interpretation. 
Worcesters Holy Cross University Press, 19^8.
Madariaga, Salvadore de. Spains A Modern History. 1st. 
ed., New Yorks Praeger, 1958.
Meehan, Eugene J. The Theory and Method of Political 
Analysis. Homewood, Illinoiss Dorsey, 1965*
Messner, J. Social Ethicss Natural Law in the Modern 
World. St. Louiss B. Herder, 1952.
Mora, Jose Ferrater. Ortega Gasset s An Outline of His 
Philosophy. New Havens Yale University Press, 
1957.
McDonald, Lee Cameron. Western Political Theorys The
Modern Age. 1st ed., New Yorks Harcourt, Brace 
& World, 1962.
McKeon, Richard, ed. Introduction to Aristotle. New Yorks 
Modern Library^ 19^7•
Murray, A. R. M. An Introduction to Political Philosophy. 
New Yorks The Philosophical Library, 1953*
Northup, George Tyler. An Introduction to Spanish
Literature. 3rd ed., Chicagos Chicago Univer­
sity Press, i960.
Oromi, Miguel. Ortega £ la fllosophias seis glosas. 
Madrids Esplandian, 1953.
Ortega y Gasset, Jose. Concord and Liberty, trans.
Helene Weyl. New Yorks W. W. Norton, 1963.
___________ History as a System and other Essays Toward
a Philosophy of History, trans. Helene Weyl.
New Yorks W. W. Norton, 1962.
■____ . Invertebrate Spain, trans. Mildred Adams.
New Yorks W. W. Norton, 1937*
~____ . Man and Crisis, trans. Mildred Adams. New
Yorks W. W. Norton, 1962.
________ « Man and People, trans. Willard R. Trask.
New York* W. W. Norton, 1963*
________ . Meditations on Quixote. "Introduction" and
"Notes" by Julian Marfas, trans. Evelyn Rugg and 
Diego Marin. New Yorkt W. W. Norton, 1963*
 _______ . Mission of the University, ed. and trans.
Howard Lee Nostrand. New Yorki W. W. Norton, 
1966.
________ . Obras completas. Ediciones De La Revista De
Occidente, 11 vols., Madrids Talleres Graficos 
de Ediciones Castilla, S. A., 1969*
________ . The Dehumanization of Art and Notes on the
Novel, trans. Helene Weyl. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 19^8.
________ . The Modern Theme. trans. James Cleugh. New
Yorks Harper & Row, 1961.
 ______. The Origin of Philosophy. trans. Toby Talbot.
New Yorks W. W. Norton, 1967.
________ . The Revolt of the Masses. trans. anon., New
Yorks W. W, Norton, 1957*
________ . What Is Philosophy, trans. Mildred Adams.
New Yorks W. W. Norton, i960.
Pilapil, Vincente R. Alfonso XIII. New Yorks Twayne, 
1969.
Riesman, David; Glazer, Nathan; and Denney, Reuel. The 
Lonely Crowd. New Havens Yale University 
Press, 1961.
Rubia Barcia, Jose, and Zeitlin, M. A., ed. Unamuno s
Creator and Creation. Berkley and Los Angeles s 
California University Press, 1967*
Sabine, George H. A History of Political Theory. 2nd 
ed., New Yorks Henry Holt, 1953*
Santayana, George. Reason in Society. New Yorks Mac- 
millan-Collier, 19^2.
Schmandt, Henry J. A History of Political Philosophy. 
Milwaukee: Bruce, 19^5.
Schmandt, Henry J., and Steinbicker Paul G. Fundamentals
X U  u
of Government. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1963*
Simon, Herbert A. Administrative Behavior. New York: 
Macmillan, i960.
Somit, Albert, and Tanenhaus, Joseph. The Development
of Political Science from Burgess to Behavloral- 
ism. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 19^7.
Storing, Herbert J., ed. Essays on the Scientific Study 
of Politics. New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1962.
Thomas, Hugh. The Spanish Civil War. New York: Harper
& Roxtf, 1963*
Uribe Garcia, Fernando. Jose Ortega £ Gasset, El Problema 
crltico. Bogota: Pontificia Universidad Cato-
lica Javeriana, 1950*
Villasenor, Jose Sanchez. Ortega £ Gasset Existentialist. 
trans. Joseph Small. Chicago: Henry Regnery,
19^9.
Wasby, Stephen L. Political Science: The Discipline and
Its Dimensions. New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1970.
Weinstein, Michael. Philosophy, Theory and Method in 
Contemporary Political Thought. Glenview, 
Illinois: Scott, Foresman, 1971*
Whyte, William H., Jr. The Organization Man. Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday, 1957*
ARTICLES CITED
Adams, Mildred. "Ortega y Gasset." Forum. Vol. 90. 
December 1933» PP* 373-378.
"A Great Doubter." Newsweek. Vol. E6. October 31»
1955, P. 92.
"Basic Human Standards." Time. Vol. 5^ * July 18, 19^9» 
pages 58 and 60.
Binsse, Harry Lorin. "A Selected Shelf." The Bookman. 
Vol. 75. September 1932, pp. 509-510.
Brinton, Crane. "Philosophy in Balance." The Saturday 
Review. Vol. 50* January 19^2, p. 5*
Campbell, Brenton. "Free Will^and Determinism in the 
Theory of Tragedy* Perez de Ayala and Ortega 
y Gasset." Hispanic Review. Vol. 37* July 
1969, PP. 375-382.
Catlin, George. "Political Theory* What Is It?" Political 
Science Quarterly. Vol. LXXIII. March 1957»
pp. 1-29.
Curtius, Ernst Robert. "Ortega." trans. Willard R.
Trask, Partisan Review. Vol. 17* March. 1950, 
pp. 259-271.
"Deaths* October 18, Jose Ortega y Gasset." Wilson 
Library Bulletin. Vol. 30. December 1955» 
p. 298.
DeCles, F. "Through Spanish Eyes* Ortega on Bolshevism."
Living Age. Vol. 344. April 1933, PP. 130-132.
Ebenstein, William. "Toward International Collaboration 
in Political Science." American Political 
Science Review. Vol. 42. December, 1948, p. 
1181-11931
Frank, Jerome. "Invitation tp Despair." Saturday Review. 
August 10, 1946, p. 10.
Giusso, Lorenzo. "Jose Ortega y Gasset." Living Age.
Vol. 34l. January 1932, pp. 421-425*
Glaser, William A. "The Types and Uses of Political
Theory." Social Research. Vol. 22. Autumn,
1955, PP. 275-292.
Guillen, Claudio. "On Reading Ortega." New Republic.
Vol. 138, March 10, 1958, pp. 19-21.
Hocking, William Ernest. "Marcel and the Ground Issues
of Metaphysics." Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research. Vol. 14. June, 195^7 p. 467.
"Intellectual's Horizon." Newsweek. Vol. 50. November 
18, 1957, pages 134 and 136.
Kaufman, Arnold S. "The Nature and Function of Political 
Theory." The Journal of Politics. Vol. LI.
January, 1954, PP* 5-22.
152
Kaufman, Herbert. "Organization Theory and Political 
Theory." American Political Science Review.
Vol. 58. March, 196 ,^ pp. 5“l4.
Krey, Laura. "What Wind." The Sewanee Review. Vol. 50.
January 19^2, pp. 103-105*
Levi, Albert William. "Shortest Route to Significance." 
Saturday Review. Vol. *i4. June 2^ , 1961,
pp. 15-16.
Livingstone, Leon. "Ortega y Gasset's Philosophy of 
Art." PMLA. Vol. 67. September 1952, pp. 
609-65 .^
McCloskey, Robert G. "American Political Thought and 
the Study of Politics." American Political 
Science Review. Vol. 51* March, 1957* PP. 
115-129.
Molnar, Thomas. "Ortega's Last Book." The Commonweal.
Vol. 67. March 21, 1958, pp. 6V^6^6.
Nosick, Martin. "Unamuno, Ortega, and Don Juan." The 
Romantic Review. Vol. ^-0, December 19^9,
pp. 268-274.
"Ortega's Dilemma." Wilson Bulletin. December 1936,
P. 257.
Ortega y Gasset, Jose. "Concerning Pacifism." trans.
A. Pastor. Nineteenth-Century. Vol. 12^.
July 1938, pp. 20-3^.
________ . "In Search of Goethe from Withim Letter
to a German." trans. Willard R. Trask. Partisan 
Review. Vol. XVI. December 19^9* PP. 1163-11&8.
________ . "Man Must Tame the Book." trans. Helen
Muller. Wilson Bulletin. Vol. X. January 
1936, pp. 305-307.
________ . "The Nature of Love" rev. George Pendle.
Living Age. Vol. 343. February 1933. PP* 522-530.
________ . "The Nature of the Novel." trans. fSvelyn
Rugg and Diego Marin. The Hudson Review. Vol. 8. 
Spring 1957. PP* 11-421
______. "The Price of Basques." Atlantic Monthly.
Vol. 207. January 1961, pp. 113-116.
J-UJ
_________• "The Self and the Other." trans. Willard R.
Trask. Partisan Review. Vol. XIX. July 1952*
p p .  392- w :
_________. "The Unity of Europe." Atlantlc Monthly.
Vol. 167. April 1941, PP. 432-442.
_________. "Time, Distance, and Form in Proust." trans.
Irving Singer. The Hudson Review. Vol. 11.
Winter 1958-1959, pp. 504-513.
_________. "What Goes On?" trans. from El Sol, Living
Age. Vol. 433. August 1933, PP* 496-560.
Pollock, James K. "The Primacy of Politics." American
Political Science Review. Vol. 45. March, 1951, 
P. 15.
"Return of the Native." Time. Vol. 53* January 17,
1949, PP. 44-46.
"Spain* Death of a Philosopher." Time. October 31,
1955, pages 22 and 25.
"Spanish Writing." Books Abroad. Vol. 27. 1953, PP.
123-124.
Smith, David G. "Political Science and Political Theory."
American Political Science Review. Vol. 51*
September, 1957, pp. 73^-74^u
"The Cynical Mourners." Nation. Vol. 181. December 
3, 1955. P. 470.
"The Duty of Acting Grandly." Time. Vol. 47. June 10, 
1946, pages 102 and lOT^
"The Menace of the 'Mass Man'." The Literary Digest.
Vol. 114. September 3, 1932, p. 22.
West, Paul. "Ortega and the Humanist Illusion." The 
Twent let h-Centur.y. Vol. 166. October 1959» 
pp. 241-247.
White, David. '|0ne of the Twelve* The Life and Thought 
of Jose Ortega y Gasset." Religion in Life.
Vol. 25. Spring 1956, pp. 247-258.
164
WORKS CONSULTED
Cohen, Raphael Morris. American Thought. New York* 
Macmillan-Collier. 1962.
Jackson, Gabriel. The Spanish Republic and the Civil 
War. Princetoni Princeton University Press.
T9S5.
Payne, Stanley G. Flange* A History of Spanish Fascism.
2nd ed. Stanford, California* Standford University 
Press. 1962.
Petrie, Charles. King Alfonso XIII and His Age. London* 
Chapman & Hall” 1963.
Vives, Jaime Vives. Approaches to the History of Spain.
trans. Joan Connelly Ullman. Berkeley* Cali­
fornia University Press. 19^7.
ARTICLES CONSULTED
Apter, David E. "Theory and the Study of Politics."
American Political Science Review. September, 
1957, PP. 747-762.
Boyd, Ernest. "Literature Abroad." Saturday Review. 
October 5, 1935, PP* 49-50.
Chase, Gilbert. "Spanish Diagnosis." Saturday Review. 
May 8, 1937, p. 7.
Cobban, Alfred. "The Decline of Political Theory."
Political Science Quarterly. September, 1953,
PP. 321-337.
Easton, David. "The Decline of Modern Political Theory." 
The Journal of Politics. Vol. 13. 1951,
pp. 36-58.
Hacker, Andrew. "Capital and Carbuncles* The 'Great
Book' Reappraised." September 195^, PP* 775-786.
Hallowell, John H. "Politics and Ethics." The American 
Political Science Review. Vol. 38. August 1944,
pp. 639-655.
165
Mora, Jose Ferrater. "Reviews: Ortega. I. Circunstancia 
y vocacion." Hispanic Review. pp. 3^2-3^3«
Newberry, Wilma. "Aesthetic Distance in Garcia Lorca's
'El Publico:' Pirandello and Ortega." Hispanic 
Review. April 1969, pp. 276-296.
"Ortega on America." Living Age. August 3. 1933• PP. 
551-553.
Ortega y Gasset, Jose. "On Point of View of the Arts." 
trans. Paul Snodgress and Joseph Frank,
Partisan Review. August 19^9» PP. 822-836.
Pennock, J. Roland. "Political Science and Political
Philosophy." American Political Science Review. 
December, 1951. PP. IO8I-IO85.
"Philosophy in Balance." Saturday Review. April 5. 19^1. 
P. 5.
Shaw, D. L. "A reply to 'Deshumanizacion' -- Boroja on 
the Art of the Novel," Hispanic Review. April 
1957. PP. 105-111.
"Universities and the 'Whole' Man." Saturday Review. 
December 23, 19*j4, p. 8.
Weber, Frances. "An Approach to Ortega's Idea of Culture: 
The Concept of Literary Genre." Hispanic 
Review. April 196 ,^ pp. 1^2-156.
E X A M I N A T I O N  A N D  THESIS KEi'OKT
Candidate: Wilmer Albert Sweetser
Major Field: Political Science
Title of Thesis: The Political Thought of Jose Ortega Y Gasset
Approved:
Major Professor and Chairman
' r .
Dean of the Graduate School
EXAMINING COMMITTEE:
l  J- ■^ICOUA-'IA AJHAjJL
Date of Examination:
October 10, 1972
VITA
Wilmer A. Sweetser was born in Mobile, Alabama, October 12, 1930.
He received his diploma in 1948 from McGill Institute, Mobile, Alabama.
He served in the U.S. Army on active duty from 1950-52; he graduated 
Magna cum laude in 1956 from Spring Hill College in Mobile where he re­
ceived the B.S., majoring in Political Science and minoring in History 
and Philosophy. In 1961 he received his M.A. from the University of 
Detroit in Political Theory. Before entering Louisiana State University 
in September 1964 to begin work on the Ph.D., he was Lecturer, Instructor 
and Assistant Professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile from 1956-1964; 
Teaching Fellow at the University of Detroit, 1956-57; Visiting Assistant 
Professor during the Summer of 1965 at the University of Alabama. During 
his years of study at Louisiana State University he was a Teaching Fellow 
and Visiting Assistant Professor. Since 1970 he has been Assistant Pro­
fessor and Acting Chairman of the Department of Political Science at 
Southwestern at Memphis.
